Confronting 'meaningless' suffering : from suffering-as-insult to suffering-as-ontological-impertinence by Nelson, Sally
Confronting ‘meaningless’ suffering:                         
from suffering-as-insult to                                    
suffering-as-ontological-impertinence 
 
A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester                            
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy                                                     























Abstract          7 
Declaration and Copyright Statement       8 
Acknowledgements         9 
Introduction         10 
The 20th century watershed        10 
The key questions         12 
Seeking a way forward         13 
Chapter 1: The context of suffering and death    15 
1.1 Crossing the cultural divide: the experience of dying    15 
1.2 Richard Dawkins, neo-Darwinism, and the ‘two cultures’    20 
1.3 Problems with reductionism       23 
1.3.1 A brief historical diversion       23 
1.3.2 Unpacking the problems of reductionism     25 
1.3.2(a) Secularisation       25 
1.3.2(b) Complexity and simplicity     28 
1.3.2(c) The loss of meaning and the loss of God    30 
1.4 Theological responses to the two cultures      31 
1.4.1 Opposition        32 
1.4.2 Separation        33 
1.4.3 Engagement        34 
1.5 Key issues for a study of the embrace of suffering and death   35 
1.5.1 The question of suffering       35 
1.5.2 The human person       36 




Chapter 2: God and the world       39 
2.1 Materialism and European culture       39 
2.1.1 Pervasive materialist-reductionist thought     39 
2.1.2 The significant historical development of monotheism   43 
2.1.3 Issues for classical apologetics when dealing with suffering   45 
2.2 Some possibilities in process theology      47 
2.2.1 Process thought and apologetic issues relevant to suffering   49 
2.2.1(a)The question of intervention     49 
2.2.1(b) The question of foreknowledge     51 
2.2.1(c) The question of omnipotence     53 
2.2.1(d) The question of change in God     54 
2.2.1(e) The question of ultimacy     55 
2.2.1(f) The question of incarnation and salvation   56 
2.3 The power of suffering        57 
2.3.1 Suffering and the cross       59 
2.3.1(a)The crucifixion and the Trinity     59 
2.3.1(b) The historical cross and universal suffering   62 
2.3.1(c) Suffering and the free creation       64 
Chapter 3: Who dies? The place of the person    70 
3.1 The material person        70 
3.1.1 The problem of defining the ‘self’      72 
3.1.2 Theological background: the God−world relationship    75 
3.1.3 Social and biological concepts of death     78 
3.1.4 The person fragmented by dualism     82 




3.2  A way forward: the dialogical person      88 
3.2.1 Overview of McFadyen’s personhood     89 
3.2.2 How is a self identified dialogically?     91 
3.2.3 The death of the dialogical self      92 
3.3 Enhancing the model of the dialogical person     94 
3.3.1 The vertical dimension/the transcendent     96 
3.3.2 Dealing with dualism       96 
3.3.3 The use of narrative       97 
3.3.4 Problems with power       98 
3.3.5 Existential longing        98 
Chapter 4: Narrative and transcendent experience   100 
4.1 Narrative selves and postmodernism      102 
4.1.1 The lost transcendent dimension      103 
4.1.2 The return of the story       104 
4.1.3 Internal and external stories: harnessing the transcendent   105 
4.2 Characteristic paradigms of narrative      109 
4.2.1 The universal desire for coherence in a life story    110 
4.2.2 The universal identification of beginnings and endings   112 
4.2.3 The universal need to participate      114 
4.2.4 Interim summary of argument      116 
4.3 Narrative and process thought: natural partners?     117 
4.3.1 The sense of a journey or story that is also coherent   118 
4.3.2 The implications of relationality      119 
4.3.2(a) Contingency       120 




Chapter 5: Resituating suffering      123 
5.1 The matter of meaningless suffering      123 
5.2 A narrative possibility        126 
5.2.1 The metaphorical nature of narrative     127 
5.2.2 The temporality of narrative      130 
5.2.3 The holistic nature of narrative meaning     132 
5.2.4 Narrative truth or narrative fiction?     133 
5.2.5 The reflexive narrative self       135 
5.2.5(a) The suffering person understood as a creator of meaning 135 
5.2.5(b)The suffering person understood as signification   137 
5.3 Suffering understood as liminal temporality     139 
5.3.1 Liminal experience       139 
5.3.2 Liminality and transcendence      142 
5.3.3 Liminality and suffering: the place of pilgrimage    144 
5.3.4 Liminality and temporality       147 
5.4 Suffering: the central human experience?      148 
5.4.1 Mute shock stage        149 
5.4.2 Articulation (lament) stage      151 
5.4.3 Transformation stage       152 
5.5 Blame and lament: the ontological impertinence of suffering and the story of Jesus 154 
5.5.1 The ontological impertinence of the passion    156 
5.5.2 The ontological impertinence of the resurrection    159 
5.5.3 The ontological impertinence of personhood    160 




Chapter 6: Conclusion − meaningful suffering as ‘ontological    165                                            
impertinence’ 
6.1 Job’s suffering: the ancient story illuminates the modern problem   165 
6.2 The modern pastoral problem: ‘Why me?’      168 
6.3 The underlying worldviews        169 
6.4 Contemporary responses to suffering      173 
6.5 Key features of a framework for thinking about suffering as meaningful  174 
6.5.1 Transcendent experience as a challenge to materialism   174 
6.5.2 Creativity and change as a challenge to unchanging perfection  175 
6.6 Metaphor, metanoia and ontological impertinence     177 
6.7 Pastoral practice         181 
6.7.1 Practical application       181 
6.7.2 A warning: meaning or signification?     183 
Bibliography           185 
 
 















The University of Manchester 
Sally Nelson 
Doctor of Philosophy 




From the personal contemporary pastoral experience of caring for dying people, and 
with particular attention given to the psychospiritual anguish often associated with the 
perceived failure of death,  I argue that suffering is primarily identified in the modern 
West as an insult to normality, expressed in various forms of the question: ‘Why me?’. 
I challenge this view of ‘suffering as insult’ by selectively identifying and critiquing 
some culturally embedded views of the nature of reality, taking note of the influence 
on suffering persons of the dialogue between science and faith in the UK, and by 
introducing dialogue with the process thought of Whitehead as an alternative to 
traditional theistic models of God.  Such a dialogue also affects the nature of the 
person conceived in imago dei, and so I examine the effect of replacing the rational 
autonomous individual with the dialogical personhood of McFadyen.  I then consider 
the rehabilitation of suffering as a key experience of metanoia in the formation of the 
person.  Finally I reflect on suffering in postmodernity in the light of Ricoeur’s 
hypothesis that reality is narrative in form, and develop the argument that suffering 
can be understood as an ‘ontological impertinence’, analogous to the ‘semantic 
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Why is light given to one in misery, and life to the bitter in soul? (Job 3: 20, NRSV)  
As a hospice chaplain I became part of a group of professionals who adopted a fascinating and 
eclectic practice with patients in extremis.  We were not afraid to ‘spoil the Egyptians’ and 
make use of ideas from sociology, psychology, and spirituality of all kinds. These methods were 
often very effective in helping people to live with their suffering, but, thinking as a Christian 
pastor, were they adequately theologically underpinned?  This thesis is part of the search for a 
pastoral theology of suffering that really fitted the people I met every day, who for the most 
part knew little about the Christian God and yet asked me constantly the deeply theological 
question, ‘Why me?’, expecting me to be able to offer some answers.  Broader reflection 
shows that this anxious question is not in fact confined to the hospice but applies to all people 
who find themselves isolated and confused by the struggle with suffering in a success-focused 
late modern culture.    
  
The  20thcentury watershed 
My first step requires the pastoral question to be located. In Chapter 1 I have surveyed the 
‘landscape’ in which we suffer and die, noting that one of the highly significant factors that led 
to the development of the modern hospice movement is that people who are terminally ill do 
not ‘fit’ anywhere. Hospitals are places of cure, and the terminally ill are beyond cure. Normal 
society struggles to ‘do’ death, and the terminally ill are not able to be ‘normal’. Dame Cicely 
Saunders, who founded the first modern hospice, describes this attitude as people ‘crossing 
the road’ to avoid the embarrassing encounter with death – literally, avoiding the terminally ill. 
While death has rarely been a welcome friend in any era, there would in earlier centuries have 
been a stoicism about it that has disappeared, in a culture that currently offers multiple 
opportunities for the evasion of the reality of mortality. Not only is our culture predicated 
upon achievement, success, and fulfilment, but medicine offers us opportunities to ‘cheat’ and 
postpone death in ways that our forebears could never have envisaged. 
In spite of this post-Enlightenment optimism, however, the reality is that we do still die 
eventually; and we do still suffer along the way, whether mentally, physically, or 
psychologically.  We still need a worldview that can help us when the material promise of the 
post-Enlightenment world fails. I have described this in Chapter 1 as a crisis place between the 
‘cultures’, in which the suffering and dying person finds him/herself: a crisis place in which the 
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solutions offered are material ones, but the problem exists in the transcendent space, and 
encompasses questions such as: What makes a person? What is spirit? What cannot be 
empirically rationalised? The crisis place is not, however, the simple antagonism between 
science and faith that is often presumed.  The pain of the suffering and dying person is 
exacerbated by the continuing expectation that a philosophical materialism is a sufficient 
worldview, because that person – often understood as the rational autonomous individual − 
can neither articulate nor address his/her pain solely in a material dimension.  The popularity 
of the books of Richard Dawkins, for example, suggests that many people do accede to an 
underlying reductionism and materialism, but the truth is that there have been enormous 
shifts in science and philosophy, especially during the 20th century, that have deposed the 
Newtonian view of the world from its dominant status. A Newtonian model is often acceptable 
for practical purposes but it is not sufficient or adequate for the totality of human being. 
Rather than the antagonism that is often popularly assumed, it might be more helpful to 
understand theology and science as helping one another to develop and mature. The picture is 
far from simple. The superstition of the pre-Newtonian world was replaced by a period of 
technological and industrial development in which religion came increasingly under pressure.  
Some see Kant, the great Enlightenment philosopher, as a single-minded advocate of reason to 
the detriment of religious faith; yet in fact Kant did have religious concerns (see the useful 
book by Anderson & Bell, Kant and Theology) and indeed, religion is only irrational under 
certain metaphysical presuppositions (ie that we can only work meaningfully and truthfully 
with empirical facts).  
The influence of Hegel on western philosophy has similarly been enormous and enduring, and 
his thought undergirds some of the watershed mentioned above. Hegel was concerned during 
his life in the 19th century about the moral and religious disintegration of western culture. He 
believed that there was no real division between philosophy and theology if they addressed a 
single ‘absolute’. His work was encyclopaedic and complex, but included the important ideas 
that (i) reason (beloved of the Enlightenment) can be understood as absolute Spirit and thus 
directs us to an ultimate and singular reality; and (ii) that reality itself has a dynamic and 
relational character (often described as dialectic). These two ideas were and are hugely 
influential and have been of fundamental importance in the journey of western culture to 
where it is today. They are also vital tools in thinking about the hidden ‘crisis issues’ of the 
suffering person to which I refer above.  
 Other significant figures include Darwin, whose work was a serious challenge to the religious 
fatalism and escapism of Victorian Britain, and after whom hermeneutics could never be the 
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same again; Marx, who applied reason and dialectic to economic policy and generated an 
atheistic apologetics that still influences the western world; and Einstein, whose theory of 
relativity was a true paradigm shift that surely could not have occurred without these earlier 
foundational steps in thinking about the nature of reality.  
This overview of the watershed of 20th century thought is very rough and broad but indicates 
the basis for some key aspects of our 21st century embedded worldview. We live with a 
working dependence on technology that seems to make sense within a Newtonian view of the 
world. Because it is successful, we apply it indiscriminately to other aspects of life. C. P. Snow’s 
critique of the ‘two cultures’ is still significant in that many of our policy makers are poorly 
educated in science, misunderstand its limitations, and therefore do not engage creatively 
with a non-material worldview.  However, science has in fact moved on.  We can search for a 
view of reality that is less unhelpfully dualistic and which does not dismiss religious faith as 
irrational. That is why Whitehead’s process thought has been such a helpful dialogue partner 
in this study.  I use process thought as a ‘narrative tool’ with which to question the unhelpful 
embedded materialism that prevents modern westerners from accessing the transcendent 
dimensions of human experience. I am not undertaking a process analysis of the human 
person but I am using key shapes from process thought – its dynamism, its transience, its 
openness to future possibilities; its commitment to a single reality; its sense of ‘God with us’ – 
as metaphors for aspects of reality. I have not dialogued explicitly, for example, with 
Whitehead’s idea of God’s dipolar character. I am aware that this method opens the argument 
to specific criticisms, but I want to hold fast to my convictions about the value of narrative and 
metaphor in the description of reality: that we look for a shape, a sense, a pattern, which is 
just as valid as an empirical assessment in the total experience of being alive in this world.    
 
The key questions 
In considering this question, ‘Why me?’, with regard to suffering, I have identified three key 
areas of discussion. 
(i) The nature of the embedded worldview that underlies the question. When we say ‘Why?’, 
that is essentially a question about the nature of reality; as a consequence it also indicates the 
character of the crisis in which the sufferer finds him/herself, by focusing on what does not 
‘fit’. I have discussed the context of the ‘Why me?’ question in Chapter 1, which leads naturally 
to the content of Chapter 2, in which the nature of the God−world relationship and the 
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possibilities of using some process ideas as a response to reductionism and materialism are 
explored. 
(ii) The nature of the human person – the way in which we understand what ‘makes’ a person 
is crucial, because we are dealing with matters of value, purpose and meaning when we say 
‘Why me?’. The prevailing cultural idolatry around the idea of independence reflects our 
underlying commitment to autonomy; while our capitulation to rationality and materialism 
undercuts the spiritual and transcendent dimensions of being that are essential if we are to 
address our human existential pain.  In Chapter 3 I have interacted with McFadyen’s model of 
the dialogical person as a basis for understanding the human being in this thesis.  I like 
McFadyen’s model because it is dynamic, not static; relational, not individual; it can 
comfortably accommodate a variety of process insights (although McFadyen did not intend it 
to do so); and it also has a narrative shape (see (iii) below).  
(iii) The importance of narrative structures in human life. Narrative therapy was observed to be 
extremely effective in the hospice in helping patients to incorporate their suffering and loss 
into their lives and to live more contentedly with it (not necessarily to understand it).  Ricoeur 
has to be one of the finest exponents of narrative theory in the late 20th century and his view 
that reality is narrative in shape is an effective way of mediating between (i) the nature of the 
God−world relationship and (ii) the nature of the person.   
 
Seeking a way forward 
Having set in context and broken down the pastoral problem, I then dialogue extensively with 
narrative ideas. In Chapter 4 I suggest some examples of the practical therapeutic use of 
narrative in songs and other mementi mori and outline the recovery of interest in storytelling 
in the late 20th century. Narrative offers a way of linking the transcendent and the everyday 
and it is also the natural desire of the person to tell his/her story and to find in it a coherence 
that ‘makes sense’ of the life it represents.  Narrative also ‘fits’ a process model and the two 
can be happily used together. 
With this threefold foundation of narrative, relational personhood, and process thought in 
place, I move on in Chapter 5 to a fuller dialogue with Ricoeur’s narrative approach, 
particularly the material in The rule of metaphor and the three-volume Time and narrative. I 
am interested in the temporal nature of narrative, since the extension over time of suffering is 
extremely important.  I also develop in this chapter my main thesis: that if narrative is credibly 
a basic pattern of reality, then perhaps we can use the idea of Ricoeur’s ‘semantic 
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impertinence’, which he discusses in the context of the role of metaphor in a sentence, as a 
paradigm for the effect of suffering in the narrative of life.  Thus I identify suffering as an 
‘ontological impertinence’ which, like metaphor, causes us to stop and re-evaluate meaning – 
but in this new case, we re-evaluate the meaning, purpose and significance of life, not just the 
word in the sentence. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, in which I consolidate the application of ontological impertinence, I also 
consider the two archetypal stories of suffering in the Bible: the book of Job; and the passion 
of Christ.  In these two stories I can identify the characteristics of ontological impertinence. If 
we are made in imago dei, then these stories are patterns, suggestions, on which we can 
model our own lives. They do not offer explanation, in the scientific sense; nor is this strictly a 
theodicy, for God is not exonerated (though neither is God blamed): but the idea of ontological 
impertinence dismisses the suggestion that suffering may have no meaning, which so degrades 
the person who is enduring it.   
 
The key argument of this thesis is that there is no ‘meaningless’ suffering,1 but rather, 
suffering has the character of ‘ontological impertinence’ and is (a) the primary vehicle for 
metanoia or personal transformation; and (b) the intrinsic mark of personhood in the image 
of Christ. I hope that in believing that the suffering of those I care for in the pastorate has a 
meaning, I can restore value and hope to their condition – and to my own.   









                                                          
1
 Not everyone will be comfortable with the idea that all suffering has meaning. See fn 550 and the main 
text of Chapter 6 for a fuller argument. 
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Chapter 1. The context of suffering and death   
Only a few years will pass before I go on the journey of no return (Job 16:22, NIV) 
 
1.1 Crossing the cultural divide: the experience of dying 
The modern hospice movement in the UK was founded by Cicely Saunders in the 1950s to 
allow dying people the dignity of being able to integrate the whole experience of life and 
death.2 Saunders’ personal experience in social work and medicine during the mid-20th century 
had led her to a disturbing conclusion: that dying was often an experience that isolated and 
dehumanised the terminally ill at a time when support and affirmation were desperately 
needed. Over 50 years on, hospices providing this kind of supportive environment at the end 
of life now constitute a highly successful, although under-resourced, section of the charity 
sector3 in this country and overseas, yet, in spite of the growth of the hospice movement, 
terminal illness remains outside mainstream consciousness and the discussion of death is still 
difficult in western cultures.4  I think it is also true to say that the discussion of suffering in 
general, of which terminal illness is a particular category, is discouraged. In this chapter I will 
consider some possible reasons for this avoidance of suffering and for the existential crisis that 
is undergone by those who do suffer. I will argue that the western tendency to reductionism 
and materialism struggles with the allocation of meaning to suffering because of an 
impoverished grasp of the transcendent aspects of human life, and question the presumed 
antagonism between science and faith that lies in the background.     
Sociologists and anthropologists have explored the reasons why the modern taboo around 
death should exist.5 Although the background is complex, there is a general cohesion of views 
that death − except perhaps for elderly and infirm persons − is perceived to be a failure. It is a 
                                                          
2
 See, for example, Saunders & Baines, Living with dying: the management of terminal disease, p1. ‘The 
aim of the treatment of terminal disease is more than the absence of symptoms, it is that the patient 
and his family should live to the limits of their potential’. See also Saunders’ books, Beyond the horizon 
and Watch with me for more on her philosophy of terminal care.  Useful material can also be found in 
Murray, Faith in hospices. 
3
 I think it is significant, when thinking about our cultural perception of death, that in a market economy 
based upon success it is primarily the charity sector that has invested in the terminally ill. Rohr (with 
Feister) mentions the ‘market mind’ in which everything is for sale, in his discussion of postmodern 
culture in the book, Hope against darkness, p 7. 
4
 Gorer, The pornography of death, first published in Encounter, October 1955 and reprinted in Death, 
grief and mourning, appendix 4.  
5
 See, for example, McNamara, Fragile lives: death, dying and care; Walter, The revival of death; Walter, 
The eclipse of eternity; Kellehear, A social history of dying; Kellehear (ed), The study of dying. More 
discussion of ‘modern’ death can be found, for example, in Anderson, Attending the dying, Brown, The 
living end, Clark (ed) The sociology of death.  
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failure of modern medicine; a failure of social and economic participation; and a failure of the 
hopes and expression of the autonomous self. On the basis of her observations among dying 
persons, Saunders comments: ‘Loss of love, of freedom, of abilities, of self-respect and peace 
of mind are all forms of suffering that assail us in sickness and bereavement. We look back on 
the past and what has gone; we wake each day in a bleak present and we look ahead in fear or 
apprehension’.6  
Such observations have philosophical justification: death is a source of existential pain because 
it acts as a constant reminder of our inability to tell the whole stories of our lives – and 
reminds us of our mortal limitations.7  Martin Heidegger notes the way in which people try to 
comfort someone who is dying by telling him or her that s/he will escape death, effectively 
evading the reality of that person’s impending non-being (definitely a failure in our culture of 
self-fulfilment). He says that publicly we are compelled to distance death from ourselves; to 
‘tranquillise’ our minds: ‘The public interpretation of Da-sein says that “one dies” because in 
this way everybody can convince him/herself that in no case is it I myself, for this one is no 
one. “Dying” is levelled down to an event which does concern Da-sein, but which belongs to no 
one in particular’.8 Paul Fiddes comments that ‘We are unable to bring our past, present and 
future into a whole. We cannot integrate our present with our past because we either regret 
the loss of the past in nostalgia, or we try to obliterate our memory of it in guilt. We cannot 
integrate our future with our present, because we either try to escape into it in wish-fulfilment 
dreams, or feel threatened by it. Most acutely, suffering defeats us because we cannot unify 
our time; suffering overwhelms us because we cannot live with our past or face our future. If 
we were whole in time we would not be broken in our personalities by suffering’.9       
In recognising the existence of what she uniquely termed ‘total pain’,10 Saunders was 
intuitively responding to a deeper clash of worldviews in British society, of which the 
experience of dying was (and is) one aspect. On one side stood the reductionist and materialist 
scientific approach that had empowered rapid technological progress and which increasingly 
underpinned daily life in modern times; on the other, a vestigial religious belief struggled to 
hold its ground. Dying was not accommodated well within the dominant materialist worldview, 
but an alternative ‘religious’ interpretation was not − and still is not − perceived to be 
                                                          
6
 Saunders, Beyond the horizon, p1. 
7
 Cavarero reflects on our desire to tell our stories as a basic human characteristic (with a particular 
emphasis on feminist issues) in Relating narratives, discussed further in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
8
 Heidegger, Being and time, p 234-5. Da-sein is translated roughly as ‘being’ or ‘existence’ (see his p 5).  
9
 Fiddes, The creative suffering of God, p 103. 
10
 The phrase ‘total pain’ expresses the all-consuming nature of some pain. It has physical, emotional, 
social and spiritual components. See Saunders & Baines, Living with dying, p13. 
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compatible with an authentic scientific framework.11 This clash created a tension for the dying 
person who struggled to locate his/her experience meaningfully – and still does so.  
Since Saunders founded the hospice movement, British culture has continued to evolve rapidly 
and is now often described as postmodern12 – a reaction to the unachievable optimism of 
modernism, leading to deconstruction and a loss of faith in the big picture. Loughlin13 
describes postmodernism (with reference to Lyotard) as ‘what happens when master stories 
lose their appeal and become incredible’.  Some of the many possible ‘markers’ of 
postmodernism of relevance to this study are the perceived individualisation of meaning, the 
erosion of traditional locations of authority, and the rehabilitation of spirituality. These 
developments have led to a greater recognition of the importance of spirituality in healthcare 
settings generally, and to a partial loss of the 20th century authority of the scientific endeavour 
in the light of current environmental and medical issues. Together these changes might at first 
be supposed to alleviate the psychological tension and spiritual pain of the experience of 
dying. However, numerous pastoral encounters14 demonstrate the continuing enormous 
difficulties with which people are reconciled to their mortality – and, indeed, to the process of 
living life as it actually is, rather than as we might hope it to be. People with or without 
religious faith are struggling with the big questions of suffering, evil, and death.  
Even within the Christian community these big questions are often avoided within the normal 
devotional life of individuals, until circumstances change and something traumatic has to be 
faced and somehow incorporated into one’s belief system. With this particular community (as 
with other faith groups) it is of course still possible to draw upon a ‘grand narrative’ or 
‘metanarrative’ – a ‘big’ story or worldview that makes sense of the world as it is. Christians 
should be able to understand the biblical accounts of the life of Christ and his context as 
paradigmatic of life generally, and can explore what it means in practice to hold the belief that 
Jesus, the second person of the Trinity, represents perfect humanity and personhood but 
nevertheless experiences an actual human existence that includes profound pain, suffering 
and rejection, and ultimately an unjust death. It is useful to note that this illumination or 
                                                          
11
 See, for example, McNamara, Fragile lives, chap 4. 
12
 See, for example, Lyon, Postmodernity, for an overall discussion. The Brill Dictionary of Religion speaks 
of postmodernism as ‘plurality-friendly opportunity’ with a spectrum of approaches but in particular, 
modernism ‘with its “technological superiority complex,” is said to have conjured up an ecological crisis 
too, and therefore to be in need of complementation in the form of a postmodern era of nature 
mysticism’. Von Stuckrad (ed), Brill dictionary of religion, vol III, p 1479. 
13
 Loughlin, Telling God’s story, p 9. 
14
 Personal conversations with patients, 2003−2006. 
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‘meaning’ of life and death is not deduced from scripture: rather, it is inferred.15 I will return to 
the importance of this point about meaning in Chapter 5 in the discussion of narrative and 
reality.  
When we speak of a Christian metanarrative, we are also making implicit assertions about the 
nature of scripture. We are talking of parable, story and metaphor, of the precious ‘is and is 
not’ quality of the text that allows it to live and remain meaningful in a diachronic and 
crosscultural manner.16 A particular problem for modern cultures that have been deeply 
impacted by reductionist analysis is the loss of the communal ability to use and understand 
metaphorical, non-concrete, story-like forms of explanation, which are open to a range of 
interpretations and do not close off alternative meanings.17 There exists culturally a perceived 
difference between ‘form’ and ‘content’ (or between the expression of truth and truth itself), 
and a belief that truth is ‘correctly’ expressed in terms of abstract logical argument,18 although 
experientially we know that life does not fit into such categories of explanation.  Mary Hesse, 
discussing the presumed authority of science in contemporary culture, notes: ‘There is a 
contrast of mathematical, impersonal order, which is the only context given to the concept of 
God, with the messy, dynamic, contingent and accidental history of the universe and 
humankind, which apparently has no place for God’. 19 John Cottingham argues that the 
austerity of contemporary ‘scientific’ discourse has its place when we are 
‘confronting...particles in the void, or molecules in a test tube’, but when dealing with real life 
it is ‘plainly misguided’. He notes that even philosophy has narrowed its horizons to focus on 
the immanent and descriptive; it is ‘modest in its ambitions’ and can be described as 
‘postmetaphysical’ (quoting Habermas).20 Philip Hefner observes that much scientific 
argument about the person ‘leapfrogs directly from physics, biology, genetics, and 
neurobiology, right over culture, to make judgements about the human mind and the 
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behaviour it organizes...’ but continues to argue that, in contrast, personhood ‘is defined in its 
intercourse with the challenges it must face’ − ie it is messy, mulitfactorial, and open-ended.21   
Life cannot be reduced to its parts.  When we are unable to validate the ‘messy’ experience (of 
disaster, death, or loss) by rational explanation within the dominant materialist-reductionist 
framework, then the suffering experience becomes an excluding and isolating one of failure 
rather than being understood as a season of life.      
Reductionism, often wrongly identified exclusively with scientific method, has become so 
deeply embedded in the cultural psyche that it is difficult to think in a different way about 
understanding the world, yet Hesse warns that to use empirical scientific methods and 
language to evaluate the traditions and beliefs of religion is to start in the wrong place. She 
identifies the ‘metaphorical and mythical language of religion *as+ perhaps nowadays the most 
intractable stumbling-block in the confrontation between science and religion’,22 adding that 
the perceived use of religion to support abusive social power structures is another issue 
(although not in fact one to which science is immune). Colin Gunton supports the theory about 
language, saying that ‘*t+he underlying approach is still that utterly clear and distinct ideas are 
more suited to tell the way things are than that language which draws upon sense, imagination 
and the historically particular’.23 Hesse notes in her essay that science does in fact have myths 
and metaphors of its own, but they are evaluated internally by the science that produces them 
− which is actually an inappropriate authority for science to hold. In other words, science is 
used to challenge religion and science is also used to challenge science, yet there are good 
epistemological reasons why this should not be so.  
Unfortunately for those who are dying, the materialist-reductionist context that has shaped so 
much of their life experience cannot provide a truly satisfactory narrative for death and 
bereavement. To say bluntly that death is the end may be theoretically satisfactory in 
reductionist terms (biologically, this creature ceases to be alive), but does not address the felt 
pain of anticipating that end for ourselves or for another, which is why we are driven to denial.  
Committed materialist-reductionists may be content to say, with the biologist and writer 
Richard Dawkins, that the only immortality we will have lies in the ideas and writings we leave 
behind us,24 but for many people the idea that death is a terminus simply raises additional 
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questions about the meaning and value of life. In particular, people who are terminally ill seek 
a cause, or at least something to blame (even if illogical). Increasingly, genetic factors are 
found to be active in disease processes and so there is a popular sympathy for Dawkins’ idea of 
the human body as a vehicle for genes, although his theory may not be well articulated or 
understood by the victims of such diseases. Inadvertently Dawkins has thus allowed people to 
have a materialist rationale for their illnesses while being free to blame the God they do not 
believe in for their misfortune: in other words, it is possible to occupy the space between the 
cultures intellectually, even though this position provides little emotional or spiritual support 
when dying or suffering.  Dawkins’ ideas constitute a useful corpus with which to dialogue, of 
extreme (and influential) materialist-reductionism. 
 
1.2 Richard Dawkins, neo-Darwinism, and the ‘two cultures’25 
Dawkins’ personal atheism was progressively confirmed by his scientific work and he has 
written extensively (and increasingly) over the past 30 years about the intellectual redundancy 
of God in a post-Darwinian age. He comments: ‘We no longer have to resort to superstition 
when faced with the deep problems: Is there a meaning to life? What are we for? What is 
man?’26 He is comfortable with the sense of ‘natural awe’ that any scientist contemplating the 
natural world may feel, but refuses to identify such feelings as spiritually ‘meaningful’ and 
eschews any suggestion of an ultimate Being as the origin of ‘creation’, seeming to be unable 
to understand how theologians think and capitulating instead to an objectification of God.  
Dawkins, a neo-Darwinist,27 is an evangelist for Darwin’s theory in terms of our understanding 
of the world and sees in it the ultimate ratification of reductionism. Darwin’s theory of 
evolution by natural selection comprehensively challenged the earlier 19th century assumption 
that the massive variety of different species in the world had been ‘designed’ for their specific 
habitats. Evolution occurs via the natural processes of physics and chemistry and does not 
require God as a designer (dispensing with the cosmological argument for God), an ultimate 
cause (the ontological argument), or a source of meaning (teleological argument). In River out 
of Eden Dawkins discusses the human tendency to ask the ‘Why?’ question, and suggests: 
                                                          
25
 The ‘two cultures’ is a reference to the influential book, The two cultures and the scientific revolution 
by Snow, first published in 1959, in which Snow claimed that science and literature formed two 
dangerously non-interacting cultures separated by an incomprehensible gulf. Science was perceived to 
be the vehicle for the improvement of humanity but was beyond the reach of understanding of most 
politicians, the decision-makers, whose (normally upper class) classical education would have focused 
upon literature rather than science.     
26
 Dawkins, The selfish gene (new edition, 1989), p1. 
27
 Neo-Darwinism combines the theory of evolution by natural selection with Mendelian probability and 
Dawkins describes his position with clarity in his first book, The selfish gene.  
21 
 
‘When the obsession with purpose becomes pathological it is called paranoia – reading 
malevolent purpose into what is actually random bad luck’. He argues that the ‘Why?’ question 
is often simply inappropriate to the nature of the problem, and goes on to explain that the 
only mechanism that ‘operates behind the scenes’ is not God, but DNA survival. He quotes a 
priest’s response to the news of a fatal bus accident: ‘...we do not know why there should be a 
God who lets these awful things happen...[but] If the universe was just electrons, there would 
be no problem of evil or suffering’. Dawkins responds:  ‘if the universe were just electrons and 
selfish genes, meaningless tragedies...are exactly what we should expect, along with equally 
meaningless good fortune...The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should 
expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, 
pitiless indifference’.28     
It has been suggested that Dawkins has simply replaced one religion with another (ie science). 
He writes: ‘Not only does the Darwinian theory command superabundant power to explain. Its 
economy in doing so has a sinewy elegance, a poetic beauty that outclasses even the most 
haunting of the world’s origin myths’.29 The philosopher Mary Midgely comments that 
‘Evolution…is the creation myth of our age’,30 explaining that as the Christian worldview is 
shaken apart, some parts of traditional religion have simply migrated to a new place in a 
scientific world framework.  Hesse, on the other hand, although drawing our attention to the 
‘unnoticed’ mythology of science (see $1.1), still affirms that science is unable to fulfil any real 
function of religion because it does not have the authority to posit metaphysical claims about 
design, origin or purpose, but merely to organise and predict empirical data.31   
Dawkins views religious interpretations of the origin of life as misleading at best and evil at 
worst, because of the exclusive and oppressive tendencies that he sees as the unavoidable 
outcome of irrational belief in a supernatural source of power and authority. His recent and 
popular book, The God delusion, is not about biology but is entirely given to communicating his 
atheism: ‘…there is nothing beyond the natural, physical world, no supernatural creative 
intelligence lurking behind the observable universe, no soul that outlasts the body and no 
miracles − except in the sense of natural phenomena that we don’t yet understand’.32  
The perception that science and religious belief are today incompatible for an intelligent 
person is still fairly widely held, which is worth unpacking, given the fruitful companionship of 
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science and faith in earlier periods – many of the original founders of The Royal Society were 
committed Christians, for example.  Useful accounts of the history of the science/faith debate 
include Colin Russell’s Cross-currents, chapter 2 of Alister McGrath’s Dawkins’ God (a careful 
apologetic response to Dawkins written in 2005), and John Weaver’s In the beginning God, 
already mentioned; but there has been a vigorous output of such books in the wake of the 
publication of The God delusion.   
For Dawkins the incompatibility is intellectual: religious people have ‘blind faith’,33 without the 
credibility of evidence, and theologians might be sincere but are certainly mistaken. McGrath, 
however, has a different explanation of the perceived ‘feud’, maintaining that science and 
religion (specifically Christianity in the West), having for centuries enjoyed a close partnership 
of goals in exploring the natural world, then parted company in the Victorian era because it 
was sociopolitically (rather than intellectually) expedient to do so.34 Moltmann’s 1984 Gifford 
Lectures, addressing natural theology,35 also identify the context of the debate as one of 
science colluding with politics in ‘usurping power’ by the objectification and consequent 
subordination to humanity of the material world.36 Seeking the true location of power in a 
particular worldview is a useful feature of many contemporary theological approaches, and 
may be especially significant for a study of death and suffering in a culture which perceives 
these experiences as failures.37    
In the past century, surrounded by ecological and economic global problems directly related to 
the technological development of society, the ‘moral’ authority of science has been 
challenged, and there is a growing public realisation that we are responsible for putting 
science to work (science itself is not the culprit, but our scientific idolatry might well be). A 
parallel questioning of medicine has arisen as expectations of the health services increase and 
‘failures’ become more prominent. The result has been a partial capitulation to more organic 
strategies, evidenced particularly in the increased bias in personal healthcare towards 
complementary and alternative medicines; in the holistic care of hospices; and paralleled in 
community projects that seek to reduce an impact on the environment. John Weaver remarks 
that ‘It is significant that people have sought satisfaction of their spiritual hunger in 
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movements that tend to hold human beings and the world together in some sort of 
harmonious relationship’.38 Mary Midgley describes the danger of the inappropriate 
application of knowledge – scientists have to live and apply their science in a real context, 
contending with politics and corruption, and this reality raises its own ethical issues: some 
things can be inappropriately studied and naїvely applied.39 For example, J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, the controversial figure who was known as the ‘father of the atomic bomb’, 
remarked that scientists had discovered ‘sin’ when nuclear technology was used to develop 
the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – an example of gifting science with an 
inappropriate moral authority.40 In short, living with the two cultures unreconciled leaves us 
with a great many difficulties, of which meaningful dying is one.  
 
1.3 Problems with reductionism 
The everyday success of the scientific worldview has left western culture with a pervasive 
tendency to think of the materialist-reductionist approach as the only intellectually credible 
method of investigation.41  Why should this be so? 
1.3.1 A brief historical diversion42 
The purpose of this diversion is not to survey the history of western philosophy of religion, but 
to outline the possible roots of the dualism with which we contend in pastoral care today. 
Many of the philosophical problems that Christian theology faces can be identified as rooted in 
the faith itself. Two features are particularly important. First, the development of monotheism 
meant that all reality had to be related to the same ultimate, so God and philosophy became 
logically connected. Not only was Judaism monotheistic at the time of Christ, but many Greeks 
had also adopted monotheism, which had thus become the currency of religious and 
philosophical debate. Secondly, Christianity was profoundly influenced by Greek culture, in 
which religion had traditionally had an anthropological function regarding ritual and culture; 
while philosophy addressed the ultimate questions of life and death.  Greek philosophers 
emphasised the ability of human reason over belief or revelation in terms of finding the truth. 
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As early Christianity spread, its apologists in the West were obliged to adopt the rational 
argument of Greek debate.43 Thus Christian belief in the West had an inbuilt latent tension 
from the very earliest stages, and the Enlightenment provided the cultural conditions in which 
this tension could be developed. Although the defence of the existence of God was frequently 
addressed philosophically in earlier periods, in the context of Christendom it became an 
academic exercise (literally ‘preaching to the converted’). However, once the possibility of 
unbelief was given cultural credibility in more modern times, the matter of defending God’s 
existence became a very different exercise.          
Very broadly, the beginning of the permissible cultural articulation of doubt about religion is 
usually considered to be rooted in the revolution initiated in the 17th century by Galileo and 
Descartes (although neither intended to discredit the Christian faith).  Galileo bravely 
challenged the teaching of the church on the basis of his astronomical observations (ie 
empiricism ‘taking priority’ over tradition); while Descartes developed a philosophy that had a 
profound impact upon religion and wider culture: his approach to religious belief was 
reductionist: he wanted to strip it down to a reliable ‘foundation’ and then to rebuild it in what 
he perceived to be a credible manner.  As applied by others in practice, the Cartesian approach 
was more destructive than constructive for religious belief, but this was not Descartes’ 
intention. A particular development was that the three classical arguments for God – the 
teleological, ontological and cosmological arguments – became hugely important as 
foundational justifications for religious belief in God. If the primary belief in God could not be 
justified then the whole religious edifice fell.         
The awareness of the ‘wedge’ between the material and the transcendent was driven more 
deeply into western culture by Hume and Kant in the 18th century, although it is again 
important to note that the philosophers were not intent upon discrediting faith per se, but 
upon showing that the investigation of the material world does not shed light on the 
transcendent and vice versa. Hume was anxious to confine philosophical investigation to 
matters of experience and fact: ‘The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by 
arguments from its cause and effect; and these arguments are founded entirely on 
experience’.44 Hume challenges scholars of divinity or metaphysics to show that their 
reasoning is abstract and factual, and if not, asserts that their books should be committed to 
the fire for they contain ‘nothing but sophistry and illusion’.45 Kant made a significant 
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distinction between the noumenal world (things as they are in themselves) and the 
phenomenal world (things as we experience them), suggesting that the noumenal world is 
simply beyond the possibility of investigation. However, although these Enlightenment 
philosophers have undoubtedly been used to discredit religious belief, and the sheer beauty 
and usefulness of the scientific revolution dazzled human beings into viewing it as an 
alternative ultimate explanation, the Enlightenment can be better understood as a valuable 
step in the development of human understanding rather than as the intentional process of 
religious destruction.  John Cottingham suggests in an interesting chapter that the proper 
response to the Enlightenment’s challenge to religion is not to discredit the Enlightenment, but 
to move forward from it and make use of the philosophical (and technical) advantages it 
continues to offer.46 
In the 19th century, Charles Darwin’s work reinforced the challenge to the authority of 
traditional religion. The literal understanding of the Bible was already being challenged by 
developments in literary criticism and Origin of species was an influential addition to the 
debate, using the methods of science as a measure of truth. The two cultures came into an 
open conflict at this point that has not yet been fully resolved.    
1.3.2 Unpacking the problems of reductionism 
Having briefly indicated this background to reductionist thinking, we can return to the main 
concerns of this study. The problem with materialist reductionism is its inability to deal 
adequately with the questions and ‘untidiness’ of life, particularly matters of ultimate 
meaning, as evidenced by experience with people who are in extremis. A number of specific 
issues connected with reductionism can now be identified as significant for this study.  
1.3.2(a) Secularisation 
It is often suggested that we live in a secular society,47 meaning that we seek non-religious 
explanations for the questions of life, and this belief is arguably institutionalised in modern 
culture such that it is difficult to identify, challenge, and adapt. There is, however, a debate 
about whether secularisation is occurring: it may rather be that fundamentalism has adversely 
affected popular adherence to traditional religion; or that our social dependence on 
technology has simply prejudiced us towards ‘knowledge’ over ‘wisdom’.  David Martin’s 
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recent book48 discusses the complex sociological background to religious decline in the west, 
and suggests that there is no simple connection with scientific success, although neither are 
they unconnected: he is more inclined to talk about the impact of rationalisation and of 
‘disenchantment’ (the loss of the sacred)49 – the philosophical roots of which can be identified 
in the same kind of traditional monotheistic separation of God from the world as is discussed 
in Chapter 2 of this thesis, and which may lie behind the two cultures.  
Whether or not science is the new religion, and whether or not secularisation exists, the new 
philosophy is probably naturalism:50 a determination to account for ‘things’ without recourse 
to supernatural arguments. Cottingham, who argues this point clearly, defines naturalism 
either as methodological (ie that phenomena can be explained without recourse to the 
transcendent) or as ontological (ie that there is no such thing as the transcendent). This 
emphasis on philosophical naturalism will certainly be mirrored in the movements of the 
philosophy of religion and one such development has been the emergence of natural theology, 
which is an area of study that affirms that something of God can be known from the study of 
nature.51   
The postwar German theologian Jürgen Moltmann recognised the need for a theology that 
made sense in a technological world; a theology that reintegrated God and creation and 
provided a vision of hope.52 Moltmann’s style and method have proved him to be an 
exceptional exponent of Christian theology in the postmodern era.  I would like to dialogue 
with Moltmann here because he has so profoundly entered into the question of suffering in 
The crucified God.  Moltmann’s ideas are very helpful in dealing pastorally with suffering and 
dying people who are asking ‘Why me?’, and so I was interested to see how he had also dealt 
with the issue of the two cultures.  
(i) Separation of God and the world.  Moltmann’s God in creation begins with an exploration of 
some of the world-shaping dualisms that support the apparent rationalism of secularisation.  
Modern theology’s residual dependence on Platonism has tended to identify God as the 
‘absolute subject’, which means that the material world tends towards absolute object: ‘The 
more transcendent the conception of God became, the more immanent were the terms in 
which the world was interpreted. Through the monotheism of the absolute subject, God was 
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increasingly stripped of his connection with the world, and the world was increasingly 
secularised’.53 Reductionist investigation, highly successful with the material world, thus 
delivers little or no information about God (or indeed anything transcendent), who is therefore 
deemed (in reductionist terms) not to exist – or, at best, to be completely unproven.  
Moltmann argues that this separation of God and the world is both read into and out of 
mainstream theologies of creation, which are based upon a flawed interpretation of the 
Genesis accounts. He suggests that Genesis is intended primarily to teach the difference 
between God (the creator) and the world (the created) in order to distinguish them 
appropriately; however, the loss of the immanence of God in God’s creation is something that 
we have made up for ourselves, because modern reductionism does not (and logically cannot) 
need God as an explanation. A helpful corrective would be to recover a pre-modern concept of 
reason (particularly when reading such pre-modern texts): one that makes use of the concepts 
of participation and perception, and which sees the integrated whole rather than simply 
causes and effects or results. Moltmann’s panentheistic perspective, which is not palatable to 
some traditional theists, is a characteristic common to many newer approaches to natural 
theology.  
(ii) Anthropocentrism.  Another issue identified by Moltmann is the uncritically anthropocentric 
perspective assumed with respect to life on this planet: that in the Genesis creation stories 
readers normally (and wrongly, according to Moltmann) understand the ‘crown’ of creation to 
be humanity. This ‘usual’ reading then leads the reader to an implicit subordination of the 
created world to human needs and desires – with the result that the earth can be abused by 
humans, with God’s ‘permission’. Moltmann suggests that reading Genesis 1 and 2 properly 
shows us that the crown of God’s creative activity was properly the sabbath, which leads to a 
different fundamental understanding of the purpose of the whole of creation: that of 
displaying the glory of God. Within Moltmann’s reading, humankind most certainly has special 
responsibilities on the earth, but creation has a profound intrinsic value that is not connected 
to its materialist ‘use’. Our preconceptions immunise us against a critical reading and we 
become stuck in the domination paradigm: ‘Because the second creation account gives the 
impression that the world was created for the sake of men and women, people believed that 
the modern conquest of the world by human beings proved that the ancient anthropocentric 
view of the world was the true one’.54 One of the minor themes of this thesis is the need to 
continue to acknowledge the existence of such ‘canalised’ thinking: that we have default 
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mental pathways that lead us to monochrome interpretations of the experiences and events of 
life, but which are so natural to us that they are very difficult to perceive.         
(iii) Power and dominion.  Moltmann examines the effect of this objectification of creation on 
our way of life and comments that we even perceive our bodies as something that we 
‘possess’.55 This dualistic belief that the self is somehow separate from the body underlies 
much of modern medicine and culture, but in particular Moltmann observes that the 
objectification of the natural world means that science (which investigates it) is godlike in its 
authority. We are reminded of the discussion in $1.1 and $1.2 about power and authority and 
the perceived superiority of scientific thought in our culture. Theology, says Moltmann, is not 
considered a proper tool for the understanding of nature but is relegated to the study of 
human history, with science dominating theology because of its ‘manner of knowing’, which is 
linked to power.  
This discussion of power and authority is highly significant for the way in which medicine and 
technology dominate at the time of sickness and death, and also for the way in these 
experiences have been removed from the ‘place of life’ (the home and community) to the 
‘place of science’ (the hospital or – better, but still institutionalised − the hospice). Suffering 
and death, the ‘messy’ experiences of life, are subjected to a rationalistic analysis and 
treatment; yet there are good arguments to suggest that this process is inappropriate.    
1.3.2(b) Complexity and simplicity 
 In a reductionist worldview, conclusions about complex systems are drawn from the 
understanding of simple ones. This approach to investigation is elegantly described by Peter 
Atkins, a physical chemist at Oxford, as follows: ‘there is nothing that cannot be understood, 
and [the] path to understanding is to peel away appearances in order to expose the core, 
which is always of unsurpassed simplicity’.56 Atkins believes that this approach is universal in 
its scope and comments further that ‘it is possible to think rationally about what many regard 
as lying beyond explanation, such as the processes involved in the creation of the universe and 
the emergence in it of consciousness…there is no need to involve the idea of a Supreme 
Being’.57 He thus concurs with Dawkins’ statement: ‘if there is something that appears to lie 
beyond the natural world as it is now imperfectly understood, we hope eventually to 
understand it and embrace it within the natural’.58  
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Experientially we know that we cannot describe everything satisfactorily as the sum of its 
parts, but rationalist and reductionist thought beguiles us with its veiled promise of power.  
We would all love to command our own destinies, and the Enlightenment hope of 
understanding leading to wellbeing is highly resilient.  Thus the public communicators of 
science have a great responsibility in a culture shaped, maintained and progressed by technical 
expertise,59 for the promise may exceed the actuality.  For example, a person who is dying may 
be aware of the potential genetic root of his or her cancer and of the possible contributions of 
diet and lifestyle, freely chosen, that led to the disease being manifest. He or she may have all 
available knowledge about drugs, therapies and surgery. Even so, suffering and death remain 
in a mysterious zone that cannot be penetrated by science. It is for such matters that a 
reductionist approach to life will not answer.      
Because materialist reductionism is such a deep influence on our culture it is difficult to 
evaluate it in non-reductionist ways. Moltmann’s suggestion of using pre-modern reasoning, in 
which relationships are as primal as things, is helpful.60 Then true knowing is defined as 
communication rather than domination, which fundamentally alters the dynamics of power. 
Theologically our working view of the Trinity is important: whatever we might affirm in the 
creeds, commonly in practice we imagine a God whose relationship with the world is one of 
remote one-sided domination. A truly trinitarian and immanent conception of God challenges 
every aspect of God’s relationship with the created world – and particularly our fixation with 
cause and effect, which often even shapes the form of our prayer.61  
If humans are made in imago dei, then the model for this trinitarian relational interaction in 
the Christian worldview is that of eucharistic community rather than hierarchical authority, 
characterised by self-giving love rather than abusive and acquisitive relations of power. The 
dynamic possibilities of such community are pictured and modelled in the gospels in the life, 
teaching and ministry of Jesus, whose other-centredness challenges the canalisation existent in 
human social structures.  This way of life is opposed to individualism, authoritative power, 
hierarchical domination, and the categorisation of others. It is fundamentally non-reductionist 
but functions unashamedly through metaphor and mystery. Consequently the way of Christ is 
a profound challenge to the power structures embedded in modernism.    
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Later (in Chapter 5) I will discuss the phenomenon of liminality, the ‘in-between-ness’ of dying 
and suffering. We are generally uncomfortable with this poorly defined threshold experience 
because we cannot pin it down, explain it, analyse it. It has a metaphorical character that ‘is 
and is not’ and it resists reduction to simpler components. Our discomfort with this state may 
be in part related to our desire to analyse and possess. 
1.3.2 (c) The loss of meaning and the loss of God  
Although the scientific enterprise has been optimistic in terms of its ability to describe and to 
understand (‘Complete knowledge is just within our grasp’,62 claimed Atkins), it is 
epistemologically ill equipped to deliver hope in the sense of a meaning to life beyond the 
cycle of existing, consuming, and then dying to make room for the new generation. In the 
hospice it is interesting that many patients appear to benefit from exploring their own sense of 
‘meaning’: perhaps by oral life histories; or by expression of their experience through art or 
music; or by leaving a ‘memory box’ behind which summarises their existence in some way. 
Those individuals who are able to explore meaning − either in these ways or through a 
personal faith − seem to be able to enter the dying process more peacefully. The idea that 
terminal illness ‘just happened’ to this particular set of biological organs (ie this particular 
individual person) is rarely felt to be an adequate explanation and is almost always contested 
by denial, anger, and disbelief (via a whole range of ‘Why me?’ and ‘What is God doing?’ 
questions, even from those who claim no personal faith).63  
Although the idea of the totally objective viewpoint has been comprehensively challenged 
both philosophically and scientifically, a fascination with the objectification of the natural 
world is tenacious and underlies hardline reductionism.  Moltmann observes that such 
objectification and dualism not only alienate human beings from the natural world but also 
alienate us from our own bodily existence,64 leaving us existentially ‘adrift’ in the cosmos, 
without purpose or meaning.  In addition, since God’s creative activity is both contingent and 
free, there is no way in which the objective creation is causally linked to the creator: and so a 
commitment to a strictly mechanistic and disenchanted worldview means that we also lose 
access to God, since revelation does not count. Dawkins, for example, quotes James Watson 
(of the Watson–Crick hypothesis): ‘I can’t believe anyone accepts truth by revelation’.65  
We need a relational metaphysics in which humanity is truly a part of nature rather than in 
authority over it, and in which the perceived distinction between God and the world, which 
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raises so many philosophical issues, can be appropriately reconciled.  John Cooper, in a 
comprehensive recent study,66 notes the increasing tendency for theology to move away from 
classical theism and towards panentheism (towards which, as a traditional theist, he is not 
sympathetic), because of the felt need to address the kind of issues that have to be reconciled 
with science. Particular problems with classical theism include God’s immutability and 
transcendence; the issues around freedom and divine foreknowledge; and the particularity of 
the incarnation.  Modern theologians have been vigorously seeking new approaches to these 
questions, taking seriously the challenge and the credibility of science. 
 
1.4 Theological responses to the two cultures 
Charles Darwin had initially a fairly literal biblical faith, but moved away from it first because 
he could not achieve a satisfactory consilience between evolution and Paley’s natural 
theology67 (by which he had been deeply influenced), and later because of the problem of evil 
as evidenced in the brutality of nature itself. Darwin effectively made a choice between 
apparently incompatible belief systems, although he never referred to himself overtly as an 
atheist.  His scientific contribution was hugely influential and impacted religious belief, and the 
discussion is alive today. 
Most people learn some basic awareness of the process of evolution and many assume 
uncritically that it is an unanswerable challenge to God. Dawkins’ prolific output has already 
been mentioned, but he is not the only highly literate proponent of atheistic evolutionary 
theory. The philosopher Daniel Dennett68 (for example) claims that Darwin has given us a 
‘dangerous idea’ with two serious implications for theology – first, that all living creatures 
share a common ancestry, which blurs the distinction of human and other (and even between 
living and non-living); and secondly that natural selection is random and undirected and leads 
us to an impersonal, self-generating universe. The first ‘dangerous’ implication challenges the 
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literal Genesis account of creation; the second challenges belief in the existence of a necessary 
creator God at all.69  
Theology continues to develop responses to Darwin’s legacy. Ian Barbour has reviewed the 
current dialogues of theology with science and has suggested four main categories:70 conflict; 
independence; dialogue; and integration.  I have decided to group responses here into three 
categories of opposition, separation, and engagement, since Barbour’s dialogue and 
integration are closely related.    
1.4.1  Opposition 
The most obvious form of opposition is simply to say that Darwin is wrong, and prominent 
among the holders of this position are the proponents of creationism,71 particularly strong in 
the US.72 If the non-negotiable assumption of creationists is that scripture must be literally 
inerrant, then a seven-day understanding of creation is the only possible conclusion and an 
impasse with science is unavoidable. This is not the place to survey hermeneutical approaches, 
but simply to note that using the Bible as explanatory of current scientific evidence is an area 
of interpretive difficulty.  Philip Clayton, a process theologian/philosopher, comments that ‘the 
textual accounts of Yahweh must not be read as dispassionate quasi- (or pseudo-) scientific 
accounts of the world’.73 However, opposition may not be opposition to evolution per se, but 
rather to the underlying metaphysics of scientific materialism. In this case it is important to 
find ways of ‘decoupling’74 the issues of evolutionary theory, which are well evidenced and 
currently highly credible, from the intrinsic materialism through which they have been 
interpreted by Dawkins, Dennett and others.  
A dying person in 21st century Britain will be likely to feel indebted to the benefits of the 
scientific and technological enterprise (having been in receipt of medical care and possibly 
mechanical assistance in the home or care environment), and is also likely to be fairly sceptical 
about a creationist position, since only around 5.5% of the total population actively practises 
the Christian faith75 and of these a much smaller proportion will hold a fundamentalist 
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creationist point of view. Most patients will not be particularly scientifically or theologically 
literate and will hold a worldview that is shaped by a fairly basic idea of evolutionary theory, 
and a view of religion shaped by a hard classical theism. Some will vehemently reject any 
supernatural or transcendent dimension to life; but most will be caught within the culture 
clash and struggle to make sense of the transcendence of death within a working materialist-
reductionist worldview.     
1.4.2  Separation 
A much more common dialogue between theology and science has been ‘separation’ – by 
theologians who recognise that the evidence of evolution cannot be ignored, but who cannot 
fully integrate it with religious belief. This approach normally insists on the empirical nature of 
science and the transcendence of God, which thus occupy separate realms, each of which is 
epistemologically inaccessible to the other (after Hume, Kant, Spinoza). The separation 
position is frequently expressed, for example, in terms of science answering the ‘how’ and 
theology the ‘why’ questions of life.  This form of ‘escape’ from the issue can be intellectually 
unsatisfactory. The biologist Stephen Jay Gould coined the term ‘NOMA’ (‘non-overlapping 
magisteria’) for the separatist approach, which has been criticised by Dawkins as a technique 
for evading difficult questions.76  
The root of the separatist approach is ontological.  If God is the ultimate, necessary, uncreated 
ground of being, the ‘that than which no greater can be thought’ of Anselm’s Proslogium, then 
what theologians call the ‘creation’ (and scientists call ‘nature’) can of course be contingent 
rather than necessary. There is then no possible rational or causal link back to God from any 
empirical study of nature, and there is also a proper area of study of God that is of another 
order – whether one speaks of revelation, supervenience,77 or the numinous, or some other 
term.  
Again, the difficulty is an issue of materialist or reductionist metaphysics integrated into 
science and not of evolutionary theory itself, a point that is not always made clear in 
discussion.  Rather, the problem is the insistence by Dawkins and other like-minded writers 
that God be fitted into a rationalist worldview, because that is the only possible worldview of 
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which they can conceive. Such a limitation of God is clearly untenable in any orthodox 
understanding of scripture, tradition, and transcendent religious experience – and so Dawkins 
attacks all these bodies of knowledge as unreliable in his more recent publications, always 
basing his arguments uncritically upon materialist assumptions.  
Separation has much to commend it theologically because of its humility in the face of 
revelation. But does separation help those who are dying? Not really, because most of the 
existential questions about the nature of suffering fall into the transcendent category, while 
the physical experience is dealt with in the materialist dimension. Somehow the person is not 
whole, and the answers are unsatisfactory. Walter Wink describes the separatist position as a 
reaction to a materialist worldview and views its inherent lack of wholeness as ‘schizoid’.78 
1.4.3  Engagement 
In the light of the ‘new physics’79 Weaver says: ‘We have left the deterministic, infinite 
universe of Newtonian physics behind, and as Christians we will need to come out from the 
bunker of private religious belief and engage in a dialogue with science’.80 Scientific 
materialism has the great advantage of ‘working’ at a hands-on level in daily life: in fact 
without it we could not plan, organise or predict very much at all. On the other hand, not all 
that is of significance in life is amenable to forensic description. Moltmann hopes for ‘a 
community of scientific and theological insights’ in which relationships are as primary as 
things.81 A dialogue is crucially important for theology. 
Sometimes people might believe they are ‘engaging’ when actually they are ‘separating’. Post-
Darwinian engagement between science and theology generally falls into one of two 
categories:  either science is used to interpret religion, which may alienate those of a religious 
persuasion; or primacy is allocated to religious belief. Is it possible genuinely to hold both 
science and religion together as equal debating partners? Bearing in mind that the ‘view from 
nowhere’82 is unobtainable, the answer is probably no – a person in today’s divided culture will 
need to adopt a starting point that is either scientific or religious in character. However, there 
is no reason why theologians should not use a considered argument that begins and ends in 
God.  Mary Hesse reminds us of Kant’s three philosophical questions: What can we know?; 
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What then can we do?; and What can we hope for?, and notes that science cannot really 
answer any of these except in a partial way.83  
In the search for a metaphysics that makes sense in late modernism, questions of authority, 
theism, hermeneutics, and providence are unavoidable: these are the questions that are 
important to dying people struggling to deal with the slippery issues of suffering, pain, and evil. 
In Chapter 2 I will discuss how process insights can help to address these issues. 
 
1.5 Key issues for a study of the embrace of suffering and death   
I began with the suggestion that an overly reductionist and materialist view of reality is a 
serious hindrance to the task of answering the question: ‘Why me?’.  Western culture is liberal 
and postmodern, yet demonstrates the existence of an influential underlying mechanistic view 
of the universe, and remains highly enchanted with the promise of technological answers to 
the problems of health, environment and age − understandably so, given its dependence on 
successful technological development to raise the standard of living for the majority of people. 
This ready capitulation to reductionist explanation may result in an extreme hostility to 
religious belief although once again it should be noted that it is not science per se but the 
materialist metaphysics to which it is frequently wedded that is the cause of this problem.  
As this point, certain key issues have emerged that may be useful in addressing the root 
problem of dealing pastorally with issues of suffering and dying, summarised here. 
1.5.1 The question of suffering  
The questions, ‘Why me?’, or ‘Why does God allow cancer at all, if he is good?’, arise with 
regularity in the hospice setting. It is rarely possible or appropriate to engage in any 
meaningful theological or philosophical debate when someone is either very ill or very 
distressed. However, having engaged with such questions oneself is a great help in the ministry 
of ‘being with’ those who are asking, even if one’s own experience or reflection is never 
explicitly verbalised. In the following chapters the issue of suffering will be addressed to 
support the pastoral question as follows: in Chapter 2 there will be some metaphysical 
analysis; in Chapter 3 the suffering person will be the focus of discussion; while in Chapters 4, 
5, and 6, I will look at the use of narrative theory and develop my main thesis of understanding 
suffering as ontological impertinence.      
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1.5.2 The human person 
The question, ‘Why me?’, directs us to a consideration of the human person.  Is a person 
something that can be studied in a mechanistic or reductionist fashion? If not, why not?  The 
related issue of an individualistic cultural view of personhood is vital for this argument, and I 
will consider the implications for the suffering person of being a person in relation, and ask 
whether our individualism impairs our experience of suffering such that we can no longer 
incorporate it meaningfully into the stories of our lives.  
Individualism has some fascinating features – in particular, defining freedom as total 
detachment from others, which allocates great power to each individual.84 Personal autonomy 
is a prized status and exercises a powerful influence on healthcare and palliative care. 
However, it can make the process of dying a lonely one, because the emphasis on patient-
centred care has the potential to damage awareness of the patient’s relational context.85  
The contemporary social commitment to personal autonomy also causes confusion around the 
concept of suffering: there is a tendency to assume that the pain and suffering belongs largely 
to the patient. Thus family members will often comment that they would prefer a quick death 
(like a fatal heart attack) to the lingering demise of cancer or MND (motor neurone disease) – 
although in reality, while suffering may be reduced for the person who dies suddenly, it will be 
enormously increased for those who remain. This loss of relational awareness is another 
difficulty for modern people who are trying to deal with suffering (of any sort) and death.           
1.5.3 Language and story 
How do we deal with material that does not lend itself to discussion as ‘facts’? If we cannot 
understand suffering in a reductionist or causal manner (‘it was a result of X or Y’), then how 
are we to speak of it? And even if we identify such a cause, does that really reduce the pain, or 
simply satisfy our curiosity?   
In the following chapters I will be thinking of the sort of language used to discuss suffering – in 
particular, the use of story or narrative. The practical, pastoral value of telling the story will be 
discussed and I will think further about the implications (for suffering) of this observation by 
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using narrative theory, focusing on the work of Ricoeur.  Our scientific culture, and the 
scientific language that goes with it, resists the use of story, parable, and metaphor because 
these forms are perceived to be ‘woolly’ rather than ‘factual’. Does this resistance really 
indicate a deeper cultural discomfort with not being in control and with the sense of the 
impenetrable mystery that we call transcendence?  What might that mean for the way in 
which we deal with suffering? This observation leads me to mention two final points that will 
be of interest: the phenomena of canalisation and of liminality. 
Canalisation86 is a biological phenomenon that describes stereotyped reactions. Canalised 
thinking triggers patterns in the mind rather than analysing the facts, which may be complex. 
Human learning is often canalised, and this includes cognitive and moral development. Of 
particular interest for this research is the tendency to assume that personal agents cause 
events to occur. Patricia Williams notes that human beings have a canalised response which 
leads them to personalise all sorts of inanimate and non-human objects (we might call this 
anthropomorphisation) – leading to certain beliefs about the causes of evil. In particular, 
studies on ancient religions by Walter Burkert87 indicate a canalised reaction to catastrophic 
events which falls into four parts: an event is perceived as a catastrophe; a mediator is 
involved; the mediator links the catastrophe to sin of some sort; and finally the community or 
person makes atonement for the sin.88 Williams examines this process with respect to 
atonement theory, but the implication for the question: ‘Why me?’ is clearly interesting. I have 
explored the implications of this tendency to canalisation for the role of the chaplain in a 
hospice setting in another article, suggesting that patients tend to see their doctors as liminal 
guides through this difficult terrain because of the perceived authority of the medical model, 
but in fact, because of the power of the perceived two cultures, the best placed person to be a 
liminal guide in the threshold world is indeed the chaplain.89   
In  this study the interesting features of canalisation seem to be (a) the assumed connection 
between punishment and sin, remembering the injunction in Romans 6:23 that the wages of 
sin is death (‘she didn’t deserve to die, she lived a good life’); (b) Williams’ repeated warning 
that canalised thinking should not be accepted uncritically precisely because it is stereotyped 
and not a proper response to the facts in hand (the reluctance to accept bad news or ‘failure’); 
and (c) the positing of personal causal agents behind things that happen (‘God allowed my 
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husband to die’). I will discuss these issues in Chapters 5 and 6 and make some use of the 
classic biblical story of Job.  
Liminality − liminal experience is about standing on the threshold of something new; about an 
open future; about possibilities and progress; about not being narrowly defined. Although 
commonly our culture displays a fascination with the new and the different, in practice we 
enjoy order and control, which means knowledge and understanding in a mechanistic 
universe. Richard Rohr90 and others (see Diarmuid O’Murchu91 for example) have started to 
discuss the ways in which a lack of cultural liminal experiences (such as initiation processes for 
adolescents on the verge of adulthood, for example) in our western culture holds people back 
from exploring their inner personal identities.    
Death and dying are liminal experiences – or could be, depending upon what one’s personal 
beliefs might be. An extreme materialist would not view death as liminal, simply terminal 
(although possibly such a person might allow that the process of dying has liminal 
characteristics).  
I think that it might be useful to examine why we are so uncomfortable with the liminal and 
particularly to place this question within the materialistic, reductionist worldview that we have 
already identified, with a view to addressing the needs of those who are suffering or terminally 
ill. This material will be discussed more fully in Chapter 5 with the help of a narrative approach.  
Before that, in Chapter 2, I want to consider the impact on our culture (even though it is no 
longer Christian) of the way in which we conceive God to relate to the world (particularly 
through the science−faith debate), and in so doing, have found process-based thinking 
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Chapter 2. God and the world  
Where then does wisdom come from? Where does understanding dwell? (Job 28:20, NIV) 
 
2.1 Materialism and European culture 
A person’s image of God, whether or not s/he believes in that God personally, will nonetheless 
shape that person’s response to, and expectations of, that God; and thus also his/her 
rationalisation of the whole of life.92 Concepts of God are drivers of meaning, often operating 
‘below the radar’ of conscious awareness, but this should not be taken as a suggestion that 
God manipulates us mentally from behind the scenes. Culture, religious tradition, and personal 
experience are not neatly separable, and we do not simply bring an abstract ‘shape’ of God to 
our lives to dominate our conscious or subconscious responses: rather, we will question and 
interact with our assumptions about God in the light of our experiences in life.93  In the 
contemporary interaction of materialist metaphysics and Christian theology, certain ‘shapes’ 
of God have been reinforced while others have been eroded. In this chapter I will examine the 
implications of the ‘shape’ of God for the suffering person.  
2.1.1 Pervasive materialist-reductionist thought 
In Chapter 1, which set the context for this study of suffering and dying in 21st century Britain, 
the impact of materialist reductionism on our culture (primarily via science, technology, and 
medicine) was discussed. This phenomenon cannot be ignored by any theologian or pastor 
who is attempting to develop contemporary apologetics or spirituality. Richard Rohr, who has 
written many books on the crisis of spirituality in the West, comments rather sadly that ‘The 
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Western mind refuses to be in awe any more. It is only aware of what is wrong…’,94 and it is 
this hopelessness which leads to the existential anxiety that characterises postmodern living – 
and even more, postmodern suffering, and dying.95  In this chapter I will examine the way in 
which the mechanistic cultural shift has interacted with Christianity to precipitate revisions of 
the ‘classical’ God−world relationship.96 In particular, Christian worldviews founded upon 
versions of classical theism have struggled with some of the questions of the post-
Enlightenment, primarily around the task of harmonising the existence of suffering and evil 
with an understanding of God as both sovereign and good, since a powerful God is normally 
viewed as ultimately causal. The emergence and application of process thought over the 20th 
century is one response to these dilemmas, and is especially helpful in thinking about the 
issues of suffering and of personal and individual significance, as we shall see in $2.3. Later I 
will draw also on some aspects of narrative thought which seem to me to be complementary 
to a process model of reality.      
The great hope of the Enlightenment was (and it still is, in part) the triumph of reductionism 
and materialism – that everything can be explained by ‘taking it apart’ to see what the simpler 
components are, without recourse to the non-material or spiritual. As our ability to investigate 
empirically becomes more sophisticated, so the realms of the supervenient97 and of the 
mysterious appear to become smaller; and the need for God as an ultimate explanation is 
supposedly correspondingly reduced.98 But has this strategy been successful in responding to 
the deep questions of life? Walter Wink, a popular theologian who has been writing about the 
nature of the transcendent for the past 20 years, speaks of the ‘sickness’ of materialism 
conceived as an ultimate principle.99 He comments that ‘…the moment the decision was made 
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to seek for the ultimate principles of nature in nature’s irreducible components, the choice had 
been made for materialism, whether one was a theist or not’.100 He describes a development 
over the centuries of the loss of ‘participating consciousness’ in favour of mechanisation, such 
that human beings now experience a deep estrangement from nature as its consumers and 
controllers.101 He believes that Christianity’s contemporary lack of credibility is not to do with 
its intrinsic message but rather that this message cannot be meaningfully communicated 
within a materialistic cosmology.102  This difficulty is exactly that experienced in the pastoral 
care of suffering people: transcendent meaning escapes forensic definition, but the latter is 
our preferred method of thought, analysis, and communication.  In Chapters 4 and 5 I will be 
discussing the need for different kinds of explanation to deal with life, and in particular the 
nature of meaning in the context of suffering, arguing that the kind of meaning for which we 
are now conditioned to search is bound to elude us at times of crisis. 
Since the Bible is neither written out of nor for a materialistic cosmology, there is clearly an 
issue of metaphysical interpretation to be addressed when using it today (in addition to the 
cultural, historical and linguistic influences that need to be negotiated around the 
interpretation of ancient texts). It is inappropriate to use reductionist methods alone to 
understand scripture, and yet in fact such methods (which are part of our near-invisible 
cultural baggage) are often felt to yield the most significant information because they are 
more ‘scientific’ than, say, narrative or metaphorical approaches. Historical-critical methods 
and etymological studies, which are reductionist in character, are indeed extremely useful, but 
they can only yield incomplete meanings for texts that were written for people in a pre-
modern culture. Some of the meanings of these texts will never be truly available to us, with 
our contemporary presuppositions, culture and worldview,103 but that is far from saying that 
truth and meaning are not present in these texts for us today. 
The analysis in Chapter 1 and above of the development of post-Enlightenment culture and its 
impact upon religious belief is well studied, and reference has been made throughout this 
thesis to many works on this subject and on the response of various natural theologies, which 
in a sense ‘beat science at its own game’. By this I mean that the methods of observation, 
logic, and rational deduction are used in conjunction with Christian doctrine to generate 
apologetics of one form or another – and applications of process theology currently provide a 
                                                          
100
 Wink, Unmasking the powers, p 137. 
101
 Moltmann discusses this idea in the early chapters of God in creation. 
102
 Wink, ibid, p 6.  
103
 See, for example, Barr, Has the Bible any authority?, chap 4 in The scope and authority of the Bible; 
Cotterell & Turner, Linguistics and biblical interpretation; Fish, What makes an interpretation 
acceptable?, chap 15 in Is there a text in this class?. Later chapters will examine some of these issues in 
the interpretation of narrative from Ricoeur’s viewpoint. 
42 
 
helpful synthesis in the contemporary climate. However, it is taken as given that we are 
shaped by our life experiences and that the interpretation of truth has to evolve and to move 
on as environments change. Scripture itself is an example of progressive revelation over time, 
such that the God of the Old Testament is sometimes barely recognisable in the New – 
although this is not to do with the truth of God, but rather with the interpretive environment 
and the contemporary mythologies and ethics of the people with whom God communicates. 
David Hay has a research interest in tracking religious trends in the UK and has written several 
books on the nature of contemporary belief.104 His conclusions, from sociology and science, 
are that human beings are hard-wired for religious belief and that indeed (as Dawkins and 
others assert) this trait may confer survival advantages. In Hay’s view, this ‘evolutionary’ 
aspect of human development does not necessarily invalidate the existence of God.  
Hay has traced the history of our culture of scepticism in Europe. In particular he examines the 
contribution of written languages to the formation of western individualism and abstract 
thinking, as opposed to the arguably more ‘instinctive’ social and concrete knowledge of pre-
literate societies.105 He concludes that widespread literacy alters our cognitive approach to life 
by promoting the practice of thinking in abstract categories and of detachment from others. In 
turn this practice impairs our ability to understand ourselves as integrated and interdependent 
beings; it impairs our practice of prayer and meditation; and it impairs our sense of 
communion with God (or ultimate reality, whatever form that reality might take). Hay’s recent 
book, Why spirituality, examines the impact of this abstract and individualistic thinking on 
economics and politics; and also surveys the results of neuropsychological experiments on 
meditative prayer practice, finding that there is no reason to assume that mystical experience 
is not ‘real’. He concludes that the widespread scepticism about religion can be shown to have 
evolved culturally and also to have shaped culture; and the supposed superiority of the 
empirical scientific method is a philosophical assumption − just one that has become so much 
part of the furniture that we cannot see it any longer (it has become ‘canalised’ − see $1.5.3). 
Hay believes that the increased sense of global belonging that is now emerging (for example, 
in response to ecological and debt crises) will help us to regain a confidence in spirituality that 
we have lost in the West: ‘Spirituality will regain its rightful place at the heart of our 
understanding of what it is to be a true humanist’.106      
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2.1.2 The significant historical development of monotheism 
The materialist-reductionist, abstract, individualistic ways of thinking which are now culturally 
dominant align themselves naturally with some aspects of Christian classical theism. The early 
development of the Christian faith took place in a world heavily influenced by Greek 
philosophy and culture, and the doctrines and creeds of the church inevitably bear the marks 
of this scholarship, for good and ill. The Judaeo-Christian worldview developed over many 
centuries of writing and reflection, and a number of particularly significant transitions occurred 
as it took shape from within the ancient world. Both Greek culture and the ANE tribal cultures 
against which Judaism and later Christianity were progressively defined were originally 
polytheistic in nature, which influenced profoundly the kind of God in which people believed.  
Polytheism allowed a multiplicity of gods, existing ‘outside’ the world, frequently to intervene 
causally in human affairs – there was no ‘problem’ of divine agency as there is for us today. 
Each god had his or her own area of responsibility relating to human life. Often there would be 
an ‘overall’ god who was responsible for creation in some way.107 Clayton points out that this 
view of a creator god should have led to philosophical questions about ultimacy, but since 
matter was held to be pre-existent in the ancient world such questions did not appear to arise 
(an example of ancient canalisation, perhaps).108  The switch to belief in a single God would 
naturally alter this God’s characteristics significantly: God would have all the power of the 
others and would not be limited by the others in the group; it would also be tricky to identify 
God’s characteristic ‘features’ (because this God would not exist in necessary relation to 
anything); and there would be difficult questions about whether God also created matter ex 
nihilo.  
In short, belief in a single God leads to a very different worldview. Clayton writes that the 
Hebrew authors of scripture realised what Yahweh represented and this was the cause of their 
frequent references to a ‘jealous’ god, which often seem strange to us from a Christian 
perspective. Furthermore, this shift took place gradually, so that Yahweh was initially 
described as the God above gods (henotheism); but finally as the only God, with unimaginable 
power, yet retaining the ‘otherness’ of the polytheistic gods that had been superseded.109  
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Clayton110 suggests that this historical process towards monotheism led logically to the options 
either of classical theism or pantheism: and clearly pantheism was incompatible with the Bible, 
so classical theism, rooted deeply in the past, by default ruled our ‘shape of God’ for centuries 
(and continues to do so). Unintentionally, as a result, we can endow this ‘principal’ God with a 
subtle competitive and comparative nature, because that is how human ‘principals’ normally 
reach the top. For some thinkers this is a reason to avoid the loaded term ‘person’ for God. 
Stanley Rudman notes that while modern philosophers like the use of ‘person’ to describe God 
(because it is comprehensible), theologians today are cautious in handling the term, aware of 
its pitfalls: he says they often ‘...emphasise that God cannot be a person in the sense of one 
being amongst other beings’.111 Rudman surveys the views of a variety of theologians on this 
subject and the overall message is one of caution. God is generally understood to have 
personal characteristics; yet God the Trinity is also a community of persons; and God is not 
quite like human persons. Rudman notes the need to hold onto the relational and 
transcendent dimensions of God’s personhood:112 humans also have these personal 
characteristics yet we understand that we are both like, and not like, God. (Interestingly, even 
Whitehead, who is concerned to identify a single reality, understands God to be ‘more than’ 
any other entity, as demonstrated by his description of God as the ‘chief exemplification’ of all 
metaphysical principles.113)     
The idea of a singular powerful God is hugely attractive to humans, whose livelihoods depend 
inescapably upon competition for material resources on a limited planet, reflecting all that is 
most successful on Earth. Such a God ‘makes sense’ within our experience of life – especially in 
the kind of materialistic, post-Enlightenment culture that we have been thinking about. 
Scripture tells us that we bear the imago dei, and it is very difficult for men and women to 
discern when they are reading this image from God, and when they are projecting it back onto 
God114 − one of the many pitfalls of the interpretive process both then and now.  Scripture also 
provided sufficient ‘monarchical’ metaphors to support this view of God for centuries, and 
indeed God is still alive and well in this form, to the exclusion of others, in many sectors of the 
church today.115 Some are satisfied simply to say that God, being God in the Anselmian sense, 
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is under no obligation to defend Godself,116 but to make this assertion surely does not attempt 
to address the issues of contemporary society satisfactorily: particularly with respect to 
suffering. Moltmann comments that death, suffering and mortality have been excluded from 
the divine being from the earliest philosophers until the present day precisely because we 
image God in a way that assuages our own insecurities.117 Does such an inert God really help 
when someone is experiencing failure, disability, dying, or in pain? How does this God relate to 
the processes of reality?  
The same question resurfaces in each cultural shift. In Cross-currents, a survey of the 
science/faith dialogue over the centuries with a particular focus on English belief, author Colin 
Russell says of the scientific revolution of the 17th and 18th centuries: ‘The dilemma posed by 
the success of the mechanical philosophy was, therefore, about the relation of God to his 
universe. How could nature be apparently self-sufficient and yet under God’s control?’118 
Russell identifies five responses in English thinking at that time: pantheism, deism, semi-deism, 
human instrumentalism, and radical Christian theism (this latter as exemplified by Wesley and 
the early evangelicals). Today this same question, in the UK at least, has led to a massive 
proliferation of spiritual alternatives and also to a significant group of agnostic and atheist 
positions, as a more literate and affluent population is unafraid to challenge the traditional 
teaching of the church in the light of lived experience. The cry of pain that is expressed as ‘Why 
me?’ is no longer rhetorical. It represents a profound existential question that can be broken 
down into a number of fundamental recurrent questions about the God−world relation.        
2.1.3 Issues for classical apologetics when dealing with suffering 
Some of the current apologetic difficulties with classical theism in terms of God’s involvement 
with the world, and of especial relevance to the issues of suffering, can be briefly summarised 
as follows.119 
Immutability. The classical theistic God is ‘immortal, invisible, God only wise; in light 
inaccessible hid from our eyes…unresting, unhasting, and silent as light; nor wanting, nor 
wasting, thou rulest in might...’ – but does God really care? It can be argued that such a picture 
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does not adequately reflect the progressive OT revelation of God; neither does God really look 
like the God incarnated and revealed in Jesus Christ.  
Impassibility. This question is indicated in fn 96 of this thesis. If God is immutable then how 
can God suffer – since suffering must imply change? Suffering also suggests weakness and 
impairs God’s omnipotence. But if God does not suffer, then how can God understand our 
humanity, and what does that mean for the incarnation?  
Dualistic thinking. God ‘out there’ encourages dualistic rather than holistic thinking – a Greek 
influence on the Fathers, leading to a conception of God as pure spirit and in ontological 
‘opposition’ to the material world. In Christian circles there can be a tendency to denigrate the 
bodily and the material for this reason; and at times even to embrace suffering and asceticism 
in a perverse (rather than a healthy and necessary) manner.120  
Divine agency. Causality is a problem – if God ultimately determines everything in a causal 
manner, exactly how and why does God intervene in the world, which is classically perceived 
to be ontologically other? And surely such a God would be able to create a world without the 
sin and suffering of this one: in which case, if this world were perfect at the beginning, why 
should God need to intervene at all? What about miracles?  
Responsibility for evil. This question relates to the previous one: if God is the ultimate source 
of everything and is omnipotent and omniscient, then it is impossible to avoid the conclusion 
that a good God is also responsible for evil.      
Determinism. If God is omnipotent and omniscient in the classical way then it is difficult to 
understand how humanity’s freedom can be real; the outcome of our decisions must already 
be determined. There are serious related questions about God’s foreknowledge. 
Many contemporary theologians employ a revised version of ‘hard’ classical theism – for 
example, one can distinguish between God’s impassibility and his immutability in addressing 
the issues of God’s involvement with suffering; or separate God’s essence and existence (God’s 
active from inner being); or the immanent and the economic Trinity (God’s central nature and 
God’s self-revelation in history), so that God’s interactions with the world involve genuine 
relationship and are not just some kind of sterile intervention.121 These approaches have 
particular validity in retaining the very clear difference between creator and created that is 
classically vital to maintain a good correspondence with the scriptural shape of God – in fact, 
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this ontological issue is one of the main objections to process thinking and panentheism, which 
can be argued to blur the distinctions between God and creation and to place limitations upon 
God.122  There are others who believe that panentheistic (and process) insights currently 
address these questions more satisfactorily in a scientifically literate culture, without 
becoming heterodox. It is not necessary to dispense with a biblical or trinitarian basis in order 
to do this: examples of theologians who are committed to holding science and faith together 
include Moltmann, particularly in his Gifford series of lectures123  (we should note that 
Moltmann does not base his arguments on process theology, although he is a theologian of 
the 20th century watershed); Paul Fiddes, especially his work on suffering; and Philip Clayton, 
who has written on the science/faith interface. 
 
2.2 Some possibilities in process theology 
Process thought is a complex product of the 20th century which grew out of reflection on the 
watershed changes in natural science, evolutionary science, theology, and philosophy (see the 
Introduction for an outline). The first comprehensive version of process thinking is usually 
attributed to A. N. Whitehead124 (although he is part of a historical development of thought). 
Process thinking has been extended and applied in a variety of ways but is panentheistic125  in 
nature, understanding God as the ultimate reality who also participates fully in the universe’s 
ongoing and unconstrained development − one of Whitehead’s best known proposals is that 
‘God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their 
collapse. He is their chief exemplification’.126 Process thinking has of course evolved in the light 
of the complex crisis of faith in western society that we have been discussing. The Holocaust 
and the more recent episodes of ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia have 
led to deep theological reflection in recent times on the nature of a God who could ‘permit’ 
such offences against humanity – although, as we have seen, western society’s reservations 
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about God’s power actually has deeper roots, dating from the Enlightenment and even earlier. 
Nevertheless, in spite of suspicion about religion,127 atheism remains a terrifying option for 
many people and an intellectual need for ultimate meaning prevails, which places a number of 
governing criteria on the nature of God: for example, he should be worth worshipping; he 
should be both good and ultimate; and he should make sense of our experience of reality.  
David Pailin, a contemporary British process theologian, is of interest because he has engaged 
very personally with the reality of suffering in his book, A gentle touch.128 This book is a 
theology of disability resulting from Pailin’s pastoral care of the family of a severely affected 
boy named Alex.  Pailin observes that in a classical scheme the convictions of faith and the 
demands of reason seem to make incompatible claims. The God of love, nurture and action 
(revealed particularly in Christ) cannot be easily harmonised with the traditional view of a God 
who is absolute, necessary, unchangeable, infinite, eternal, and impassible.129 Pailin argues 
that theologians working with the traditional view of reality accept that God’s nature cannot 
be contradictory and he helpfully categorises their responses into four types, which I 
summarise here: 
(1) that God is basically the unmoved mover of Aristotle, and reason is superior to faith; 
(2) that revelation takes priority over reason, but we must accept that our understanding of 
revelation is not value-free and may be wrong; 
(3) that the terms describing God are used loosely − which is confusing; 
(4) that we hold both reason and faith as true, and say that God is inexplicable to humanity.   
The first alternative leaves us with no explanation for God’s ‘presence’ or ‘absence’ in human 
affairs; the second is a postmodern position in which every man’s religious truth is ‘true for 
him’, but does not deal with universals; the third is an issue of hermeneutics and homiletics; 
the fourth leaves God’s goodness and integrity open to doubt.  All four are inadequate to 
account robustly for suffering and evil.    
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Some writers believe that process thought can offer a helpful way through this maze. A 
Whiteheadian version of process thought argues that reality (including God) is not static, but 
exists in process − ie it is dynamic.  All entities are in relationship with all other entities, and all 
undergo change – there is an immediate predecessor and a successor for each actual state, 
which exists transiently and then decays. To illustrate, Pailin invites us to think of the 
continuation of ourselves in life, each as an ‘I’ (in context and relationship) that experiences, 
responds, and changes constantly, yet remains ‘I’. God is the pre-eminent example of such 
dynamic reality, and every tiny experience is held eternally in God’s being. This holding of all 
experience is Whitehead’s ‘objective immortality’, the way in which he gives eternal 
significance to all ‘bits’ of life. There is an ongoing debate about the adequacy of objective 
immortality to account for the felt human longing for eternal life in the light of the 
resurrection of Christ,130 but for now it is sufficient to say that, at a philosophical level, process 
thought deals with (a) the eternal significance of all aspects of creation, including human lives, 
and (b) the presence of evil, which exists as part of a free reality within Godself, rather than 
being perceived as an unexplained intrusion into a good creation.      
2.2.1 Process thought and apologetic issues relevant to suffering 
Process thinking in its various forms has several helpful features that can help to address the 
logical difficulties described in $2.1.3 around the nature of the God−world interaction. Process 
thought is most helpfully viewed as a useful working model in the current context, rather than 
as a comprehensive ultimate explanation.  Clayton, for example, acknowledges that there is 
yet work to be done on how far one can allow God to be affected by the world without 
sacrificing God’s sovereignty; yet affirms the possibilities of panentheistic process thinking for 
describing the God−world relationship.131   
2.2.1(a) The question of intervention   
Interpretations which maintain a strict difference between God and the world will struggle 
with the task of explaining God’s intervention. How can God bridge this ontological otherness 
to be active in creation as the biblical record suggests; and how can God’s apparent 
interventions be understood as just when there are so many occasions when God does not 
seem to intervene? In other words, the classical ‘otherness’ of God also leaves God open to 
being held ultimately responsible for evil.  
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Process-adapted thinking can retain the idea that God is necessary being, and the ultimate 
ground of creation. The process God is panentheistic, which requires that all creation is held in 
God in some way: God is not ‘outside’, although neither is God defined and therefore limited 
by creation. To those who argue that this imposes a limitation on God (ie that creation is 
necessary for God), Paul Fiddes responds that for us to discuss how the God−world 
relationship might be ‘otherwise’ does not make any sense.132 By thinking of ‘otherwise’ we 
raise the spectre of a capriciousness in God that does not cohere with God’s nature as 
revealed by scripture and in Christ as self-giving and ultimate love, because we then hold the 
possibility that God might not love the world, or might not have created it/continue to hold it 
in creation. (It is also true that ‘otherwise’ means that we are no longer dealing with the 
processes of reality, since we have begun to talk about some other creation which we do not 
inhabit, and it is fair to say that if God created time and space, then to speak of ‘before’ or 
‘outside’ creation is difficult if not impossible conceptually.) Moltmann133 comments that if we 
view nature as God’s creation (and his view of creation is panentheistic), then nature and 
natural law must be contingent (as opposed to necessarily existent), since nature cannot be 
deduced from the idea of God, only observed.134 Contingent, too, is the rational process by 
which we observe nature! We cannot escape these limitations to our subjectivity. Very recent 
research suggests that there may be other universes in which the natural laws of physics are 
different – although it is simplistic to jump to the conclusion that this proves some version of 
the anthropic principle, it may support the argument that we cannot assume that we are 
necessarily existent!  Clayton takes the view that even if the conceptual difficulties with a God 
who can be affected by God’s own creation are sustained, they do not outweigh the biblical 
testimony to a God who is intimately involved with all that God has made.135   
Fiddes further notes that we really do have to engage with the worldview of today: that many 
of the theological objections to natural theology relate to scientific worldviews that have 
actually been superseded, although they might still influence the popular understanding of 
reality.136 Today we conceive of reality in terms of community, network, relationship, 
symbiosis, cooperation, organic structure and change (Moltmann’s ‘relational metaphysics’137). 
The ‘designer’ of such a community or ongoing project must necessarily work from within it 
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and alongside it as it develops, not stand ‘outside’ the finished article.138 This approach is 
profoundly different from the classical insight into creative possibilities and the nature of 
God’s intervention. Of course, we cannot prove or read God adequately out of the world as we 
see it, says Fiddes, but the traditional objection to natural theology (that it produced the god 
of the philosophers and not the God of the cross) is no longer valid, and we can see the image 
of the crucified God in the world. Pailin says that we have no choice but to use this way of 
thinking about God and reality: anthropomorphisation is the only experience truly available to 
us and it need not be demeaning to the divine, since we have to interpret the reality we 
inhabit, and which ultimately bears the image of God.139    
2.2.1 (b) The question of foreknowledge 
 Are our lives laid out in advance before God?  If so, what does it mean for the nature of our 
choices and our freedom? The possibility of foreknowledge presents enormous difficulties for 
classical theism, particularly over the matter of suffering: why would a good, omnipotent and 
loving God observe and foresee God’s creatures struggling through life without taking action?  
To approach this question from non-classical perspectives opens up some alternative avenues 
of explanation, which may not be fully satisfactory in terms of a biblical faith140 but are 
nonetheless useful in helping us to think creatively about the relationship between God and 
the world. In principle God (on the Anselmian definition of God) knows everything, but 
logically God can only know what is to be known: there is no ‘defect’ in God because God does 
not ‘know’ the things that do not happen. Pailin argues that this problem lies with our concept 
of omniscience, and is not a limitation of God. Future possibilities are not knowable until they 
actually happen – the future is not symmetrical with the past. Whitehead speaks in terms of 
the totality of ‘potential’ and ‘actual’ events available to God. He describes God’s nature as 
‘dipolar’, possessing a primordial and a consequent aspect nature.   God as primordial is, he 
says, ’the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality. In this aspect, 
he is not before all creation, but with all creation’. God is also ‘consequent’ (he is the beginning 
and the end,141 but we should take care not to equate these ideas directly with past and 
future). God is in ongoing dynamic and salvific relationship with creation. God ‘constantly 
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saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life’, and ‘God’s rôle is not the 
combat of productive force with productive force, or destructive force with destructive force; 
it lies in the patient operation of the overpowering rationality of his conceptual  
harmonization. He does not create the world, he saves it: or, more accurately, he is the poet of 
the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and goodness’.142 This 
whole picture is one of moving forward, absorbing and adjusting (‘judging’) events and 
experiences to form an ultimate harmony. There is no sense in which this picture of God and 
the world is static, determined, closed, or separate. Pannenberg even describes God as ‘the 
power of the future’, which is ‘being itself’,143 and further believes that humans are free only 
because they have a future and can go beyond their present existence: so being a person 
means having a future.144 This logically implies that there is indeterminacy about the future, 
which we can interpret as blessing or bane.   
Sometimes the question of foreknowledge is accommodated by an argument from a classical 
position that God’s omniscience and foreknowledge is about God’s ability to know all things 
contemporaneously.145 The argument is that since all possible places can coexist 
simultaneously for us, so also can all possible times coexist simultaneously for God.  Pailin, 
Fiddes and Clayton (and implicitly Moltmann, who discusses the nature of time as a network of 
processes146) all argue that contemporaneity is not persuasive as a solution, since it invalidates 
the meaning of relationship, which involves being affected by the other dynamically over time. 
Without this time constraint, God’s perception of our suffering is not a truly experienced 
understanding, since God can only observe it, not participate fully in it as we do. Thus the 
question of God’s foreknowledge is very important for a discussion of suffering, for a large 
component of our pain is not to know whether or when our suffering will end. 
Panentheism describes a reality in which nothing can occur outside the divine experience and 
response. Thus panentheism rejects the possibility that God chooses to respond sometimes or 
never responds at all, in favour of the argument that God always responds, and is always 
involved, having freely chosen to be a God who creates and loves. Panentheism also rejects 
the argument that we are therefore unfree, because God is understood therein as a responsive 
and relational ultimate being, not as a dictator, manager, or organiser. The future is thus 
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genuinely open, as in the sense of Pannenberg’s argument above, and the eternal divine 
holding provides a salvific and transformational dimension to our experience that gives 
significance to all of our lives, good and bad, if we want to appropriate it. This divine 
dimension is, however, not forced upon us since God has the nature of love and not of 
oppression. Whitehead speaks rather of the ‘persuasive’ influence of God, and of the divine 
‘lure’, which we might want to call the work of the Holy Spirit. 
History is not therefore a journey in which God holds our hands and leads us to a 
predetermined outcome, but rather has a purpose perceived in the richness of human 
experience itself and in the ultimacy of God, as the final ‘holder’ of all experience. An 
appropriate human reaction to life is not to try first to discover and then to conform to what 
God ‘wants’, or to what other people want, but to find a creative and compassionate response 
to the events of existence. This creativity, being ultimately held and valued in God, enriches 
both human and divine experience and thus confers significance on all of life’s events. This 
view of life experience is especially valuable for those who suffer, and the relating of the 
human story to the divine in the search for meaning is a vital step in the narrative 
interpretation of suffering, as I will examine in Chapters 5 and 6.   
2.2.1 (c) The question of omnipotence 
God’s power is ultimate, but cannot be identified with the demonstrations of force that we 
normally associate with the word ‘power’. God is Godself by choosing to be the self-giving God 
in responsive relationship.  God’s power to be Godself (the I AM of scripture) is without limit, 
and has a dynamic quality because it is exercised as a response to the creation in love. Our 
view of power tends to be coercive and about the imposition of will, and so, because we do 
not recognise a persuasive self-giving as power, we then question God’s existence. Indeed 
Pannenberg argues (with others) that God as the ground of all reality is hidden from us and 
cannot be reified.147 So God’s difference from us in terms of God’s unlimited capacity for self-
giving love rather than force means that we cannot easily understand God’s power, even 
though it underpins reality itself. We do not ‘see’ it – except in the revelation of God in Christ, 
who chose a way of vulnerability that for Christians should be a normative belief. One of 
Whitehead’s most famous phrases arises in his discussion of the relationship between God and 
the world: ‘there is, however, in the Galilean origin of Christianity yet another suggestion 
which does not...emphasize the ruling Caesar, or the ruthless moralist, or the unmoved mover. 
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It dwells on the tender elements in the world, which slowly and in quietness operate by 
love...Love neither rules, nor is unmoved...’.148  
This view of God’s power forms the basis of the discussion of suffering in $2.3 and in later 
chapters in this thesis. Incredibly it also lays the foundation for making sense of our suffering. 
Pannenberg  says, quoting Bloch, ‘ “Only in relation to the ‘hidden God’ *Deus absconditus] is 
the problem of what is at stake in the legitimate mystery of the ‘hidden man’ *homo 
absconditus+ kept open.” The primacy of the future, and therewith of the ‘hidden God’ who is 
its ground, is necessary in order that man’s humanity be protected against trivialization and 
continue to be summoned to its future possibilities’.149 In later chapters I shall look at the need 
to find meaning in suffering and how process and narrative thought can suggest some ‘shapes’ 
for locating this meaning.  
2.2.1 (d) The question of change in God 
God must be worthy of worship. Traditionally theologians equated this requirement with the 
need for God to be ‘perfect’ and immutable (and sometimes also impassible, although I have 
already noted the distinction between immutability and impassibility). The logic of 
immutability is that if God changes then either God was not perfect before, or is not perfect 
after, the change: either way, God’s perfection is compromised. Anselm’s concept of God as 
‘that than which no greater can be conceived of’ is prone to misinterpretation because of our 
assumptions about the nature of power and perfection (see discussion in $2.2.1 (c) above); but 
in fact Anselm’s statement is a really good one, especially if we use Forrest’s suggestion150 that 
‘greater’ is rendered ’properly more awe-inspiring’, which escapes the association with 
forceful and potentially abusive power.  
This brief discussion helps us to see that perfection need not be defined as a ‘maximum’ or 
‘completion’. Perfection can mean that the divine is irreducibly divine even if God changes in 
responsive relationship with creatures. God can become ‘more’ Godself in terms of increasing 
God’s experiences, novelty, and creativity, without becoming ‘less’ Godself.151 God can 
supersede previous divine states and so become ‘more’ God, but can never surpass a previous 
divine state because both states are perfect (this divine process is ontologically unlike human 
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personal experience).152 Indeed, if God is God in responsive relationship with creatures, then 
change appropriate to this kind of divinity can be argued to be a logical necessity. God can 
continue to respond in perfect love and justice to us in all our changing circumstances, being in 
Godself always perfect yet far from superimposably ‘the same’.153 Belief in an unchanging God 
might also exalt our human view of the (logically unchangeable) past and thereby diminish the 
(open) future of possibilities, and our ground for hope. Possibly this is a source of some of the 
fear which surrounds death. 
Can we say that such change is of a passible nature only and so retain the immutability of God? 
This distinction within the nature of God feels rather artificial and indeed is unnecessary in a 
process/panentheistic model. In fact, ‘God is not simply passible: God is pre-eminently so’.154 
This insight is vital if we are to penetrate the meaning of suffering. 
2.2.1 (e) The question of ultimacy 
Panentheistic worldviews understand that God cannot be considered coherently without the 
world: the existence of this world necessarily prompts our reflection upon God. The question 
may be asked whether, in panentheism, God is still ontologically ultimate, or whether the 
necessity to create limits God and makes some principle of creativity the ultimate.155 In process 
thinking, which views reality as a complex network of myriad series of small changes, God is 
active among the factors which determine each miniscule event, without dictating the 
outcome.156 This activity, which is persuasive in character, is Whitehead’s divine ‘lure’ (others 
think of it as a masked supercausality or continual self-extension of the divine: maybe to refer 
to ‘the work of the Spirit’ accommodates them all). God’s involvement is, however, a real 
influence, just as we can allow God to influence our personal decisions in life – or not. This 
process philosophy allows real alternatives to classical models to emerge, rather than thinking 
of everything in terms of God’s planning and making.157 It allows for both natural and moral 
evil at different levels without impugning God’s goodness, and is delightfully consonant with 
the theory of evolution. It also allows us to address the occurrence of ‘bad’ things in life 
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without seeing God as either weak or culpable, which is helpful for a pastoral theology of 
suffering. 
2.2.1(f) The question of incarnation and salvation 
Process theology is often accused of being inadequate to account for the particularities of 
God’s self-revelation, because it is primarily an understanding of God’s influence upon every 
event. Criticisms understandably focus upon the competence of process thinking to deal with 
the key Christian beliefs in the incarnation and resurrection of Christ.158 Pailin challenges us to 
take a different view of God’s activity and relationship with persons. He understands the self 
as existing in process and the worth of the self is then determined by its relationship with God, 
with all experiences of that personal self realising their ultimate value in Godself. Jesus Christ 
shows us a concrete example of divine reality, to which we can relate in order to understand 
the nature of salvation – which is about personal value and worth, understood as love. 
Maximum creativity is achieved by maximising personal relationships, and so we can 
understand ‘heaven’ (the experience of the ultimate) as being about maximum agape.159  
The theologian James Alison, who is interested in issues around diversity from a Girardian 
perspective, puts it like this: ‘*Jesus+ went to his death in order to create the possibility that we 
might follow him in forging stories of a rich diversity which would be the fulfilment of creation. 
That is to say, we saw how Jesus inaugurated a diverse visible practice which was to become 
the constant and free re-creation of his story by us. Another way to describe what Jesus was 
doing is to say that he was bringing in the kingdom, and yet a third way is to say that he was 
founding the church’.160  This way of life is about creative openness to God’s lure, not a 
prescriptive closing-off of possibilities.  Understanding Jesus as a pattern for personhood is an 
orthodox exercise.  
In this section I have indicated the usefulness of process thinking as an underpinning of a 
dynamic view of the person understood as being in imago dei. We often fail to recognise how 
much we are influenced by the static categories of Greek philosophy and therefore just how 
radical the process challenge is. Pailin describes western metaphysics as ‘immunised’ against 
change by Greek thought.161 To deal with suffering requires a breaking open of this stasis.  
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2.3 The power of suffering 
In the light of this overview we can begin to see that the deep questions about the nature of 
suffering and dying can be understood at one level as an expression of existential anguish at 
the failure of a pathological mechanistic Enlightenment worldview (process thought is also a 
product of the Enlightenment, but without the tendencies to reductionism that characterise so 
much of our culture).  It may be intellectually satisfying to explain the origin of the universe in 
terms of physics, but the resulting inescapable conclusion that we are here only by chance and 
that there is no ultimate purpose in human life is simply unbearable for most people.162  The 
argument of this thesis so far has been to examine the pastoral effect of such reductionist 
conclusions and then to suggest alternative ways of describing reality (for example, process 
philosophy) that can (a) hold the work of science and of theology together and (b) provide a 
locus for the experience of suffering. In the rest of this chapter I will review the engagement of 
some key theologians with suffering to provide foundational material for developing a 
narrative response to the pastoral problem outlined at the beginning of Chapter 1. 
When science and medicine − which are often, but not necessarily, predicated upon a 
worldview without an overt spiritual dimension − fail, then a crisis is triggered which abandons 
the experience of ‘bad things’ perceived to be without meaning.163 Viktor Frankl,164 after his 
experience as an imprisoned Jewish psychologist during the Holocaust, reflected that it is not 
suffering that destroys a person: indeed, it was amply demonstrated in the camps that people 
could endure terrible suffering. What destroys a person is suffering without meaning.  
Dying (in the absence of a spiritual framework165) represents a failure of medicine in a 
materialistic culture, and therefore struggles with meaning. The pastoral care of those who are 
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suffering and dying has to work in this conceptual space, which is defined by intense suffering 
of body, mind and spirit – Saunders’ total pain, which requires a more holistic approach than 
analgesia alone. Perhaps it is suffering itself that can provide the key to meaning – and here 
there are some rich resources in the writings and insights of the mystics, human ‘experts’ in 
transcendence. To quote Meister Eckhart, ‘The fastest beast that will carry you to your 
perfection is suffering, for no one will enjoy more eternal sweetness than those who endure 
with Christ in the greatest bitterness…whichever mortal crawls here in the deepest 
abasement, his spirit will fly up into highest realms of the divinity, for love brings sorrow, and 
sorrow brings love’.166 Evelyn Underhill echoes this train of thought: ‘The only victories worth 
having in any department of life must be won on Calvary’.167 Are they (and others) right? I will 
argue that they are, and that suffering has a key ontological function in the project of being a 
human being.  
1 Corinthians 1:18-31 is a passionate rhetorical passage dealing with the countercultural 
characteristics of the Kingdom of God. Perhaps nowhere in scripture are the economics of 
grace so concisely elaborated: that the values of wealth, success, knowledge and fame, which 
are so attractive to human beings, are of little ultimate significance; and that the cross of Jesus 
Christ, which would normally signify indignity and suffering, is a mysterious yet hugely 
powerful metaphor for the true nature of reality. It is the love that can be crucified and find 
fulfilment in crucifixion, becoming love of the enemy and showing that suffering love is 
stronger than hatred.168 The Japanese theologian Kazoh Kitamori draws our attention to this 
hiddenness of God in suffering, when he notes that we are unable to believe in the pain of God 
(in which he argues that God’s love is rooted) by rational philosophical deduction: it has to be 
revealed to us, because it is so comprehensively NOT what we would think.169  
It is this paradox about the very nature of God that it is so difficult to communicate within a 
mechanistic worldview. Dietrich Bonhoeffer170 wrote that God was ‘weak and powerless in the 
world’, and our natural inclination (though not Bonhoeffer’s intention) is to interpret this as 
meaning that God could ‘do nothing’ about such evil as that perpetrated by the Nazis. Rather, 
God’s ‘weakness’ is that power of 1 Corinthians 1: 18-31 or Philippians 2: 5-11 – an ‘identifying 
from within’, rather than an ‘observing from without’. Even when the expectations of 
mechanistic culture have been destroyed – for example, when medicine cannot postpone 
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death or disability any longer – there is still often a human resistance to hearing the 
transcendent hope expressed in these terms of material ‘failure’. In practice, the friends and 
relatives of a dying person often struggle more with the suggestion that meaning lies in the 
cross than the patient him/herself. (Possibly this is because of the process of decathexis, in 
which the dying person’s focus is progressively limited by weakness and ultimately becomes a 
welcome to death.  This perspective is simply unavailable to someone still very much alive.) 
The experience of Christ on the cross as normative and meaningful in suffering is certainly not 
obvious to all. One terminal patient’s brother commented: ‘If he *God+ knows what it’s like, 
then why doesn’t he put a stop to it?’ In short, the suffering that we want to avoid is actually 
the key to ultimate meaning in the Christian story, and if this connection can be made 
successfully, then hope may be able to enter the suffering process – but this is a difficult task 
in our conceptual climate.  
2.3.1  Suffering and the cross 
Kitamori suggests that although every person experiences pain, only believers are able to 
understand that their own pain symbolises (and has meaning in its testimony to) the pain of 
God. For those without faith, the pain is ‘unrecognisable’. In other words, it has no apparent 
significance or meaning and seems wasteful of life, and simply reinforces the person’s 
alienation from God.171 This dynamic − of seeing pain in God and then recognising the meaning 
of our own pain as a symbol of ultimate reality – is particularly interesting and will be explored 
in Chapters 5 and 6 when Ricoeur’s narrative theory is used to examine the significance of 
suffering. Experience with hospice patients would suggest more seriously still that even 
Christian believers struggle in today’s pervasively antireligious culture to hold onto their 
convictions that suffering is not a vain experience. If we examine this difficulty more closely, it 
seems to be a question formed in the context of a reductionist worldview about the logical 
validity of extending God’s particular ‘experience’ in Christ to the universal stage of personal 
and world suffering (bluntly, what has the death of Jesus of Nazareth, 2000 years ago, to do 
with me today?).172 This question will also be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 with regard 
to Ricoeur’s narrative theory. 
2.3.1(a) The crucifixion and the Trinity 
I have argued that it is vital to address the classical material/spiritual dualism if we are to try to 
establish God’s real involvement with – and culpability for − a suffering world.  Since Christians 
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believe in an trinitarian God and an incarnated Christ as foundational doctrines , a key 
question centres on how the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth is incorporated into the 
experience of the Trinity. Was it ‘just’ an experience of the temporally human Jesus?  How 
were the Father and the Spirit involved at Calvary? What does Calvary mean for the second 
person of the Trinity in eternity? Helpful explorations of aspects of these questions with 
respect to the matter of suffering can be found in Fiddes, Kitamori and Moltmann. 
Paul Fiddes173 discusses the way in which classical theology shrank from the implications of 
allowing God to be affected by others. However, if God was ‘in Christ’, then God must have 
suffered; and, given the centrality of the cross for Christian belief and the way in which the 
crucifixion (and resurrection) dominates the NT witnesses, then that suffering must be 
significant for us. Theologians in the classical tradition have sometimes distinguished the 
economic from the immanent Trinity in an attempt to speak of the worldly suffering of God 
while retaining God’s essential impassibility without contradiction. Contemporary theologians 
of many persuasions, on the other hand, tend towards the belief that the cross shows us 
something of the eternal nature of God, not that it was somehow a ‘strange’ experience for 
him.174  
Fiddes175 rejects any kind of separation of nature or personality within God and affirms the 
possibility of God’s suffering in God’s inner essence while remaining the transcendent and self-
existent creator. God’s suffering cannot be just an omniscient sensitivity to our pain, says 
Fiddes, but pain must truly disturb God.176 While adopting some process insights into the 
nature of the God−world relationship, Fiddes develops (in preference to the process dipolar 
models of God) a solidly trinitarian personal analogy for God: the community within the Trinity 
(the ‘event of relationships’177) is the ground of God’s desire for communion with the creation. 
The Trinity is thus an adequate explanation of God’s transcendence and God’s ability to suffer, 
by being both other than and inclusive of the world (a panentheistic view). The cross signifies 
the experience of desolation at the very heart of the Trinity.    
Kazoh Kitamori178 argues that if we preach Christ crucified then we must accept a God who 
suffers. God’s pain is at the root of God’s love, because God suffers when embracing those 
who should not be embraced – in other words, God suffers in the forgiveness of sin; suffers 
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through God’s grace. This constant love comprises God’s immutability179 – God continues to 
love God’s creatures perfectly in spite of betrayal, which is Kitamori’s first location of pain 
within the Trinity. The cross is thus the place where wrath and love meet. Jesus reveals the 
loving character of God and because of this revelation he is put to death. The cross displays the 
eternal nature of God at the heart of the Trinity, and the pain of the cross is real pain. Kitamori 
urges us to remember that the Father begets the Son, but this is secondary to the fact that the 
Father ‘causes’ the Son to die: and here is the second location of the pain within the Trinity, 
which in summary has two components – the love of the unlovable, and the death of the Son.    
Jürgen Moltmann argues in The crucified God that the ‘controversy’ between a purely theistic 
metaphysics on one hand, and the story of God in scripture on the other, must lead to the 
conclusion that ‘the cross is “evacuated” of deity’,180 since the philosophical God cannot be 
identified with suffering or death and remain God.  Suffering is the point at which the 
difference between the God revealed in Jesus Christ and the ‘God of the philosophers’ 
becomes irreconcilable, and is exactly what we observe in the pastoral setting.  Interestingly, 
Moltmann quotes Whitehead several times in his key chapter, The crucified God, in his book of 
the same name.              
Furthermore, Moltmann identifies the doctrine of the Trinity as the primary characteristic of 
the Christian faith, and insists that we cannot begin to understand the cross in a non-trinitarian 
way.181 He interprets the death of Christ not through his divine−human nature but as a 
relational event in which the persons of the Trinity define themselves by their relationship. The 
Spirit proceeds from the event of suffering love – suffering love − between Father and Son.182 
The abandonment of the cross involves both the Father and Son. The Father suffers the infinite 
grief of love at the Son’s death. In the cross the Son becomes Fatherless and the Father 
becomes Sonless – both are forms of the most terrible suffering we can know, but they are not 
identical: the Father does not die, and the persons of Trinity do not collapse into three 
identical beings. It is also important to understand the unity of will between Father and Son, in 
that the Son delivers himself up to die. The events of the cross can be conceived only in 
trinitarian terms, and it is where the most profound separation of Father and Son also 
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constitutes their greatest unity; it is where God died and yet did not die, and it is thus the 
place of hope.  
2.3.1 (b) The historical cross and universal suffering 
 ‘What difference does Jesus make?’ is a question asked by many hospice patients and families, 
because our culture does not easily allow us meaningfully to appropriate and universalise the 
experience of another. How can the particular events of Calvary have meaning for someone 
dying in the 21st century? 
The ‘scandal of particularity’ is another aspect of the difficulty of attempting to communicate 
the transcendent within a vestigial mechanistic worldview. Postmodernism presents complex 
possibilities here. On the one hand, the characteristic postmodern rejection of authority and of 
global values makes it hard to understand the process of identification with a ‘hero’ or role 
model – although, in typical postmodern fashion, celebrities flourish! (but normally only when 
they are, or have been, successful). Ironically, this anti-universal culture is also the culture in 
which themed ‘self-help’ groups flourish as a therapeutic tool.183 On the other hand, the 
particular is the locus of postmodern interpretation (in other words, there is a tendency to 
validate one’s own experience in terms of ‘this explanation is true for me’), so the process of 
‘appropriating’ the work of Christ for oneself might not be stigmatised as it might have been in 
modernism. Nevertheless, as we have seen in $1.1, the cultural context is complex and the 
influence of mechanistic thought is still pervasive. 
Fiddes claims that there is no difficulty with speaking coherently about a God who suffers yet 
remains God, and who suffers particularly in Christ yet universally with us. Without becoming 
theologically complex we can see that the incarnation provides a picture or metaphor of the 
particular suffering of God (in Christ) within the universal suffering of the world, and faith 
encourages us to accept this as normative for all people and for all time.184 However, faith 
continues to seek understanding! Further, if God suffers universally then the cross cannot be a 
‘new experience’: God must eternally be suffering love (the lamb slain from the foundation of 
the world of Revelation 13:8). Some theologians have addressed this dilemma by recourse to 
theories either of timelessness or of contemporaneous experience in God, because they are 
rightly concerned to avoid any suggestion of limitation or determinism in God. However, those 
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making use, either explicitly or implicitly, of process insights are generally not persuaded by 
such arguments. Fiddes, Clayton, Moltmann, and Pailin, for example, all believe that a God 
who is outside time cannot truly identify with our suffering or even engage in real 
relationships, since neither suffering nor relationship can be undergone without development 
in and dependence upon time. This position does not, however, necessarily imply that God is 
limited or determined by time, other than by God’s own free decision (this will be discussed 
further in $2.3.1(c)).  
Moltmann argues that the cross can only heal the world if God’s experience holds all death 
and suffering as well as joy and salvation. ‘The “bifurcation” in God must contain the whole 
uproar of history within itself. Men must be able to recognize rejection, the curse and final 
nothingness in it’. He continues: ‘All human history...is taken up into this “history of God”…and 
integrated into the future of the “history of God”’.185 Moltmann continues by discussing the 
way in which God allows Godself to be ‘forced out’, meaning that in unconditional love God 
accepts the contradiction of men and heals it. The Spirit draws believers into this experience of 
the Trinity, which is no closed group in heaven but ‘an eschatological process open for men on 
earth’.186  
Kitamori discusses our use of symbol in our application of the cross to our own suffering and 
pain.187 To human beings, normally the worst imaginable pain is the loss of a child; and the 
idea that a parent might permit or cause the death of the child is so far against nature that it is 
taboo in most societies. Thus the ‘symbol’ and ‘story’ chosen by God to reveal God’s 
unconditional love for us is that of the Father−Son relationship of the cross. In this story we 
can find meaning and healing – but it is of course inaccessible to unbelievers. We must be 
careful not to suffer in vain, says Kitamori in effect, since our pain should ‘serve’ (ie be 
revelatory of) the pain of God in order to be meaningful.  
Interestingly, Kitamori notes that the pain of loss of a loved one can be self-centred and 
indulgent, and even describes it as potentially sinful (we might object that Jesus himself wept 
at the death of Lazarus, but this is not Kitamori’s point in context – he is referring to the 
exclusive nature of familial human love that denies the needs of others, and which Jesus 
condemns in Matt 10:37). Kitamori wants to show that God can communicate powerfully 
through the medium of our sin, and uses the pattern of parental love to do so.188 Man’s pain 
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(such as dying) is difficult to heal when we cannot find comparisons or metaphors to describe 
it. The cross provides such a metaphor but needs to be accepted and heard in order to be 
effective. Kitamori comments further on the cross of Christ as the central symbol of pain in the 
Bible: the suffering Servant was the symbol of redemptive suffering whose pain was fulfilled in 
Christ; and Israel is a symbol of the Saviour to come while the church is the symbol of the 
Saviour who has already come.189 In each case the symbol has both historical reality and a 
transcendent dimension, which Kitamori explores further in his consideration of the way in 
which Jesus links the love of God and love of neighbour – ie that we can find the transcendent 
in the reality of our brothers and sisters. In a materialistic culture, however, we struggle with 
the transcendent aspects of truth. Kitamori’s analysis of humanity’s appropriation of pain 
helps us to understand the need of our culture to find ways of assimilating the meaning of 
symbols and metaphors if we are to grasp the ultimacy of suffering and transcendence at all, 
and in the discussion of narrative (Chapters 4−6) it is important to remember that our scientific 
culture is not very comfortable with metaphor.      
2.3.1 (c) Suffering and the free creation 
In the context of this thesis there are implications of the nature of creation for (a) freedom; (b) 
love; and (c) personhood. 
(i) Freedom. If God is the ground of ultimate reality, whether in a classical or a process model, 
then it is reasonable, logical, and a matter of faith to assert that God is free in his essential 
nature, and that God has created beings in imago dei that can love God in freedom. Here there 
might be a division, however: classical theists of various degrees would probably say that God 
chose to create in this way, that this world is contingent, and that it could have been otherwise 
(ie God could have chosen in God’s omnipotence either not to create or to have created 
differently). Those accepting some process insights would say that God could only be Godself 
in creating as God did; perhaps adding with Fiddes that there is no meaning in ‘otherwise’, 
since this would leave God open to the charge of capriciousness (God could change God’s 
mind, even about sustaining that for which God has already decided). This fear, that the 
classical God could change God’s mind, is necessarily present as a possibility, even if dismissed 
as never to occur – but classical theists, in order to deal with this horrifying scenario, will draw 
our attention rightly to the evidence of scripture that God has always been faithful in God’s 
promises to humanity. 
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Clayton reminds us that, in the progressive revelation of scripture, the creation narratives are 
part of the history of a people who have experienced Yahweh as salvific. Moltmann argues 
that there is nothing in God that is not revealed by the cross.190 I would therefore argue that 
we can say that the creation narratives are coloured by the purposes of salvation, redemption, 
reconciliation and love, and we should not read them as an abstract project of the divine in an 
attempt to be forensic about our own origins, interesting though that might be. We must try to 
hold the whole shape of scripture together in interpreting what any part of it might mean: in 
particular, once we have identified the event of the cross as central and therefore as an 
indication of the eternal nature of God, then we cannot think of creation without the cross 
either. It is disingenuous to say that creation is primary, because of the difficulties of speaking 
of time and eternity and because God is always the Trinity whose second person is the 
crucified Jesus. Thus the God who freely creates in God’s own image is also the God who freely 
suffers on Calvary in God’s own being.  The possibility of suffering is part of the imago dei.   
We, God’s creatures, must be free if we are to respond with true love, which cannot be 
coerced or prompted in any way: ‘…it *love+ cannot command love or counterlove’.191 God’s 
trinitarian nature means that within Godself there is already an ‘event of relationships’ 
(according to Fiddes), and thus the ground for desiring fellowship and communion that is 
other-centred is intrinsic to the very heart of God.  Bruteau describes the ecstatic love of God 
that spills over from the inner relationships of the Godhead, while Vanstone styles it ‘the love 
that overflows from fullness’.192 God ‘cannot’ be otherwise since this is Godself, the God of 
love. God is, however, free to be Godself always.  
It is interesting to explore what this freedom (to be Godself) means. Fiddes says that the 
universe depends upon God for its existence, while God chooses to ‘depend’ upon the 
universe by God’s desire 193− a desire that is much more than a love that arises solely from the 
logic of the statement: God is love. Creation emerges from God’s will and desire. This desire is 
God’s will, but it is also more than God’s will since,194 if God longs for and desires us, that is the 
reason why the universe cannot be different from the way in which it is: it does not make 
sense to say ‘otherwise’. It also means that we cannot think of the ‘time’ when the universe 
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did not coexist with God, because God has defined Godself as the God who desires us. 
Incredibly, ‘God wants us as much as he wants himself’.195 In her book on friendship Liz 
Carmichael discusses the nature of both friendship and love and concludes that the idea of 
ourselves as ‘friends’ of God in a mutual way has been lost and could be helpfully reinvigorated 
in our quest for a modern spirituality.196        
Richard Rohr makes an interesting comment upon our perception – or misperception – of 
freedom that is helpful here. He talks about the difference between secular freedom, in which 
we have to do what we want; while religious freedom is wanting to do what we have to do.197 
Further, he remarks that choosing (ie using our freedom) to suffer nullifies the power of 
suffering. I think that Rohr’s insight is undergirded by something similar to that of Frankl in his 
Holocaust observations about meaningful suffering being bearable. This common ‘something’ 
is about being able to incorporate the experience into our personal stories or narratives, and it 
seems to be about the act of interpretation, which sets an experience in a context and gives it 
meaning. We can choose to interpret or not to interpret, to narrate or not to narrate, and I 
shall return to this idea when I discuss narrative and suffering in later chapters.        
 (ii) Love. Moltmann warns against interpreting love as a romantic goal, and reminds us that 
love can neither command a response nor forbid injustice or cruelty: it must be unconditional, 
and as such it can be abused − or crucified.198 If again we skip around the analytical theology 
for a moment and look instead at the picture or metaphor of the cross, then what we see is 
love. This love is not a gracious and patronising dispensation by a majestic transcendent deity, 
but suffering in agony in an incarnate Jesus. Love means a free (and often hard) choice in this 
world, not a glittering abstraction in some other existence that has no actual meaning for us.  
Love has to be freely given and received: it has to be completely unconditional, or it is other 
than love. Love is the characteristic of God’s dealing with creation (see in particular 1 John 4:7–
21 and the teachings of Jesus, but especially Matthew 22: 37-40; Mark: 12: 29-31). Love is the 
essential nature of God: and the pattern of the Trinity, of three Persons selflessly loving one 
another, is the pattern of God’s desire for relationship with us. This love, and God’s desire to 
love, necessitates the creation of beings who are free like Godself. There cannot be love 
without freedom; and with freedom comes risk. It is this aspect of reality with which so many 
people struggle: the truth that love and determinism cannot coexist, and that actually if God is 
love then there is no ‘problem of evil’ other than humanity’s inability to understand what love 
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really means. The intellectual problem with pain is not in fact the traditional intuition that a 
loving God would protect us from all suffering: this does not make sense in our dealings with 
one another as free beings and certainly does not make sense in terms of God’s dealings with 
us in freedom. The problem is the matter of recognising love and then responding to it. It is 
here that our cultural conditioning and our ability to communicate the locus of meaning are so 
very important.    
Finally we need to notice that the concepts of love and pain are often connected, both in our 
experience and in theology. Kitamori explicitly locates the love of God in God’s pain, for the 
reasons explored in $2.3.1(a). Moltmann explores this connection in the context of the 
crucifixion.  The death of the Son is not the death of God,199 but an event in which life-giving 
love emerges from pain. Moltmann says that we who suffer tend to question God and God’s 
integrity: but in fact, when we cry out in pain we echo the cries of Christ on the cross. ‘The one 
who suffers is not just angry and furious and full of protest against his fate. He suffers because 
he lives, and he is alive because he loves. The person who can no longer love, even himself, no 
longer suffers, for he is without grief, without feeling and indifferent…the more one loves, the 
more one is open and becomes receptive to happiness and sorrow…we suffer and die because 
and in so far as we love’.200  
And of course, God’s love is so full and so perfect that God’s suffering must be full and perfect 
too. Underhill warns us about the seriousness of the New Testament: ‘There we find a 
suffering and love twined so closely together, that we cannot wrench them apart: and if we try 
to do so, the love is maimed in the process – loses its creative power – and the suffering 
remains, but without its aureole of willing sacrifice. Love, after all, makes the whole difference 
between an execution and a martyrdom. Pain, or at least the willingness to risk pain, alone 
gives dignity to human love...without this, *love+ is mere emotional enjoyment’.201  
(iii) Personhood. The third aspect of the free creation that we must consider here is what it 
means to be a person, which is a key concept for this thesis and will be explored in more detail 
in Chapter 3, although it is important to indicate the importance of personhood in the context 
of this section, and considered alongside observations on freedom and love, from which it is 
inseparable. 
From the discussion so far it can be seen that personal love will inescapably involve suffering, 
since the freedom that is necessary for love is also the freedom that will disappoint and fall 
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short. Fiddes explains that the God who endures suffering cannot therefore cause suffering, 
although God is in one sense responsible for suffering because God allows it: this kind of God is 
one who accepts self-limitation for the sake of true freedom and love in that which God has 
created.202 Suffering is not a surprise because it belongs to the nature of who God is. It is also 
true that if God has created persons and not machines (ie creatures governed by cause and 
effect), then suffering is unavoidable in the self-development of these persons – but of course, 
this suffering is both purposeful and redemptive. ‘The goal of God is nothing other than the 
making of persons, and the kind of persons we become is based upon the choices we make, 
the kinds of values we hold to, the ways in which we respond to challenges and 
disappointments. The personality is not a ready-made entity, but is formed through 
experience’.203 It is to the nature of suffering personhood that we turn in Chapter 3. 
Interestingly there is also a case for saying (carefully!) that this ‘growth’ in personhood is also 
true of God’s own being, although this argument does not fit a classical theistic picture of God. 
Fiddes says that God relates to free beings which cause God to suffer. This suffering does 
prompt a ‘change’ in God, but not a change comparable to our human personal change. God’s 
change in response to suffering is such that God becomes more ‘godly’ – more truly Godself. 
Fiddes calls this the ‘perfect incompleteness’ of God.204   
In the light of the earlier remarks on suffering and pain, we can also say that thus God’s love 
increases – not implying that God’s earlier state is ‘imperfect’ (see the discussion in $2.2.1(d) 
on the meaning of perfection in God), but that (in process terms) a ‘perfect’ God can become a 
differently ‘perfect’ God. In fact, in a dynamic relationship, this dialectic process of love and 
suffering and becoming ‘more’ – accumulating new responsive experiences − is logically 
unavoidable. For Pailin, this way of thinking about God describes grace – it is the consistency of 
God’s love for persons despite the moral (and other) changeableness of those persons.205 By a 
parallel argument, if we are made into persons by our journeys of pain and love, and if 
relationships are key to this, then we might tentatively begin to say that actually it is pain in 
particular, and our response to life’s pain, that is significant in our human journeys; that, 
strangely, it is suffering that makes us more truly ourselves if we can recognise in it the 
redemptive suffering of God. This conclusion, which will be developed into the suggestion that 
suffering can be described as ‘ontological impertinence’ and a vital key to metanoia, is the 
complete opposite of the normal human reaction to pain and returns us to the passage in 1 
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Corinthians 1 with which this section began. To close this chapter with the words of 
Moltmann, ‘God did not become man according to the measure of our conceptions of being a 
man. He became the kind of man we do not want to be: an outcast, accursed, crucified’.206  
Perhaps this misunderstanding of God, in a nutshell, is our problem with suffering, as 
presented parabolically in the story of Job.  We want to be like God, but we do not really want 
















                                                          
206
 Moltmann, The crucified God, p 211. 
70 
 
Chapter 3.  Who dies? The place of the person   
A mortal, born of woman, few of days and full of trouble...does not last  (Job 14:1-2, NRSV) 
 
If our culture is predominantly materialist, reductionist, and dualist, then should people be 
content to think that terminal illness and death are merely biological processes of decay? 
Experience would suggest that it is rare for someone to be so clinically reductionist in 
practice.207 In this chapter I will examine some questions around whether, culturally, 
personhood means more than an embodied neuronal network. Although in later chapters I will 
be thinking about suffering in a broader context (ie not just terminal illness), here I want to 
adopt a particular focus on the existential suffering that is attached to dying, because I have 
come to believe that the extreme circumstances of death can illuminate our deepest desires 
and assumptions.  
Why does it seem to our culture that death is a disaster for personhood? What exactly is it that 
comes to an end when we die? In this chapter I will explore this assumption about the 
‘material’ person in the context of death, or ‘the end’, because the supposed finality of death 
may reveal that many people do not in fact fully subscribe to the profound materialism of 
contemporary culture. I will continue the debate in Chapters 4 and 5 by using the narrative 
work of Kermode, Fiddes, Cavarero and Ricoeur with respect to ‘the end’, and the way in 
which our perceptions of ‘ending’ change the way we live prior to that end. If there is indeed a 
sense that personhood includes a measure of transcendence,208 then the interpretive context 
of all suffering and death during a life is altered, and I think this insight can help us to develop 
an approach to the pastoral case of perceived meaninglessness in suffering.      
 
3.1 The material person  
When speaking of British customs around death and mourning in the early 20th century, the 
Anglican clergyman Arthur Chambers wrote: ‘How absolutely and glaringly inconsistent to 
mark our respect for a dear one “passed over,” by using a universally recognised emblem of 
gloom and hopelessness [wearing black]! Do we wonder that the non-Christian man notes it 
all, and mentally asks whether those Christians really believe what they profess?’ He wrote the 
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book Our self after death in 1916 to address the problem, particularly severe during the Great 
War, of what he called ‘Christian agnosticism’ regarding belief in the continuing existence of 
the ‘self’ after death.209 Chambers, who commented prolifically on the subject of death and 
the afterlife, advanced in this volume a theory about the nature of the resurrection body in 
which the recognisable self continues, based largely upon the gospel accounts of the 
resurrection appearances. In his attempt to bring comfort to the thousands of bereaved 
families of wartime Britain, Chambers found himself challenging the materialism of his time, 
which eroded popular confidence in the Christian hope (many historians subsequently 
analysed the seminal impact of the Great War upon our cultural attitudes to death). Our 
culture no longer styles itself as Christian, and even in the churches there is often inadequate 
routine preparation for the end of life: as discussed in Chapter 1, there is a sense that dying 
and death are in fact God’s dreadful mistake.   
The modern hospice and palliative care movement in the UK has, as we have seen, been able 
to rehabilitate the dying person to a certain degree. In hospices, more than almost anywhere, 
it is ‘OK’ to talk about dying and death; the terminal patient is treated with dignity and love; 
and the emphasis is upon holistic care with a genuine commitment to responding to spiritual 
need. Death in a hospice is not perceived as failure, as it might be in an active care setting such 
as a hospital, but it is still understood as an unfortunate ending of possibilities for the 
individual concerned: there will be no more story, no more self-development, no more 
fulfilment. Such an understanding of death is so inevitable in the context of a prevailing 
materialist culture that it can feel absurd even to suggest, within the context of religious belief, 
that death might not be as ‘terminal’ as it seems!  
As a generalisation, if we identify closely with our bodies, then physical death appears to spell 
the end of everything, and the stronger the sense of this physical ‘I’, the harder it is to face 
dying.210 The Benedictine monk Sebastian Moore notes that death is ‘disastrous’ to us because 
of our self-conscious individualism: death is perceived as the endpoint of a highly individual 
experience of living, and is catastrophic because we relate it entirely to ourselves, and anguish 
over our personal significance, rather than accepting it as an event within a process of 
universal significance.211  Ian Barbour echoes this thought: ‘Meaninglessness is overcome when 
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people view human existence in a wider context of meaning, beyond the life of the 
individual’.212 How did our culture become so ‘self’ focused?  
3.1.1 The problem of defining the ‘self’ 
The philosopher Charles Taylor, in his book, Sources of the self, traces the shaping of the 
(western) modern self. He argues that meaning (ie the answer to the ultimate questions: Who 
am I?213 Why am I here?) has been influenced in the West by three domains of thought: 
theism; rationalism; and romanticism. We inherit this complex legacy in the form of a desire 
for justice, freedom, self-rule, and a high cultural priority for the ‘avoidance of death and 
suffering’ (all of which partner an Enlightenment understanding of the person as a rational 
autonomous individual).214 Interestingly, the definition of spirituality that predominates in 
current healthcare settings enshrines broadly this set of attributes of the person: spirituality is 
that which constitutes ‘meaning, value and purpose’, and good healthcare should incorporate 
these things so that a patient is not perceived merely as a statistic (furthermore, the move to 
patient-focused practice has profoundly altered the dynamics of treatment and care).  
Although the intention is admirable, I will argue later that this apparently holistic definition of 
spirituality is in fact implicitly materialistic because of the way in which it assigns value to life. 
Taylor concludes Sources of the self with some comments on the impact of what he terms 
‘instrumentalism’ (a facet of materialism characterised by seeing things as ‘means for ends’) in 
modernity: ‘the individual has been taken out of a rich community life and now enters instead 
into a series of mobile, changing, revocable associations, often designed merely for highly 
specific ends. We end up relating to each other through a series of partial roles’.215 
Interestingly, Taylor believes that a rediscovered commitment to the larger social whole does 
not address this loss of meaning, which has taken place at a deeper metaphysical level, linked 
to the cultural ‘disenchantment’ of the universe.216 Taylor’s belief is not necessarily in 
contradiction to Barbour and Moore (above), since their rediscovery of meaning within a larger 
whole refers to a metaphysical metanoia, the appeal to some kind of transcendent belief, 
rather than to social and cultural behaviours. The question, ‘Who am I?’ in a general context is 
loaded with existential pain that can only be magnified in the contemplation of individual 
death, the focus of pastoral concern here.      
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Nikolas Rose has made an interesting analysis of the contemporary and highly influential 
therapeutic culture and its relationship with the self’s fulfilment. He suggests that the 
‘liberated’ self (ie the self that necessarily has to choose its life story from the alternatives 
available) is ‘obliged to live its life tied to the project of its own identity’.217 We are obsessed 
with our individual freedom;218 we identify ourselves through our freedom; and we reach for 
that freedom by becoming experts or by using the expert knowledge of others (power and 
professionalism), to maximise our understanding of the options available to us.219 This desire 
for ‘freedom’, which is embedded in the philosophical autonomy of the contemporary 
‘patient-led’ healthcare culture, is in fact quite isolating.220 Once again we find that the goal of 
self-fulfilment, where self is identified as the rational autonomous individual, generates issues 
around the meaning of life.  
There are myriad ways of examining and explaining the ‘person’, the ‘I’, or the ‘self’: even the 
use of these terms is disputed between scholars, and arriving at a consensus is probably 
unachievable. For example, while Taylor uses the terms ‘person, ‘self’ and ‘human agent’ 
interchangeably, Young-Eisendrath & Hall conclude a volume of essays on aspects of the self 
with the conclusion that ‘A person [my italics] is universally recognized as a particular 
occurrence of a point of view and point of action within a human body. A sense of oneself is 
secondarily formulated according to principles of individual subjective experience given within 
one’s social group’.221  
Some theologians suggest that the definitional difficulty around the person is characteristic of 
postmodernism: for example, Elaine Graham222 speaks of the mercurial nature of personhood 
as ‘the discursive result of inhabiting a culture’. The ethicist Stanley Rudman surveys 
approaches to personhood in the first part of his book, Concepts of person and Christian ethics, 
and remarks on the ‘complexity of the concept and the diversity of interpretation’.223 What is 
clear for the purposes of this pastoral study is that although the ‘person’ conceived by liberal 
individualism (broadly implying the rational autonomous subject) may be the assumed 
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functional model in our culture, it does not withstand much analysis or real life experience.224 
In this thesis I will generally use the terms ‘person’ or ‘self’ interchangeably, and in a dialogical 
sense (see $3.2).      
To add to the complexity around definition, a common contemporary assumption is that 
persons are ‘fragmented’: in other words, the complexity and disunity of our culture imposes 
multiple reactive ‘selves’ such that modern persons struggle to identify the ‘real me’. Stephen 
Levine, a Buddhist who teaches meditation techniques to dying people, observes that we 
spend so much time wishing we were ‘other than we are’ that we are not even sure who is 
dying,225 which, if true, is a revealing comment upon the constructed self of the modern and 
postmodern era.226 Dealing with this apparent confusion of identity is also a significant and 
recurring theme in the writings of the Christian mystics (and other religious), and in modern 
psychotherapy, ethics and anthropology. Linda Woodhead, however, says that theologians in 
particular have too readily assumed this ‘problem’ of the ‘fragmentation’ of the self in 
modernity; she argues that postmodernism has not caused so much as revealed the 
possibilities for multiple identities. There was no earlier ‘golden age’, when persons were 
‘simpler’.227 Holstein & Gubrium also acknowledge the complex pressures on the socially 
conditioned self, while advocating that the self is not just responsive, but able to stand up to 
postmodern pressure:  the self is ‘a construction that we both assemble and live out as we 
take up or resist the varied demands of everyday life’.228 Nonetheless, the confusion about the 
self (even if more perceived than real) creates a cultural context of pressure for the dying 
person, who is dealing with the loss of much that has subjectively defined his/her life, and is 
asking which bit really matters, which bit has enduring significance.       
Other writers utilise the move towards the less dualistic and more holistic aspects of 
postmodernism to seek new ways of describing the self. One such is Alistair McFadyen,229 who 
seeks an understanding of the person that lies between the inadequate extremes of the wholly 
collective or the wholly individual by using the concept of dialogue. I have found McFadyen’s 
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personhood a very helpful complement to the ideas and concepts from process thought and 
from narrative that are key in this examination of the suffering experience.  McFadyen avoids 
identifying body with self, and also avoids the understanding that personhood is a ‘something’ 
enclosed within a physical body. Rather, a person is intensely relational and fluid. Another is 
Stanley Rudman, who surveys personhood approaches in Concepts of person, and concludes 
that ‘Human personhood, it is clear, is importantly related to relationships and communication 
between people, as well as individual rationality and purpose’.230  This summary seems key to 
the questions behind this thesis about meaning, relationship and narrative, and identifies an 
area of popular assumption on personhood (that persons are autonomous, rational, individual) 
that may need to be challenged if we are to break through the complexity of issues around 
suffering.  
3.1.2 Theological background: the God−world relationship 
These difficulties over the nature of the person (from a theological perspective) are arguably 
rooted in a more fundamental problem over which theologians lack consensus, and which links 
neatly back to the question of the God−world relationship explored in earlier chapters – and, 
even more specifically, to the question of whether we are able helpfully to model human 
personhood upon divine personhood. What does it mean to be created in God’s image, and 
how do we know what God’s image is? Do we say, with traditional theism, that God is wholly 
other and therefore all speculation about human nature can begin only with revelation? And if 
we understand God as an absolute being, who confers personhood upon us, then the nature of 
God’s ‘absoluteness’ is also significant. For example, is our view of God influenced by 
traditional theistic or process insights? And how can we even begin such an argument without 
confronting scientific materialism?  
Rudman’s analysis of the history of Christian personhood is helpful here. He challenges 
theologians to examine the trajectory of philosophical thought over the centuries and to be 
open to the consideration that theology must be a dynamic process. He notes the tendency, 
particularly in studies of personhood that emerge from doctrines of the Trinity, to make use of 
the writings of the early Fathers without engaging adequately with the developing historical 
context of thought. Rudman231 comments: ‘It is not enough to show what the early Fathers 
believed. The continuing adequacy of their views must be argued for’. Rudman believes that 
we need to ground personhood in an ‘understanding of human nature which combines 
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attention to empirical factors with theological interpretation’.232 Rudman argues that such an 
overemphasis on the Fathers, because of the Hellenistic subculture, will also be an overly 
rational process.  He suggests that models of human personhood should be grown 
theologically not only from trinitarian doctrine, which developed from reflection on the 
gospels and stories of the early church, but should equally rely upon, say, creation doctrine, in 
which relationship and communication are significant characteristics of the nature both of 
creature and creator.233  The incarnation provides a way of thinking about an embodied and 
temporal God (as opposed to the God who is other) and affirms the use of anthropological 
insights in trying to develop a model of human personhood.    
Rudman believes that rationality and relationality are both important in thinking about the 
analogy between divine and human personhood. Tradition has emphasised rational thought 
while modern theologians are more organic, but either will provide a skewed picture without 
the other.234 Within this, Rudman is careful to caution that the differences between the 
creator and the created should not be blurred; and that direct inferences from the inner life of 
the Trinity (about which we can know nothing) to human relationships should not be made.  
The Trinity is not a ‘blueprint’ for human social behaviour.235 However, he adds, ‘In the process 
of drawing an analogy between divine and human personhood, the original conception of 
human personhood is deepened and enriched...the Trinity may become the correcting lens for 
our understanding of human mutuality, particularly if we find this insight corroborated in 
prayer and worship’.236 Once again we are challenged to consider the very nature of reality and 
of the act of knowing (and of interpretation), to question the totality of empiricism, and to 
allow transcendent experience to play a part in our understanding while continuing to hold 
that the world we inhabit is neither illusory, nor so irreparably damaged that it no longer tells 
us anything about God, but is actually indicative of the nature of God. 
The problem of the right balance of rational and of empirical explanation is not new, but 
evolves alongside the developments of natural science as the latter expands its influence. 
During the scientific revolution of the 20th century, alongside which the western crisis of 
Christianity became established, many theologians were concerned to relate Christian doctrine 
to the modern scientific world and to develop views of the person that had contemporary 
credibility. Pannenberg observed in the 1970s that no valid revival of the cosmological proof of 
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God was possible in a contemporary scientific mindset:237 the relationship between God and 
nature had been philosophically and comprehensively decoupled in modern thought. In 
addition, western Christianity from Augustine onwards had become progressively privatised, 
leading inevitably to a loss of its universal credibility and a move away from Christendom and 
towards humanism as a unifying social philosophy. Pannenberg thus argued that ‘Christian 
theology in the modern age must provide itself with a foundation in general anthropological 
studies’.238 We have no choice but to use human experience: otherwise we are not arguing in a 
comprehensible language.  
Pannenberg also argued that if God is found in all aspects of human experience, then in any 
engagement with history we are also in fact engaging with God’s revelation: and this reality 
should present possibilities for theology and personhood.239 From a contemporary perspective 
Linda Woodhead concurs, arguing that theologians should look around and see what is 
happening in the world: ‘To have any real bite, theology should engage seriously with the 
complexity of the modern world and the diverse modern construals of selfhood. It should do 
so in honest acknowledgement that it is already implicated in these strands and has played a 
significant part in their unfolding’.240 She means, among other things, that no monolithic 
theological position is likely to be credible today; a diversity of approaches that make sense in 
today’s culture will be more fruitful.  
The Catholic theologian Karl Rahner argued that all concepts and experiences are 
metaphysically and analogously linked to the absolute, which we can name as God.241  Rahner 
believes that we cannot logically speak of man without God or God without man (rather as 
Fiddes rejects the idea that the suffering world could be ‘otherwise’). If this is true then an 
anthropocentric theology is a perfectly acceptable approach that does not contradict 
theocentricity.242 Personhood for Rahner is understood as ‘man’s transcendence, his 
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responsibility and freedom, his orientation towards the incomprehensible mystery, his being in 
history and in the world, and his social nature’.243  
Each theological approach has its strengths, but the challenge of this particular culture in 
which we live, shaped by scientific materialism, demands that we pay careful attention to the 
nature of reality, and whether in fact there can be a credible metaphysical separation between 
God and the world in the manner of traditional theism. If we cannot make use of the 
experience of the everyday world to ‘see’ God (metaphorically) then we will not be able to talk 
to most people in words that they understand, less still help to moderate the existential fear of 
death. The same point is made conversely by Grace Jantzen, who notes that holding an 
extreme view of God’s otherness would mean that even God’s self-revelation will tell us 
nothing that we can comprehend.244   
Theologically, the issue of whether ‘God’s reality’ is different from ‘our reality’ is crucial to our 
self-understanding, and to the credibility of a theistic position. In the apologetic volume 
written by Rahner with Weger, the authors say that in the past, ‘One existed to serve God, 
created by God. One knew where evil in the world came from and where suffering came from; 
one had one’s place within a clearly structured society, and so on. And today?’245 They argue 
that we cannot communicate theology in yesterday’s language, but plead also for a special 
humility in our attempts because, ‘Even less than other people do Christians have final 
answers...’.246  
There are many advocates for a fresh look at forms of natural theology; or at least to be 
conscious of some of the difficulties of a traditional theistic starting point. To attempt to 
approach the issues of suffering and death pastorally means necessarily that we have an 
awareness of these difficulties.   
3.1.3 Social and biological concepts of death 
A great deal of helpful research has been done in anthropology and sociology on the dying self, 
which supports and enhances some of the theological approaches but which begins from  very 
different starting points. For example, the view that persons exist by virtue of their 
relationships in some way emerges consistently across a variety of disciplines.247 The 
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anthropologist Monika Konrad248 claims that ‘a “person” stands for a locus of 
relationships...social relations reveal the persons they produce...every relation contains within 
it its own outcome, which is a previous relationship in a transformed state’ (the similarities to 
some of the concepts of process thinking are obvious); while Kaufman & Morgan249 see 
personhood as ‘conferred, attenuated, contested, and withheld by the collective. It does not 
reside in the physical or cognitive attributes of individuals’. Young-Eisendrath & Hall say that 
‘Characteristic features of our individual selves are appropriated from the communications and 
practices of our tribe’.250 Yet again, Waskul & van der Riet, in a study of the effect of body 
image in cancer patients on selfhood, believe that the relationship between body, self and 
society is culturally constructed, not ‘natural’.251 Does all this mean that there is no such thing 
as a person, but just a relative concept? 
It has already been noted that there are many models of the person, constructed with regard 
to multiple referents and with different emphases. Nevertheless, as John Lizza comments, just 
because ‘person’ has various definitions does not mean that death − which he insists depends 
upon the definition and ontology of the person − collapses into relativism. Rather, he says, we 
need to ask which approach to personhood makes most sense of the experience of death, 
which he understands as not just biological but metaphysical, ethical and cultural.252 We can 
begin to think about death and its meaning (as opposed to lack of meaning). Lizza’s suggestion, 
which echoes the common theological plea for contemporary relevance, seems to be a helpful 
way forward when trying pastorally to navigate the turbulent area between the culture of 
materialism and its reduced view of the person, and the experience of death with its 
transcendent dimension.  
What exactly happens when someone dies? We understand what it is to be alive; and we know 
after the event that someone is dead, but what about the actual process of dying? Sometimes 
the act of dying is complicated by technology: the removal of life support systems in hospitals 
would constitute one such area, as would the use of certain interventions such as tube 
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feeding, or the use of resuscitation in terminal patients.253 Commonly life is considered extinct 
when brain death is established, and the medical criteria associated with brain death are 
constantly under review.254 In practice most medical teams would usually look for the 
permanent cessation of heart, lung and brain activity.255 At the hospice, death is usually more 
‘natural’ (because medical interventions are minimised), although the question about when 
exactly a person ‘ceases to be’ remains – if, indeed, that is what death is.  Is death simply the 
point at which breathing ends and the heart stops? Or is that point just a medical milepost to 
mark a significant step of the transition from life to death? Medical ethicist Paul Ramsey notes 
that ‘we need some procedure for determining when a life is still with us, making its moral 
claims upon us, and when we stand instead in the presence of an unburied corpse’.256 
This question about the point of death is important, since many terminally ill patients are 
heavily sedated by painkillers for some time prior to the cessation of breathing and have long 
since ceased to take an active role in the family or group: the end of breathing makes no 
effective difference to their social contribution, but it does ‘liberate’ those who watch and 
suffer with the dying. This liberation is essential for the continuance of the life of the wider 
community and normally comes as a profound relief as well as a time of deep sadness and 
loss.257 In recent research on palliative bereavement services, Milberg et al comment that, 
‘Even if being a caregiver to a dying relative or friend may be meaningful, it is clear that many 
family members also often experience substantial degrees of anxiety, depression, exhaustion, 
worse physical health, an existential crisis, and negative role changes during the patient’s 
deterioration. After the patient’s death, the family member may struggle with intense 
suffering to do with feelings of loss, loneliness, anger, guilt, and doubts about whether they 
had done enough for the patient’.258  Scripture validates the deep sense of loss and existential 
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fear combined with continuing history that characterises human experience in raw, bleak 
language:  
As for man, his days are like grass, 
he flourishes like a flower of the field; 
the wind blows over it and it is gone, 
and its place remembers him no more.  
(Psalm 103: 15-16); 
 
And, elsewhere: 
Man born of woman is of few days and full of trouble. 
He springs up like a flower and withers away; 
Like a fleeting shadow, he does not endure. 
(Job 14:1-2).  
 
These remarks will make it clear that from the pastoral perspective of the chaplain the event 
of dying is multidimensional. I would like to suggest that Cicely Saunders’ insight into the 
complex nature of total pain (and, arguably, the nature of true humanity) is finally both 
exposed and resolved at death. Mark Cobb, who has written extensively on healthcare 
chaplaincy, comments that dying is not ‘just a matter of irreversible pathology and 
catastrophic biological failure for the individual or for society’.259  
Similarly, sociologists Hallam, Hockey & Howarth comment in their study of death and social 
identity, Beyond the body,260 that life and death may not be so easily separated as we should 
like. In another article, Howarth explains that in premodern Europe life and death were 
mutually dependent, each having implications for the other. Earthly wealth dictated one’s 
resting place and memorial, while death (the great ‘leveller’) was for all a reminder that 
judgement was a possibility if one’s morality and charity left much to be desired. The 
Reformation, with its insistence that the dead were dead and intercession for them was 
pointless, helped to reinforce the separation between the living and the dead.261  
In Beyond the body, Hallam et al discuss a matrix of possible identities such as being socially 
and biologically alive; socially and biologically dead; socially dead and biologically alive (eg 
having dementia or being in a persistent vegetative state); and socially alive and biologically 
dead (the ‘continuing presence’ of the recently deceased).262 It is also true that the 
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memorialisation of the dead helps to form the identity of the still living, in that it provides a 
historical context that may be considered determinative: the dead person becomes a genetic 
and a social ancestor, with all the associated power of leaving an inheritance.263 A familiar 
example might be the post-Holocaust identity of Jewish people. Margaret Mitchell’s 
compilation, Remember me, includes some discussion of the suggestion that the relationship 
with a dead person continues and may even grow. 264 ‘It is evident that the dead do not go 
away but are maintained’, she remarks.265 The use of material memorial objects is another 
interesting area of study.266   
3.1.4 The person fragmented by dualism   
As we have already observed, Hallam et al note that materialism tends to lead to an overt 
identification of the body and the self, which renders the self vulnerable to disease, age and, of 
course, death.  In addition, to an outsider the self is understood as boundaried and defined by 
the body, but to the person concerned, the self also has an identity apart from the body 
(although the authors do caution, contra dualism, that the self exists in a physical and social 
context of which it cannot be independent; see also the fascinating discussion of the 
inseparability of the mind and brain by d’Aquili and Newberg267). Problems arise when 
observers ‘read off’ an inauthentic identity from a damaged body – and this is an issue of care 
for the terminally ill person, especially where communication is impaired and it is difficult to 
establish needs and wants (this also applies to the disabled, the elderly, and anyone who ‘looks 
different’). 
Two issues are identified as of particular interest here. First, there is an ongoing conflict 
through life between the active, individual social self and the decaying biological self, culturally 
experienced as the denial of ageing, disability, and death. Hallam et al comment that ‘Self-
reflection thus becomes more pronounced when the limits of the physical body are 
experienced’,268 because sickness, suffering and death are crisis points in this conflict. This self-
reflection is definitely observed in terminal hospice patients, and I refer here to Ian Ainsworth-
Smith & Peter Speck’s model of the dying patient’s ‘cones of awareness’, in which the number 
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of significant persons with whom the terminal patient interacts gets smaller with time until the 
dying person withdraws into him- or herself.269 This tendency is sometimes described as 
‘decathexis’ in the palliative literature.270 Therapeutically this is the point at which life 
reflection projects271 can be helpful – for example, writing or making visual or virtual life 
stories; preparing memory boxes or letters for relatives; having conversations about the past; 
and possibly seeking forgiveness and reconciliation if appropriate. In Chapters 4 and 5 I will 
examine the importance of narrative in more detail in the experience of suffering.  Other 
severe traumas may precipitate an extreme form of this ‘inward’ journey: Pines describes her 
therapeutic work with Holocaust survivors in which some survived the death camps by going 
into a form of ‘psychic death’ – a perceived separation of self from body. Not surprisingly this 
fragmentation of the whole person causes problems in later life.272 
Secondly, Hallam et al note the existence of a fear associated with the loss of normal 
boundaries in the sick or dying body, which challenges the western cultural obsession with the 
‘classical’ body that is clean and well controlled. This fear is thought by anthropologists to be 
linked to the human fear of the liminal or threshold state (see $5.3 of this thesis for a 
discussion of liminality). Julia Lawton conducted a 10-month study of hospice patients whose 
bodies were disintegrating from their disease, and concluded that hospices permitted the 
‘sequestration’ of such bodies, allowing wider society to continue to ‘live’ as normal.273 In a 
paper on the ‘abject’ (ie ‘degraded’) body, Waskul & van der Riet274 offer the belief that the 
relationship between body, self and society is culturally constructed, and therefore fragile in 
the event of serious damage to the body, as occurs through cancer. The ‘normal’ balance 
between self and body is disturbed, yet we are dependent upon the body to give expression to 
the self. In our society the visible expression of self has a utilitarian priority over inner 
meaning, although when pressed, people will acknowledge that these inner aspects of self are 
important. However, in the public space the priorities are often with utility.275   
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Clearly both these issues are pronounced in a materialist society, which has a deeply dualistic 
approach to the mind or spirit and body that escalates the conflict described between the real 
and ideal body. The second issue, the fear of abjection, is aggravated by our consumerist 
appetite for advertising and visual beauty. In a materialist society that has ‘downgraded’ its 
traditional religious or other metanarratives, it is not surprising that the body becomes the 
seat of meaning (and hence the popular interest in Dawkins’ reductionist genetics, or Stephen 
Hawking’s ‘theories of everything’, which dispense with God). The existence of soul or spirit276 
is an uncertainty for many people (because the non-material natures of these entities render 
them invisible in materialism) and ‘self’ is an apparently more rational category with which to 
work, which can be more easily accommodated within a materialist description.  
A dualist view of the person, separating body from soul, spirit or mind (depending upon one’s 
categories), is associated with certain assumptions about the nature of reality. In essence, 
dualism tells us that there are two sorts of ‘stuff’ − the physical and the non-physical  − which 
by definition are not interconvertible.277 Thus when we come to discuss ultimacy, we have a 
decision to make since there can logically be only one form of absolute reality. Either the 
ultimate is spiritual, or it is material, or it is something other than these, of which we cannot 
conceive. Materialism commits to the ultimacy of the physical and thus subordinates all other 
categories of reality to that which can be empirically examined. This decision has profound 
implications for any understanding of death and resurrection. Christianity traditionally has 
undone this dualism in theory with its insistence upon the resurrection of the body and its 
roots in Hebrew culture, yet in practice it has functioned as though it is only the spirit that 
survives death.278 This theme of the nature of reality is a recurrent one but deeply significant 
because of the entrenched and often invisible nature of the dualism described.     
The effect of a materialist metaphysics on the interpretation and experience of dying is clearly 
profound, since dying represents the logical crisis of both the conflict and the abjection. As 
anthropologists Kaufman & Morgan observe, beginnings and endings of life are ‘frequently 
characterized by a time of provisionality, indeterminacy and contestation as social relations 
are reordered’.279 This time of stress and decathexis280 among families of the terminally ill is 
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well recorded in the literature on dying and grief and accords with experience at the hospice. 
Such fluid categories of relationship and self-understanding do not fit comfortably into a 
materialist worldview. Once again we are led to the conclusion that a materialist paradigm 
does not easily contain the dying experience, and those who are dying are caught in the clash 
of worlds described in Chapter 1. The absent dimension in materialism is of course the 
transcendent: the material person at the end of life is left asking the question: ‘What happens 
to ‘me’ when I die?’, which materialism cannot address. Religious faith should address it, even 
if it cannot give an answer.281 
3.1.5 The ‘medical/professional gaze’ and the degradation of the dying person 
To summarise what has been said so far, there is a significant consensus of opinion across 
disciplines that personhood does not reside in the physical or cognitive attributes of an 
individual, but is formed in the community and context of lived experience − a major shift 
away from the Enlightenment projection of the individual autonomous person, characteristic 
of modernism, and which complemented the Reformation emphasis on the individual 
conscience.  Nikolas Rose writes: ‘The Protestant revolution begins a new era in the culture of 
the self and the systems for self-direction, in which the union of conscience, casuistry, and the 
cure of souls is rejected; in its place, each individual comes to bear the obligation of doing the 
will of God...’.282 This isolation of the self is existentially unbearable without faith, and Rose 
attributes the popular dependence upon therapies (as a substitute for religious belief) to this 
spiritual pain. The late 20th century Christian movements of charismatic renewal, and more 
recently of a recovered interest in monastic spirituality, may be responses to the hidden sense 
of meaninglessness that has pervaded the most individualistic expressions of church.283     
One of the developments of a technological and materialist society has been the ‘medical 
gaze’, a new perspective on the body, arising during the 18th century from a combination of 
anatomical scholarship and clinical practice and achieving ever-increasing diagnostic success 
and consequent authority.284 The medical gaze in its strictest form reinterprets death as a 
purely biological event, and life as a ‘commodity’ in which ‘bits’ of bodies can be replaced, 
repaired, and regrown from cells much as one would deal with a machine or engine. The 
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impact of medicalisation on death has been explored by McNamara and others and is 
discussed in Chapter 1.  
One of the consequences of the medical (or professional) gaze is a shift in power, away from 
family networks and the dying person him or herself, towards doctors and other professional 
staff.  A progressive disenfranchisement of the dying person takes place, which is increased by 
the experience of institutionalisation. Over the generations, families and friends have lost the 
confidence to deal with dying locally and have submitted increasingly to professionals. This 
whole process is endorsed within a materialist paradigm, in which the body, one’s utility in 
society, and professional skill, are all (and increasingly) described in reductionist terms. In 
1976, Ivan Illich wrote that ‘Socially approved death happens when man has become useless 
not only as a producer but also as a consumer...Dying has become the ultimate form of 
consumer resistance...Technical death has won its victory over dying. Mechanical death has 
conquered and destroyed all other deaths’.285  Ironically today, at the same time as the NHS 
has been considering a new commitment to spiritual (as well as medical) care and the hospice 
movement is growing, so is the requirement to document, objectivise and professionalise 
spiritual care.286 McNamara287 (whose experience in Australian city (not rural) hospices seems 
to parallel the UK hospice scene288) notes a further contradiction in the shift to patient-centred 
palliative care – that often dying becomes extremely individualised, and, even in the hospice 
movement, the emphasis has shifted from dying well to living well while dying, because the 
patients (and carers and professionals) themselves have bought into the materialist paradigm 
so fully that to think about death is abhorrent.289  
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Waskul & van der Riet290 note that cancer patients often undergo a loss of confidence in their 
bodies after the disease (whether or not they are ‘cured’). The damage to the balance 
between self and body already noted can be permanent. This loss of confidence may be the 
result of aggressive treatments, or arise from the disease process itself, and often patients will 
deal with the abjection by distancing themselves from their own bodies, perhaps by using 
humour. We could interpret this as a serious loss of power − and certainly of personal 
integrity, or freedom − in an embodied materialist environment. It allows the abject body to 
become an ‘object’ of professional interest – and of distaste. Nikolas Rose comments that: 
‘The regulative technology of expertise has invaded the competence of the individual and 
family, and produced dependence upon the state, the corporation, and the bureaucracy...Even 
personal life and forms of self-reliance have been transformed into a set of skills to be learned 
from doctors, social workers, and psychologists’.291        
With the delegation of power to professionals, however, comes another consequence. 
Decisions about care are more likely to be made on materialist criteria simply because funding, 
training and authority are predicated upon a materialist (and ultimately a market) philosophy. 
Thus materialism is cyclically reinforced between patients and (professional) carers.  Further, if 
the patient’s ability to communicate his or her preferences is impaired, the family (acting on 
that patient’s behalf) is more likely to default to the professional’s view. If personhood is 
perceived starkly in terms of the autonomous individual, then it is vulnerable with the loss of 
communicative ability and the absorption into the institution. However, if personhood is 
conceived as social and contextual in some way, then the whole perspective changes and the 
dying process has the potential to become more meaningful and less destructive. In Chapter 4 
of this thesis I will explore the development of narrative – and narrative medicine is of 
particular interest here – as an approach to reality.  Narrative interaction, rather than 
transactional, has the ability to replace the medical gaze with something altogether more 
holistic and can reveal different aspects of what it is to be human.   
An interesting project was undertaken recently by photographer Walter Schels and his partner, 
journalist Beate Lakotta, in a German hospice, in which photographs were taken of a number 
of patients before and after death. The team used the photographs to create an exhibition, 
which was installed at the Wellcome Foundation in London in the spring of 2008. The purpose 
was to tackle the ‘horror’ around the dead body and the fear of death.  At the start of the 
project, Lakotta explains how she had been frightened of death, especially because Schels, her 
partner, was 30 years her senior. The couple hoped to learn from the hospice patients who 
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were soon to die, and found a wide range of attitudes towards death among them. Ultimately, 
Lakotta comments, ‘I wouldn’t like to be treated as just a corpse, a dead body – “just close the 
coffin as soon as possible.” I would like that people I loved would look at my last face’.292 The 
couple experienced a profound reorientation towards the experience of abjection through 
simple exposure to the death of patients they had come to know well. This rehabilitation of 
death took place in a hospice, where the ‘medical gaze’, although still present, is less powerful 
than in most healthcare settings, and interpersonal relationships with dying people may 
develop more normally, profoundly affecting the way in which the terminal patient, and 
indeed death itself, are perceived . 
  
3.2  A way forward: the dialogical person 
We have examined how, in the western world, ‘person’ commonly implies a highly 
individualistic phenomenon deeply influenced by materialism. The model of the material 
person has serious inadequacies because it fuses the ontological and functional aspects of the 
person together. Once a person’s functionality is impaired, his/her (whole) personal being is 
also suspect, and questions of value and meaning become painful. The overview in $3.1 has 
shown that across various disciplines there has been a significant move towards a less 
reductionist view of the person based upon social and cultural constructions.  
It will be helpful in developing better pastoral care to use a theological approach to 
personhood that offers a corrective to excessive materialism while ‘making sense’ in 
contemporary culture. Alistair McFadyen’s model293 addresses this concern thoroughly – his 
‘dialogical’ person holds the self in relationship and the self in context together with a 
mainstream Christian theological understanding of what it is to be human and created by the 
triune God (ie it bridges anthropology and theology). It is also a model that explicitly allows for 
the importance of story or narrative in the understanding of the person (McFadyen speaks of 
memory and language games); and one that I believe can be used in conjunction with process 
                                                          
292
  There is a report of the exhibition by Kmietowicz in the British Medical Journal, and one by Martin in 
The Lancet.  A record of the project, entitled Life before death, is held in German at 
http://encore.wellcome.ac.uk/iii/encore/record/C%7CRb1665186%7CSlife+before+death57COrightresul
t%7CX3?lang=eng&suite=pearl, last accessed 1415h on 27 September 2010. 
293
 McFadyen, Call, passim. 
89 
 
and narrative insights to attempt to challenge some of the limitations of a materialist 
worldview.294  
3.2.1 Overview of McFadyen’s personhood 
McFadyen’s concern is to answer the question ‘What is a person?’, which originated in his 
early background in mental health nursing. Mental healthcare, like palliative care, deals with 
people on the boundaries of mainstream (and, I have argued, materialist) society; and I would 
argue that their circumstances could probably, as for the dying, be categorised as liminal (see 
Chapter 5) and therefore viewed as separate and even frightening in their strangeness.295  
McFadyen observes that some approaches to the person refer everything to the individual 
(which at its logical extremity leads to chaos and anarchy), while other approaches are overly 
collective and displace personal responsibility. He seeks a tertium quid that respects the 
inherent social and theological relationality of human life, and in doing so draws upon the 
work of the sociologist Rom Harré,296 and on Martin Buber’s theology of the ‘I−Thou’ 
relationship.297  McFadyen does not dialogue explicitly with the work of Paul Ricoeur, but I 
believe that dialogical personhood forms a natural partnership with Ricoeur’s narrative 
anthropology and will later discuss the helpful connections between these models.     
McFadyen concludes that we become ‘personal centres’ or selves by relating to other personal 
centres or selves via communication: ‘A person is a subject of communication...’,298 and ‘Being 
a person means existing in relation’.299 Each of us is a recipient, from others, of information 
that changes us: we accumulate a reservoir of such information and experience and are thus 
‘sedimented’ subjects of communication, in which history and context are important. 
(Pastorally this model feels highly appropriate when working with families at the hospice.) 
McFadyen understands creation in the image of the trinitarian God300 to mean that we are 
unavoidably and ultimately related, both to God, as the recipients of the divine address (the 
vertical dimension), and to other humans (the horizontal dimension), because the Trinity is a 
relational community of being (whose desire is creation). Personal identity and individuality, 
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says McFadyen, are neither asocial nor presocial, but develop from relationship. In other 
words, a person is not first a ‘thing’ that then relates, as construed in materialism, but rather, 
from the imperative of relationship a person begins to understand his/her centred identity.  
Relationship and community are thus ontologically prior to the individual, although 
relationship and community also require a degree of individual uniqueness and 
incommunicability to exist, says McFadyen. The unique centre of each person is indispensable 
although it cannot exist in isolation from others. 
If we lose the importance of relationship such that we posit individuals as self-constituting, 
then humans are isolated from God (this isolation being the main theological problem with the 
idea of the immutable and impassible God, see Chapter 2 of this thesis). McFadyen argues that 
this relationship means that God creates us with the freedom to respond, or not respond, to 
God’s address: there is no determinism about grace. However, we are not free to remove 
ourselves from dialogue because we are contingent beings: we cannot change God’s 
intentional address to us.301 Thus we come to McFadyen’s definition of sin: the image can be 
spoiled, but not destroyed: we can choose to ‘be deaf’ but we cannot stop God from 
‘speaking’.302 In McFadyen’s model the Fall represents the choice of self over God and of 
individual over relationship.  
The dynamic nature of personhood understood dialogically challenges the barrenness of 
materialism and allows us to reconstruct a holistic alternative that is of more help to the 
marginalised person (dying, disabled, ageing, dependent, of ethnic minority background, or 
otherwise compromised materially). Persons are structures of response ‘sedimented’ 
(McFadyen’s term) from all past dialogues;303 the context of the dialogue is clearly important, 
as is the existence of memories (history). Full personhood is awarded by social consensus to 
those whose dialogues make sense in the public sphere: ie there is some regulation or code of 
communication that arises from mutual understanding and respect, from being socially ‘for 
others’. Christians call this other-centredness ‘love’, and its ultimate origin is God and the 
perfect nature of the undistorted divine address. It follows that the church is thus the 
redeemed community in which dialogue should take place ‘properly’. It should be 
transformational of, and not destructive of, the other. In everyday terms this means that there 
is meaning to life because God is, and because God speaks.  Persons do not necessarily 
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perceive this dimension of meaning and can often attempt to live in denial of it - Rose remarks 
that a good life is now defined psychologically (ie in terms of self-fulfilment), not morally and 
ethically.304 However, the existence of meaning that is not reducible to the activities of the self 
is of great importance for the discussion of finding meaning in death, and I will use the 
categories of Ricoeur’s narrative theory to explore this further in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
3.2.2  How is a self identified dialogically? 
In $3.1 I discussed some contemporary difficulties with describing the human ‘self’ or person, 
with a particular focus on addressing the issues of suffering and death that I have identified in 
a material culture. I was concerned to think about the question of exactly who or what suffers 
and/or dies, because I think this is key to understanding the pastoral problems faced in 
extremis.  McFadyen’s dialogical personhood may be a helpful way forward at this point. 
McFadyen agrees with the consensus position outlined in $3.1 that the public recognition of 
the self is primary, while self-recognition is secondary, which again, constitutes a challenge to 
pure materialism.305 The body is very important indeed: it provides boundaries to the self, and 
also a physical and active centre for the ‘sedimented relations’ which can be identified by 
others; it is the result of genetics, development, and responses to the environment. The body, 
however, locates us physically but not socially, and so we cannot be reduced to a physicality. 
McFadyen says that the word ‘I’ describes a relative location, not a thing: it pinpoints a 
communication partner but can only be understood in the context of a matrix of persons.306 
This understanding corroborates the idea of $3.1.3, that physical death and social death are 
not the same, without capitulating to a dualist position.     
The self does not have a substantial personal core, as in materialist thinking, but is centred by 
holding a belief about oneself within the matrix of dialogue with others that is reinforced over 
time and after multiple interactions – a form of ‘testing and refining’ of the centred self by 
dialogue and dialectic. So, ‘Self is not a thing people have within them, but a theory which they 
have about themselves which facilitates personal existence’.307 It is also true that the person is 
never fully transparent to itself – it depends upon feedback from others.308 This self transcends 
embodiment and experience because it is self-aware, and it carries a continuous identity 
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throughout the changes of life even though it is dynamic and not static.309 To some extent, 
however, self is formed by the expectations of others, which form part of the context of the 
dialogue, and therefore open up the possibility of distorted dialogues − another locus for the 
impact of language and story and memory upon the person. Distorted dialogues can be 
described as manipulating the other, while undistorted dialogues give space to the other. The 
marginalised person in a materialist culture is the subject of multiple distorted 
communications which say: ‘you have no (economic) value’. This is a serious issue for the dying 
person, not only in terms of resourcing treatment, but also in terms of articulating their 
experience socially.  
McFadyen310 notes the existence of both a deep self (the ‘I’) and a local self (the ‘I−Thou’), 
which become evident in different contexts – the deep providing a reserve of identity while 
the local can disintegrate. McFadyen notes that it is essential for there to be continuity 
between the deep and local self, so that a person has an integrated private and public life – 
otherwise there is serious internal and external confusion about who the person might be.311 
This integration can only take place if there is some kind of consensus over what constitutes a 
meaningful communication, and again we are reminded of the conflict of cultures for the dying 
person.  This idea of the deep and surface selves is developed by Michael Kearney312 in his 
work with terminal patients, which is based upon the Jungian theory of individuation. 
Kearney’s observation is that dying people need to contact the deep self to find peace and 
meaning in their death: not everyone is able to do this, especially if their carers avoid depth 
and collude with denial. Those who practise forms of mystical or meditative prayer (Christian, 
Buddhist, Sufi etc) are familiar with the ‘deep’ territory and often find the dying experience 
less frightening. Once again we are led to the consideration of transcendent meaning and to 
the necessity of persons encountering the liminal spaces in life in order to access meaning. 
These ideas from the basis of the narrative arguments in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
3.2.3 The death of the dialogical self 
In writing about a time of serious illness, when suddenly there was no confidence about there 
being a ‘next week’, the historian Donald Nicholl speaks of ‘hitting the buffers’: losing the 
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‘horizontal’ dimension to life and discovering the need to learn to live in the ‘vertical’.313 If 
McFadyen’s personhood model of two-dimensional relationality is viable, then death or 
serious illness should not suddenly involve a massive reorientation from the horizontal to the 
vertical; rather, given the inevitability of death, we should ideally become aware of our 
relational multidimensionality in the midst of life. Materialist thinking militates against this 
awareness, as we have already discussed, by focusing exclusively on certain aspects of the 
horizontal, and seriously inhibits our ability to prepare for death.  This idea of holding onto the 
vertical – or, perhaps more clearly, the transcendent – takes us into a discussion of how 
comfortable we are with liminal experience (see Chapter 5) and also, eventually, towards the 
development of the key idea (explained in Chapters 5 and 6) of understanding suffering as 
‘ontological impertinence’: an experience of profound reorientation.       
I discussed in Chapter 1 the broad understanding of spirituality in healthcare settings as being 
about meaning, significance and value. In McFadyen’s model, meaning, need and freedom are 
never private, but are all experienced through dialogue:314 the parallels between spirituality, 
personhood, and relationality are thus not hard to see.  Based upon this consideration of 
McFadyen, Frankl, and others, I want to summarise the journey at this point to say that 
meaning in life is about the perceived continuing value of the self, but the self is experienced 
in the context of a social existence and so meaning does not just depend upon some inner 
‘thing’. It is in part a gift from others, including God. Full personhood is unavoidably spiritual 
and relational, but recognising meaning as existing primarily outside oneself315 is extremely 
difficult in our society, which promotes self-fulfilment, self-expression, self-development, with 
‘self’ being understood in an individualistic subjective manner.     
How does a person die ‘dialogically’? If personal meaning is developed via the exchange of 
information which changes us (through dialogue), then any problems or distortions in 
communication will damage the person. Complete incommunicability is impossible for a 
created and contingent being, because the divine address calls us into being. We can, once we 
are socially independent, choose to cut ourselves off from interpersonal communication; and 
physical or mental illness can cut us off from others in an involuntary manner, but the early 
physical and emotional dependence of the foetus, of babies, and of young children means that 
once we have been conceived, we can never really say that we are without others. We cannot 
escape our inherent relationality. (The importance of this given relationality will be explored 
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further in a discussion of Cavarero’s work in Chapter 4, which in turn draws on Ricoeur.) 
Furthermore, the undistorted address of God is beyond our control and we cannot prevent 
God from speaking (although in freedom we can choose not to hear). The life, work, and 
particularly the resurrection, of Christ inform us primarily that the address of God is not 
interrupted by death but continues into the life to come: we remain persons in dialogue 
because of this vertical and transcendent dimension of communication. The logical extension 
of this argument is that personhood has an inviolable dimension, which survives not only 
death but any form of abuse or cruelty. This ultimacy of the person is surely what is recognised 
in, for example, legislation to protect human rights, or the American Constitution, and which is 
somehow held in the very being of God. If so, this notion also takes us back to a consideration 
of Whitehead’s process thought, in which objective immortality indicates the eternal retention 
within God of all experience.  Whether or not this kind of immortality is a just and sufficient 
‘compensation’ for those who have suffered greatly is a matter of current discussion (see $6.3 
and especially fn 555).    
McFadyen discusses ways in which dialogue between centred selves can take place: one can 
manipulate another self; one can be manipulated; or the partners can truly seek one another 
in undistorted communication (this latter is conformity to Christ; being other-centred; 
sanctification). Distorted communication occurs when one treats another as an object rather 
than as a true dialogue partner; ie when the desire to change and be changed by the dialogue 
becomes lopsided or closed in some way – and arguably describes the experience of suffering. 
The question for us here is: when this damage to the person occurs, is this partial (or total) 
death? McFadyen speaks of death as being closed off from others; when no further growth as 
a person (through dialogue) is possible. For example, a person can be damaged by his/her 
sedimented communication history (eg past abuse, manipulations). To try to enter a healthy 
dialogue with this person, so that s/he can recover a sense of personhood, is a costly business, 
which we would call love, and requires a considerable level of self-giving and possibly 
(appropriate) self-disclosure. Can McFadyen’s personhood help us to develop, in conjunction 
with narrative and process insights, a view of suffering that does not deprive a person of 
meaning  and value even in the most extreme circumstances?  
 
3.3 Enhancing the model of the dialogical person  
In the mire of multiple personhood definitions, Fraser Watts offers some helpful and practical 
advice, which is especially appropriate for the complex area around suffering and death. He 
suggests that we need to maintain a broad view that holds together the biological and social: 
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science tends to emphasis the former, while contemporary theology focuses on the latter.316 
At first glance, Watts seems to be saying the same thing as McFadyen, who searches for the 
balance between the individual and the collective. However, Watts believes (although I am not 
sure that I agree) that McFadyen neglects the biological at the expense of the social, and that 
his dialogical theory is insufficiently embodied.317 Watts mentions James Nelson’s book 
Embodiment (on sexuality and theology) and also feminist writings as examples of theology 
that attempt to engage the body fully, but adds that (at the time of writing) this fusion is 
rare.318 Stanley Rudman includes a short discussion of embodiment in his book on personhood 
and ethics, in which he mentions the importance of the body for women as a result of their 
social childbearing and nurturing functions, but also the way in which a masculine and dualistic 
society has hitched this holistic bodiliness to negative social status.319  Rudman notes that 
feminist theologians have made an important contribution in identifying this issue but need to 
be careful not to turn it into a grand narrative in its own right.320 I want to argue that by using 
process theological insights to interrogate aspects of McFadyen’s relational model, we can 
develop a way of thinking about the suffering and/or dying person that is pastorally very 
helpful and also successfully links the social, biological, and theological aspects together. 
Is McFadyen’s perceived lack of bodiliness simply his reaction to the prevailing materialism of 
our culture? In the introduction to The call to personhood he identifies excessive materialism 
as a problem in healthcare, saying: ‘The most common form of this individualistic explanation 
*of the person+ attends almost exclusively to the material reality of the individual’s 
body...Therapy is then a matter of physical, usually chemical intervention...Counselling and 
other more personal forms of therapy will tend not to be offered’.321 This has, until recently, 
been the usual experience of dying people in the hospital, while in the hospice there can often 
be an overcompensation of ‘spiritual’ care to counteract the ‘medical gaze’, manifested, for 
example, in the proliferation of complementary therapies. These therapies are often of 
dubious demonstrable physical benefit, but there is a vague and often strongly defended 
feeling that they help to improve ‘wellbeing’. I discussed earlier (in connection with Rose, 
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Taylor and Illich) the possibility that the use of therapy can itself be a capitulation to 
materialism but in a disguised form, because therapy is also normally offered in the form of a 
‘professional’ intervention – if so, the hospice might not be as countercultural as it first 
appears.   
3.3.1 The vertical dimension/the transcendent  
McFadyen describes the need for persons to relate in two dimensions – the vertical (God) and 
the horizontal (with others). It is possible to argue that a third dimension is also appropriate – 
meaning that the wider world in which we live and on which we depend is also somehow 
constitutive of our personhood. This argument returns us comprehensively to the debate 
about the God−world relationship explored in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
Process thinking is panentheistic, meaning that the creation is perceived to be held within God 
in some way, and so even the ‘obvious’ distinctions between living and non-living may be 
ontologically suspect in certain forms of argument. Fraser Watts, for example, notes that 
humans share an evolutionary path with ‘nature’ and are part of it – human experience, while 
mysterious, is grounded in the brain, which is a physical organ in the material world.322 Watts 
adds that presumably divine action in the natural (ie non-human) world does not need to be 
revealed because there is no consciousness there; but although such action is not perceived it 
is not necessarily correct to assume that divine action does not take place. Miracles, continues 
Watts, need not be understood as flouting natural law, but rather as occurrences in which a 
theological explanation is more appropriate than a materialist one. One’s definition of a 
miracle is clearly important. Robert Ellis explores this theme in his book on prayer: ‘God’s 
providence extends, in a direct way, over all of nature, over the corporate life of humanity, and 
over the destinies of men and women. Everything and every event is related to God’s will and 
care’.323  
3.3.2  Dealing with dualism 
Ian Barbour finds process thought helpful in rejecting the perceived science/theology divide 
and in Nature, human nature, and God discusses research on the characteristics of systems 
that are of interest when thinking holistically about the nature of reality.324 He focuses on the 
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characteristics of self-organisation, indeterminacy, top-down causality, and communication. All 
challenge a materialist or causal view in some way and could be said to be the type of issues 
that lead to a paradigm shift in thinking.325 Barbour seeks a model of God that rejects the kind 
of divine intervention that violates the laws of nature, which by definition also means that in 
this model there is no rift in the types of reality, no body/spirit dualism. Process insights 
provide such a model, incorporating the four characteristics mentioned and also adding a 
sense of what Barbour terms ‘interiority’, which is of particular interest in the debate about 
the person.  
Interiority refers to the retention of past experiences, which is an important feature of 
McFadyen’s personhood model (described in terms of sedimentation), and also corresponds 
neatly with the process understandings of concrescence and of ultimate meaning (ie being 
held in the eternity of God in some way). Interiority involves both communication and 
emotion. Emotion is particularly interesting because it comprises non-sensory experiences and 
is not generated materially (although it is mediated materially, by the brain). Neurologists 
d’Aquili & Newberg have studied the science of mind experiences over many years, and have 
concluded that it is impossible to separate the mind from the brain (ie the conceptual from the 
biological); and also that there is good biological evidence for the existence of a transcendent 
reality, whatever that might be.326 Process thinking thus invokes a kind of multidimensional 
cobweb of events and relations within which our lives unfold and are integrated: a unified 
reality that has transcendent and immanent, material and non-material, aspects. The body (for 
Barbour) is the ‘vehicle of relationality’327 with other persons (McFadyen terms it the location 
of sedimented relations). 
3.3.3 The use of narrative  
The use of narrative to access and describe life experiences is another common denominator 
in both process and dialogical thinking, which retains both immanent and transcendent 
aspects through its metaphorical nature, and is perhaps the only way we have of accessing 
interiority: it cannot be studied empirically in a comprehensive way. Barbour argues that 
science and theology can be held together if a person is understood as a ‘multilevel, 
psychosomatic unity who is both a biological organism and a responsible self. We can avoid 
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both materialism and body−soul dualism if we assume a holistic view of persons with a 
hierarchy of levels’.328 Barbour’s approach is narrative in character: a mixture of objective fact 
and subjective experience. Narrative is both derived from and constitutive of persons, and 
bridges myriad metaphysical divisions with ease, as a child realises when s/he seeks to 
understand abstract concepts. 
3.3.4 Problems with power  
McFadyen’s dialogical model of the person also deals with issues of power: in short, the 
‘quality’ of the dialogue between persons is a measure of its authenticity (ie Christ-likeness). 
Distorted dialogue devalues and can damage a person, maybe permanently; and the power 
balance between persons can influence or be influenced by their dialogue. In Chapters 5 and 6 
I will think further about the power dynamics in the story of Job.  Process thinking, by 
providing a God-model that addresses a number of the issues of classical theism relevant to 
the person created in imago dei, can illuminate this issue of power and thus the nature of the 
person: (i) God’s power is not dominating (as in omnipotent magisterial power), but 
empowering of others; (ii) divine power is limited in process thinking by metaphysical 
necessity, not by God’s choice (addressing the problem of impassibility and the charge of 
capriciousness); (iii) human freedom is therefore real: we are truly not determined and God is 
absolved of responsibility for evil.329   
In summary, to adopt process insights about the nature of reality is beneficial for thinking 
about the person in multiple dimensions.  It confronts the problem of how God can interact 
with a creation that is wholly ‘other’ and the need to speak of the miraculous violation of 
natural law; it addresses the problem of evil and suffering. It affirms the embodied person 
holistically and dynamically in relationship, and tackles perceptions of power. All these points 
are helpful in working towards a pastoral theology for death and dying. 
3.3.5 Existential longing   
If McFadyen is right, and personhood involves both a horizontal and a vertical (or 
transcendent) dimension, then it is not unreasonable for that vertical dimension to manifest 
itself in our lives in some way. Nicholl spoke of ‘hitting the buffers’ in crisis, which alerted him 
to his lack of awareness of the vertical dimension. Perhaps more commonly we are aware of 
an ill-defined existential longing, something in us that searches. This longing, often addressed 
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futilely by consumerism in the global market economy, is the ‘mark of infinity’ upon us: our 
necessary desire for God.330 Silesius331 warns his readers about the power of this inner longing:  
Crave nothing short of God; I say it clear and strong. 
How holy you may be, your idol it will become. 
 
Perhaps we could say that in Christ we see one whose longing is perfect; and for ourselves, if 
our lives are lived and interpreted in a context of materialism, then life itself may become our 
‘idolatrous’ goal, with death as the disastrous alternative.332 I will return in Chapter 5 to 
Ricoeur’s analysis of the root of this longing – our awareness of our mortality − and expose 
further the implied necessity of the transcendent for human being.  Chapter 4 will build on the 
idea of personhood introduced in this chapter.  A dialogical model of the person, adapted by 
process insights and open to narrative description, may offer a vehicle for improved pastoral 
care.    
Personhood in such a model is never static, but ever changing under the ongoing dialogue with 
God and with others. This multifaceted dialogue thus contains both eschatological (the perfect 
response yet to be realised) and redemptive (the ever-renewed address by God) dimensions. 
The essential openness of this personhood model, to God, to the world, and to the future, 
presents a challenge to the material self and establishes the essential transcendence of being 
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Chapter 4. Narrative and transcendent experience 
I will not restrain my mouth; I will speak in the anguish of my spirit. (Job 7: 11, NRSV) 
 
In this chapter I will argue that there is in postmodern Britain a cultural reaction against the 
categoreal nature of materialism that has led to a renewed interest in story and narrative – 
and several examples of the therapeutic use of story are offered. By drawing on the work of 
Ricoeur, Niebuhr and others, I will outline some of the grounds for assuming a narrative 
character to the nature of reality, which in turn implies transcendent and relational grounds to 
the notion of personhood.  This examination forms a basis for establishing connections 
between personhood and narrative, and then I take the further step of linking narrative to 
process thought to complete the networking of ideas about suffering persons that was 
initiated in Chapter 1.    
The classic text on suffering in the OT is the telling of Job’s story: in this telling, he eventually 
finds peace. Telling the story of one’s life has a healing quality. It is cathartic, for example, for 
those who have undergone a severe trauma, or for people who have led a very public life and 
need to explain the hidden dimensions of that life which justify their apparently inappropriate 
actions.  More modestly, therapeutic intervention at the hospice indicated that finding a way 
to record the past brought a sense of purpose and direction to the fraught pressures of the 
present, and the (often fearful) anticipation of the future. Mention has already been made of 
the Rosetta Life project, which seeks to capture the life stories of hospice patients by using 
arts: in music; in film; in poetry; in art or craft; and in digital media of various sorts.333 One of 
Rosetta Life’s projects hit national fame for a brief period in 2005, when musician Billy Bragg 
helped cancer patient Maxine Edgington to write We laughed, a song inspired by a photograph 
of her with her 15-year-old daughter Jessica. This song was played on national radio and sold 
many copies. The lyrics proclaim the deep joy of a loving relationship and also a sense of loss 
(although definitely not self-pity) for the past times – one line of the song declares ‘we never 
thought those days would end’ − but there is also a calm resignation about moving into the 
future.    
Although these projects provide a memorial for the dying person there seems to be more to 
them than simply ‘leaving something behind’. The actual process of recording the memories 
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and feelings is a powerful step towards the acceptance of death. The chorus of We laughed 
declares:334 
And the hardest part of living  
is giving up what has been given; 
and you know no-one could love you more,  
whatever the future has in store,  
I want you to remember that we laughed. 
 
And the song ends poignantly,   
 
Some things don’t turn out as planned:  
if I give you to our Father’s hand, 
I want you to remember that we laughed. 
 
One patient of the hospice at which I was chaplain was a gifted artist, and produced an 
exquisite mandala335 for her family which contained references to her marriage and daughter 
that would have been easily discernible to those concerned. She also wanted to write 
something for this (teenage) daughter – both a life story and an expression of her love − but in 
spite of repeated attempts was unable to finish this before it was too late. As chaplain she 
asked me to visit her at home the day before she died, but could not complete the written 
project: however, her artwork told her story perhaps more appropriately, since she was an 
artist and not a writer. Another patient, who had very limited artistic ability of his own, asked 
me to buy a sculpture for his wife that modelled their family of three. His family (himself, his 
wife and his daughter) was the most important thing that had happened to him and this was 
his way of telling that story to his wife as a permanent memorial. All these examples indicate 
the desire to record one’s life story in some way. Psychologist Dorothy Rowe remarks in her 
study of death that ‘...our brains work in such a way that nothing is meaningful to us until we 
have fitted it into a story’.336   
Anthropologists have researched the memorial activities of human beings and note this 
common desire to ‘live on’ after death – discussed in Chapter 3 in terms of being biologically 
dead but socially alive. But observations at the hospice suggest that there is much more to this 
phenomenon than simply a desire to be remembered, or a kind of ‘human immortality’. The 
telling of the story has a therapeutic or healing value. I would like to explore some 
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philosophical and theological dimensions of this storytelling process that may be useful in 
underpinning pastoral work with dying people. 
There is some variety in the use of terms in this area. The use of metanarrative or grand 
narrative appears to be reasonably consistent across the literature and means something like a 
religious or political system that provides an interpretive framework for life or social events (eg 
Christianity or Marxism would be classed by most people as metanarratives). The terms 
‘narrative’ and ‘story’ are often used interchangeably, and normally the meaning is evident 
from the context; but we can also discern ‘levels’ of story or narrative, which some writers 
attempt consistently to distinguish. For example, one level refers to an extended happening 
over time (eg a person’s life, or the account of an organisation, or a war); while another refers 
to ‘smaller’ events that are linked together sequentially to form the bigger ones (eg the 
account of what happened yesterday). In this thesis I generally use ‘story’ in a personal context 
(eg someone’s life story) and ‘narrative’ as a more technical description.337 
 
4.1 Narrative selves and postmodernism  
Postmodernism is complex and on the whole has characteristically defied systematic 
description. Gerard Loughlin offers a helpful overview: ‘Postmodernism is not the dawning of a 
new age, but of a day without tomorrow...[it] is the idea that the once hoped-for future of the 
human race has arrived...[it] is the economics of the consumer market applied to all areas of 
human life...*it+ is a fashioning of commodities’.338 He goes onto explain that when the old 
master stories of religion began to lose credibility, modernism reinvented master stories which 
it told with ‘scientific rigour’.339 Unfortunately these new master stories generally lead to 
horrible futuristic scenarios that no-one wants, and so everyone begins to invent their own 
little master stories. This culture of multiple metanarratives, characterised by a high degree of 
autonomy, is postmodernism.   
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4.1.1 The lost transcendent dimension 
In Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis I discussed the residual dualism of postmodern western 
culture and the way in which such dualism impacts negatively the transcendent dimension of 
life. ‘Modernity was the great period of boundary-drawing’, notes Philip Clayton, adding that 
postmodernism is characterised by the transgression (not the destruction) of boundaries.340 
This idea is a useful one because within postmodernism the old cultural patterns of modernism 
are both recognisable and opened up. Others echo these analyses: ‘The greatest weakness of 
modern thought consists in the false identification that is constantly made between scientific 
thought and the effacement of all human relationships, their reduction to the simple 
objectivity of things’, says René Girard;341 while Alasdair MacIntyre342  describes the social 
tendency of modernism to separate and divide and its philosophical tendency to reductionism: 
both tendencies are destructive of any sense of telos and contribute to a general sense of 
nihilism.  
There is some evidence that westerners are tiring of this monochrome materialist worldview – 
for example, there is an increasing interest in spiritualities of all kinds,343 frequently couched in 
the language of holism and realism, and a renewed interest in narrative as opposed to analysis.  
Paul Ricouer,344 deeply frustrated in the 1970s by the straitjacket of reductionism, developed 
over the next 30 years what became almost a systematic framework of thought that is often 
styled ‘phenomenological hermeneutics’ (meaning that it is interpretation based upon real life 
experience) and which hinged upon a narrative concept of reality. Hauerwas & Jones have 
recently (1997) gathered a set of essays on narrative and agree that the significant current 
interest is likely to be a response to the aridity of Enlightenment philosophy. They draw 
attention to the ubiquity of narrative claims and suggest that narrative and epistemology are 
linked: narrative is not simply a form of literary criticism but is arguably a basic conceptual 
category.345  Stephen Crites describes this insight as the ‘narrative quality of experience’ and 
notes in particular the ontological coherence that narrative lends to the events of a life over 
time. Grace Jantzen says ‘Philosophers can generate universals in abstraction, but in so far as 
we hope to understand the world and the society which we inhabit, let alone offer 
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constructive interventions, we cannot dispense with actual life stories, the narrative of 
individuals and their intersections’.346 With her usual perspicacity Dorothee Sölle cuts through 
the morass of western forensic thinking and comments, 'Contemporary attempts to restate 
religion or to state it anew simply do not make sense unless they take into consideration the 
centrality of experience'...'experience sets itself over against the empiricism of normality and 
the idealization of scientific learning in which the individual is reduced to a number, and over 
against "bending the knee to the altar of reason"’.347   
4.1.2 The return of the story 
The church is often popularly perceived as a modern and authoritarian construct and therefore 
unattractive in a postmodern setting. In response, organisations such as Bible Society and the 
Northumbria Community have started storytelling initiatives, developing narrative-based 
communication techniques for the traditional content of scripture. The revolt against 
prescriptive thinking has also taken place in other sectors, and the NHS worked on the 
development of a policy named Caring for the spirit,348 which placed a value on spiritual 
healthcare, while since the mid-1980s there has been a growing interest in ‘narrative 
medicine’, in which consultations have evolved from forensic and transactional encounters 
between experts and patients to dialogues about life in which patients’ information is received 
less critically.349 Writers and speakers such as the psychologist Oliver James are openly 
challenging materialism;350 there has been outspoken (if transient) public criticism of the way 
in which consumer politics have obscured the ‘things that really matter’ during the global 
recession beginning in 2008; while the Reith Lectures of 2009 given by Michael Sandel 
discussed the need for our culture to develop a shared moral philosophy (we currently struggle 
with a fragmented morality combined with a legislated emphasis on individual rights and 
corporate standards, which is highly and often unhelpfully relativistic).351   
If narrative is truly a fundamental category, then the human fascination with stories, both in 
describing the deep things of reality and as relational tools, is easy to understand; but 
narrative perceived in this way may also provide a rationale for the deep desire of suffering 
and dying people to leave a story behind them, which thus has implications for pastoral care. 
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Narrative may provide the essential link between the very immediate lived materialism of daily 
modern life and the transcendent dimension of being that is often manifested as desire, 
longing, fear and anxiety and which we find it so difficult to name and to manage.  
4.1.3 Internal and external stories: harnessing the transcendent  
I would like to return to the idea introduced in Chapter 1 that one of the tensions around a 
dying person is that of articulating a transcendent experience in a dualistic materialist culture.  
Philosophical theologians have described this tension in various ways. R. H. Niebuhr locates its 
roots in what he terms the ‘two-aspect’ theory of history, in which we think in terms of 
‘internal’ (ie personal) and ‘external’ (ie public) stories or histories.352 Too often, he says, we 
relegate revelation and the sacred to the ‘external’ location and fail to understand such history 
as ‘ours’. We think of ourselves as observers of, say, the gospel stories, and not as participants 
in them.  This is quite unlike the way in which the NT writers make use of the OT as their own 
‘internal’ history.353 Niebuhr develops the notion that internal and external histories exist 
properly in a dialectical relationship.354 Each is challenged and reshaped by the other, although 
this can only really happen if the histories are internalised. This dialectic is also explored by 
Ricouer in Time and narrative (vol 3), in which he discusses the world of the text and the world 
of the reader: ‘...considered apart from reading, the world of the text remains a transcendence 
in immanence. Its ontological status remains in suspension – an excess in relation to structure, 
an anticipation in relation to reading. It is only in reading that the dynamism of configuration 
completes its course. And it is beyond reading, in effective action, instructed by the works 
handed down, that the configuration of the text is transformed into refiguration’.355  Thus the 
text, or the external story, is not a frozen and static thing that is merely observed, but can be 
‘refigured’ by its user or reader. This dynamic and dialectic process has to be recognised as a 
form of participation.   
Ricoeur speaks of a cycle of testimony and revelation.356 We tell a story, and in the telling the 
story is revealed to both teller and listeners, and transformation occurs – the way in which we 
approach the story changes. In a dialogue between Ricoeur and Lewis S. Mudge at the 
beginning of Essays on biblical interpretation, they discuss the ‘I AM’ discourses of Jesus in 
John’s gospel.  Ricoeur calls this the ‘trial of truth’ in the fourth gospel, which establishes the 
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identity of Jesus through a process of testimony (lived and spoken) and reflection that is 
revelatory. The church must continue to reflect in this way upon the testimony of Jesus in a 
new context.  This dynamic occurs not only in the history of the church and other groups, but 
also in individual life stories; and resonates with Niebuhr’s internal/external picture and with 
McFague’s model of dialogical personhood, in which persons are formed and shaped by their 
dialogues within a context.  It seems likely that the perceived integrity of a history will 
determine its staying power or its sedimentation potential.357   
Alasdair MacIntyre, in After virtue, observes the profound effects that this dialectic (between 
internal and external histories) can have in society. He argues (and we might perceive echoes 
of C. P. Snow’s two cultures) that in the west a true scientific culture was largely lost and then 
resurrected from a skeleton knowledge, with the result that we possess fragments of a 
conceptual scheme that has lost its significant context. He then argues that the same thing has 
happened with morality. The problem is that we cannot see what has happened because the 
phenomenon is institutionalised, and since we have the trappings of morality without the 
context, the result is a contemporary morality that is a ghost of what it should be.358 It lacks 
integrity because we cannot understand what it is to do with us.  The result is that moral 
decisions are extremely difficult to make and moral arguments easily become cyclical and self-
referential.  Ricoeur’s analysis of our modern inability to ‘hear’ the Bible (a story of 
transcendence) is based upon a similar contention: we have lost our sensitivity (the ‘first 
naïveté’) to the symbolic language of scripture through our desire to control and atomise our 
context.359 Because scripture does not seem to address our concerns in a rational manner, we 
may stop listening to it altogether: ‘something has been lost, irremediably lost: immediacy of 
belief’, says Ricoeur, although he then speaks of the ‘second naïveté’, when ‘by 
interpreting...we can hear again’.360 
Christians thus do continue to believe that scripture describes reality – it is the story of the 
God−world relationship, although not in a scientific language.  However, the vital point here is 
not the kind of language that is used, or even whether it is ‘true’ (although Christians believe 
that it is true), but rather that it is part of our shared history, and we cannot escape our 
history. We cannot live as if it were not so (ie we cannot pretend that historically there was not 
supposed a transcendent dimension to reality).  We have together been irreversibly changed 
by the existence of this reality story as it has been told and retold.  To attempt to separate our 
personal lives from any historical context is an inadequate (and reductionist) hermeneutical 
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strategy.  If we do attempt it, the result is to disengage us from the shared stories of our world, 
which of necessity (because they are shared and not merely personal) have a transcendent 
universal dimension.  Ricoeur, describing the way in which we pursue our own life stories, 
comments: ‘In place of an ego enamoured of itself arises a self instructed by cultural symbols, 
the first among which are the narratives handed down in our literary tradition. And these 
narratives give us a unity which is not substantive but narrative’.361  
Christians tend to think in terms of non-believers refusing to engage with the story of faith and 
thus failing to discover meaning in life; however, the criticism can also be levelled that the 
Christian community refuses to engage properly with the world’s story, and even its own story, 
by taking an overly dogmatic approach to doctrine as definitive of what it is to be a Christian – 
thus being too reductionist and too self-referential. In a recent article on ‘aesthetic theology’, 
Paul Fiddes considers the difficulty of regarding Christianity as culturally distinct from the 
world in which it is embedded. He describes the linked but different functions of systematic 
and narrative theologies: the former provides a grammar362 or set of rules (Tolley suggests a 
landscape363) for interpreting the scriptural story, while the latter takes a less theoretical and 
more holistic approach to scripture: ‘In short, literature tends to openness and doctrine to 
closure’.364 Fiddes explores the idea that the surrounding culture (he examines extrabiblical 
literature in particular) needs to be allowed to ‘break in’ to the Christian story, to open it to 
new insights and reshape the Christian community in each new generation so that the world 
and the church can speak the same language.  This is a dynamic and dialectic process.  Does it 
matter that some of these narratives with which we should interact are not ‘true’ (ie they are 
fiction)? Ricouer argues that the division between what we call ‘history’ and what we call 
‘fiction’ is a thin one indeed.  History is interpreted as we order it into an account; while fiction 
can in fact change and impact a reader’s life as s/he reads, interprets and internalises the 
story.365 Lindbeck notes, ‘It need not be the religion that is primarily reinterpreted as world 
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views change, but rather the reverse: changing world views may be reinterpreted by one and 
the same religion’.366 
Ultimately the attempt to separate internal and external histories divorces people from belief, 
meaning and relevance: without an internal history that is linked to a bigger vision, we cannot 
really have a sense of a goal for life. Niebuhr comments that ‘To be a self is to have a god’,367 
linking the need for story with the need for a sense of the transcendent with the notion of 
personhood, all in one. He feels that only a decision of the self can effect the transition from 
observer to participant and styles this as metanoia.368 It is a new way of looking at life, a 
complete change of perspective.  Ricoeur, in his opus, Time and narrative, explores the 
connections between what he terms ‘cosmic’ (or universal) time and ‘human’ (or lived) time, 
which is the same kind of idea.369 Ricoeur notes that our awareness of the two kinds of time 
causes us existential anxiety: we recognise that cosmic time exists beyond us and without us, 
and our mortality becomes very evident.  This anxiety is understood to drive us to leave in 
some way a mark of our human significance: the drive to establish a personal story or narrative 
in some way (though Ricoeur notes that this mark will still have to be interpreted by those who 
come after us, and we cannot control the act of interpretation). Ricoeur also notes the 
existence of historical time, which mediates between cosmic and human time. An example is 
calendar time, which allows us to place events in relation to one another: so we might be living 
through an event, but the context of that event is something else: historical time allows us to 
conceptualise both.370  I will examine the importance of the temporality of narrative for 
suffering further in Chapter 5, but here it is useful to note that we cannot actually exist on 
internal history: it is linked philosophically to the external or cosmic dimension. This has two 
important consequences for this argument about suffering persons: (i) that our human 
relationality is inscapable; and (ii) that transcendence is not something we can choose to buy 
into: it is a part of being human, however successfully we might live on the material plane for 
much of the time.          
Logically, then, we are driven to say that personhood itself is dependent upon this link to 
‘godness’ (whatever that godness might be: but certainly ‘it’ transcends the individual). 
Without this shared human search for meaning (ie the process of linking the personal story to 
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something ‘bigger’ and with greater longevity), we cannot have a shared history: this is the felt 
plural misery of postmodernism, in which we have to make moral decisions and in which we 
undergo suffering and death. Hauerwas & Burrell argue that an ethical life can only be properly 
constructed in terms of a narrative, because then it includes this context of which we are a 
part: ‘It is exactly the character of narrative that helps us to see that we are forced to choose 
between some universal standpoint and the subjectivistic appeals to our own experience’.371  
This appeal is to ‘practical’ wisdom in preference to systems and prescriptions, and Hauerwas 
& Burrell emphasise in particular the fact that the intelligibility of the plot is not the key thing. 
Narrative exposes rather than explains. It provides context, not causality.372  Narrative is thus a 
suitable vessel in which to place questions that do not have an obviously causal answer: and 
the question about the origin of suffering, which is a part of the living and dying process, falls 
into this category.  
 
4.2 Characteristic paradigms of narrative 
In $4.1 we discussed the philosophical possibility that narrative is a fundamental category of 
reality; but this possibility can also be explored by theology and science. Three main world 
religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) are essentially narrative in form; while investigations 
in neuropsychology by scientists such as d’Aquili & Newberg and Cozolino suggest connections 
between brain and mind and the nature of consciousness that lead to a narrative basis for 
brain activity. Cozolino373 has written a chapter entitled The construction of the narrative self, 
in which he describes the centrality of narrative in building and organising the brain during 
evolution. He says: ‘Despite the number of voices in our heads and our changing feelings, 
thoughts, and sensations, we generally experience ourselves as stable and consistent through 
time. The stories we tell about ourselves have a unified agent – a single self that is the 
protagonist of our stories’.374 This unifying process sounds rather like McFadyen’s sedimented 
personhood, but without the latter’s explicit dimension of God: Cozolino views the self as a 
social construction, although he acknowledges the value of story and myth in human learning 
and (psychological) healing. D’Aquili & Newberg go further in insisting also that it is possible to 
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experience the transcendent as a unitary state, and to demonstrate that experience (of unified 
being) through tests of neurological activity. They note also that science will never be able to 
establish whether the transcendent experience actually exists or whether it is generated 
within the brain itself, because empirical science can only test the brain and not the 
transcendent.  However, there is broad current agreement that narrative may be a 
fundamental activity of humans, in which case we should be able to identify some 
paradigmatic characteristics of narrative – as attempted here. These characteristics can be 
observed consistently in pastoral engagement.  
4.2.1 The universal desire for coherence in a life story 
People need to link their temporal experiences together diachronically and also to place them 
within a bigger picture. This insight is key to the development of my own argument about the 
meaning of suffering from a pastor’s perspective.  Ricoeur’s exploration of the various types of 
time – human, cosmic and historical – is enormously helpful and will form a major part of the 
discussion in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.  However, many others have explored the idea of 
needing a personal story for life, and I would like to acknowledge some of them here. We have 
already considered Niebuhr, who pinpoints the need for this sense of coherence over time; 
while Crites speaks of the resonance between the ‘mundane’ (personal) and ‘sacred’ 
(fundamental narrative) stories in the world, meaning that when we feel that our own story 
has points of identity with the ‘big’ stories of life then there is a sense of security.375 This desire 
for order seems to be a fundamental human need with ancient origins and has been explored 
variously. In his Gifford Lectures, Moltmann observes the vestigial desire of humanity to link 
temporality to eternity through ritual: ‘Human experience and human acts must find their 
foundation and form in their correspondence to what is primal and divine if they are to be 
meaningful...it is only ritual which confers safety in a mysterious and chaotic world’,376 he 
writes, adding later in the chapter that a focus on human history that is disconnected from its 
theological significance (as it is in modernity) will merely cause pain and stress to humanity.377   
The chaos myths of the ANE are thought to have influenced the writers of the Genesis creation 
and flood narratives (in the sense of a monotheistic God controlling the disorder of the deep 
waters); and Revelation speaks hopefully of the eschaton as the time when there is no more 
sea (Revelation 21:1). This desire for order, safety and security is not just a theological 
concept.  I have already referred to the neuropsychological research of Cozolino and d’Aquili & 
Newberg, which suggests that humans are hard-wired to find causality and order in the world 
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as a basic survival mechanism; while anthropologist René Girard378 identifies the root of 
violence in human societies in a desire to order and control the unexpected. This tendency to 
violence is also noted by Ricoeur in his analysis of the truthfulness of testimony that is 
perceived as destabilising.  A narrator becomes a witness when he testifies out of conviction: a 
witness may, in due course, become a martyr. ‘The witness is the man who is identified with 
the just cause which the crowd and the great hate and who, for this just cause, risks his life’.379 
I think we could say that the group does not want its self-referential and currently coherent 
narrative to be disturbed. Incidentally, once again we are reminded of the impossibility of 
separating one’s internal and external histories.  
The philosophers Hannah Arendt and Adriana Cavarero have each explored the need of human 
beings to have stories, and as feminists approach the subject from the viewpoint of a minority, 
which is helpful when thinking of people who are suffering and thus misunderstood or even 
ostracised by society. ‘The story reveals the meaning of what otherwise would remain an 
unbearable sequence of sheer happenings’, says Arendt, commenting on the life of the writer 
Isak Dinesen (Karen Blixen), who used storytelling almost as a life skill.380 Stories are, however, 
told not just to provide a kind of retrospective patterning, to insert events into a logical 
sequence for the sake of rational tidiness, but to yield a sense of the ‘who’ of a person in a 
manner that is inaccessible from a philosophical starting point, which latter only leads us to 
‘what’ the person is (the classical subject): in other words, stories can indicate the fact that the 
whole (person) is greater than the sum of the parts. Cavarero argues that selfhood cannot be 
separated from the self’s story, so to say ‘who’ I am requires a story.381  McFadyen discusses 
the way in which the communication of the monological subject (ie the one who refuses 
dialogue) is about valuing causality and success above sociality and understanding.382 
Arendt recognises this ‘who’ view of the person as a political act because it refuses to see 
people as things: derogatory speech tends to be directed towards ‘what’ and not ‘who’.383 We 
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recognise other persons by the fact that we sense that they have a story – a narratable self – 
as we ourselves do; although we do not need to know the details of that story in order to 
assign to that being the status of personhood. We then depend upon one another to tell our 
stories, especially since we cannot narrate our own birth and early life events. In fact, 
Caverero’s thesis turns on the assertion that we are human because of our desire to have our 
story from the mouth of another person.  This desire may arise, according to Cavarero, 
because at the moment of birth our lives have a unity that is subsequently lost because we 
cannot later recall it, and so our lives appear incomplete to us; we long to return to that sense 
of unity and desire others to fill the ‘gaps’ in the story for us.384 Ricoeur might understand this 
desire as an alternative description of the existential anguish we discover in the intersection of 
human and cosmic time.   
This process is entirely dynamic: ‘Life cannot be lived like a story, because the story always 
comes afterwards, it results; it is unforeseeable and uncontrollable, just like life’,385 says 
Cavarero. If we try to make life happen like a story then it will change the story.  This 
observation mirrors that of Niebuhr when he discusses internal and external histories and the 
impossibility of separating them by being a spectator rather than a participant.386 However, 
the meaning of the experience appears only retrospectively, after a process of interpretation, 
and not contemporaneously with the actual living. Thus story (or narrative) makes an excellent 
vehicle for dealing with the experience of apparently meaningless suffering. 
4.2.2 The universal identification of beginnings and endings 
A second universal paradigm is the search for story boundaries: beginnings and endings. In 
Being and time Heidegger asserts that ‘Time must be brought to light and genuinely grasped as 
the horizon of every understanding and interpretation of being’.387 Although Heidegger 
cautions that time can be understood in various ways, nonetheless the notion that there might 
be time-related boundaries to the self is affirmed, and this theme crops up again and again in 
studies of the person. Heidegger discusses the effect of death on the self (Da-sein): he says 
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that we know that we must die, yet veil it from ourselves, and live in a fraught condition of 
certainty that death is possible at any moment combined with uncertainty about when that 
moment will be.388  He calls this an ‘everyday entangled evasion of death’ and denotes the self 
as Being-toward-death. In other words, we live knowing that one day we will die, and this 
knowledge makes us the kind of beings that we are; yet we are not dead yet.  Kermode’s 
fascinating 1960s study of fiction, The sense of an ending, discusses the notion of beginnings 
and endings with special reference to the apocalyptic genre. Kermode reiterates the 
coherence theme (see $4.2.1) by noting that events draw their significance from a grand 
unitary narrative, rather than from one another.389 His insight that men are born ‘into the 
middest’ of life, and need a beginning and an end against which to orient that life, echoes and 
expands the notion of Arendt and Cavarero that there is an innate desire for ‘completion’ or 
unity in the project of living.   
Kermode390 distinguishes chronos (passing or waiting time; a time of expectation of the next 
event) from kairos (significant or crisis time; the time when something happens to punctuate 
the ongoing continuum), rather like having (kairos) time ‘beads’ on a (chronos) ‘string’ of time. 
Those working in bereavement services find that young children are unable to contextualise 
their experiences adequately because they have relatively few memories and only a nascent 
sense of chronos time and perspective against which to develop the meaning of any kairos 
event, let alone the permanent impact of a death.  The result is that children interpret their 
experiences very concretely and their stories tend to be ‘of the moment’. At the hospice I 
found often that a bereaved child would weep desperately at the loss of a parent, then 
immediately will run outside to shout and play because his/her friends have arrived. Humans 
need chronos to understand kairos.391 
Kermode senses that we project ourselves to and past the ‘end’ in the effort to conceptualise 
the whole: this whole simply cannot be scoped from the middle (‘middest’), which is where we 
are temporally located. In fact, although we want to do so, we cannot pin down and objectivise 
the story because narrative (Ricoeur style) is dynamic and dialectic, depending always upon 
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the narrator and interpreter: this unrealised desire continues to drive us to seek more 
explanation and information. The ‘end’ of my story is ever immanent, and affects all other 
events, although it may not be imminent, or reifiable.392 Every time ‘something happens’ to us, 
as an experience of kairos, we effectively speculate about whether it is the end; although it 
seems (from the experience of children) that we need to see and grasp the ‘ends’ of others 
before we can sense our own.393 
Arendt, Cavarero and others have eloquently described the opacity of a person’s beginning. I 
cannot remember my own birth or indeed my first year of life. This impenetrable bit of each 
person’s life is essential for the project of unity and coherence but escapes us all because we 
have no memory of it.  There is also a certain parallelism between birth (rather than life) and 
death: we cannot narrate either birth or death for ourselves, but depend upon others to do it 
for us. Life narration is rather different: indeed, we can narrate our lives with ‘spin’ if we want 
to do so.  Sallie McFague observes with respect to all language that we are ‘hermeneutical 
creatures’,394 both in our understanding of what others tell us and in our expression of our 
own life experiences and their meaning. But the narration of birth and death is outside our 
control: we are inescapably linked with others in the stories of our lives, and indeed, cannot 
correct their accounts of us (reminding us of McFadyen’s observation that we have no control 
over the dialogue or response of others, and that we are responsible for one another’s 
personhood).  
If it is true that humans are ontologically hermeneutical or narrative, and that we rely on 
others to provide parts of our narrative, particularly at the boundaries of existence, then a 
materialistic and reductionist approach to life will cheat us of meaning at these critical points 
by trying to pin down and reify what cannot be pinned down and reified. It is not surprising 
therefore that people often turn to ritual and poetry, rooted in metaphor and narrative, to 
express complex feelings about birth and death.   
4.2.3 The universal need to participate 
If narrative is descriptive of self or personhood, then participation is implicit in narrative. Why 
must this be? Because, following Buber, McFadyen, Harré, Cozolino, Arendt, Cavarero and 
many others, I have argued that persons are formed relationally. A person conceived in this 
manner cannot be a totally self-determined subject but must function and exist dynamically 
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and relationally in his or her social context. Narratives, as ontologically determinative of 
persons, and persons, as ‘narratable selves’,395 must exist in a dialectical relationship with one 
another in this framework. Thus Hans Frei can say that character and circumstance are nothing 
without one another, and so ‘Jesus is his story’;396 and we can be transformed by his story to 
the extent that we are able to participate in it, dialogue with it, make it ours.  
A person will always be unique because of this participation. The dynamic relationship in which 
we exist with others is also affected by our contingent circumstances,397 and a person is 
narratable because he or she is exposable to others who tell his/her story. McFadyen grasps 
this concept in a different manner – he speaks of the inescapable dialogues in which we exist, 
both with God and with others.  We cannot fully tell our own stories: we need one another as 
narrators (the intangible occasions of birth and death have been discussed in $4.2.2).  
Cavarero, a feminist philosopher, believes that the western tradition post-Descartes has 
become a male field of self-representation.398 By proposing the abstract and non-participative 
person (as ‘what’ rather than ‘who’), men (subjects) have established the notion of success as 
dominance and universalism. Women (objects) have tended to focus on the finite and 
particular, of which uniqueness is an extreme form.399  In plain language, Cavarero generalises 
that women tell stories of lives (ie ‘who’); while men discuss achievement (‘what’). Yet, she 
insists, we can argue that a life is unique without being exceptional or powerful. Why does this 
matter? Because dying – and sometimes suffering − brings a story to an effective end in this 
life; and at the end of a life we want to know who we are, how we are distinguished from 
others: this lies not in the size of the footprint we leave behind but in its uniqueness, which is a 
given for every self.  
Janet Finch, in a recent British study of names as indicators of kinship, remarks: ‘My name has 
two dimensions. It marks me as a unique individual, and it also gives some indication of my 
location in the various social worlds which I inhabit...’.400  She continues later with a quote 
from Susan Benson, who writes on issues of naming and slavery: ‘...naming [is] a 
quintessentially social act...naming acts as a critical element in processes of social 
incorporation and the constitution of personhood’.401  Benson continues, ‘We are named by 
others and, in many naming systems, for others: in a critical sense, then names belong as 
                                                          
395
 The term ‘narratable self’ is Cavarero’s designation. Cavarero, Relating narratives, passim. 
396
 Frei, Theology and narrative, p 42. 
397
 See Loughlin, Telling God’s story, p 70; Cavarero, Relating narratives, p 33.  
398
 Cavarero, ibid, p 49. 
399
 Ibid, p 53. 
400
 Finch, Naming names, p 709. 
401




much, if not more, to the givers of names as to those that bear them’. The dual dimensions of 
the person are identified by Finch as individuality and connection. In a subjective universe 
these appear to be opposites yet closer analysis shows they must be held in creative tension: 
this is the realm of narrative. 
The notion of participation in narrative is particularly interesting for this study because of the 
nature of scripture. Scripture is often described in terms of ‘transforming’ narrative; the story 
of Jesus of Nazareth invites us always into participation, not least because of its parabolic 
form. This invitation is made even more explicit by Paul’s frequent use of the incorporative 
style ‘in Christ’, or ‘in him’, when referring to the members of the church. Approaching the 
gospel is certainly not an objective reading experience.  Loughlin reminds us of the instruction 
to John in Revelation to ‘eat’ the scroll (Revelation 10:8-11), followed by the commission to go 
and prophesy about (and to) many nations. The sequence is the paradigmatic one: a 
participation in the transforming narrative; and the integrity of that participation will 
determine the longevity (sedimentation) of the witness.   
4.2.4 Interim summary of argument 
I have emphasised three common desires in autobiographical storytelling which I think are 
identifiable in the stories told at the hospice and have sought to find support for these 
characteristics in the literature of narrative.   
(i) To find coherence or an order for the plot.  Recounting one’s life story and emphasising the 
things of particular significance is valuable. Patients often found it helpful to ‘account for’ their 
lives prior to their illness, and this process is frequently repeated at the funeral service after 
death for the benefit of the bereaved.402 There has been some anguished debate among 
Christian chaplains about whether a service based upon memorial material is actually a proper 
ritual for death. Some argue that the funeral should be a commendation of the deceased into 
the hands of God, and less focused on a celebration of the life that has now been completed. 
Clearly the choice is to some extent determined by the religious beliefs of the family 
concerned, and contemporary funeral services (outside the committed church congregation) 
are largely about commemorating a life. But is this an evasion of religious belief? I would argue 
that there is narrative justification for understanding a memorial celebration, which effectively 
recounts the life, as a vital pastoral tool that does actually connect the bereaved with a greater 
reality. The extent to which we might name that reality needs to be determined in the context 
of that family. 
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(ii) To identify beginnings and endings. Patients were often keen to talk about where they were 
born and who were their parents. In addition, they often wanted to outline the process of the 
disease that had brought them to this place of anticipation of the end (noting that of course 
we can only anticipate the end; we cannot ‘own’ it). Once again, this was also important to the 
families after death, as was the palpable sense of relief once the funeral service was over: the 
‘end’ had finally been achieved. 
(iii) To narrate participatively. Stories did include personal achievements, but much more 
important were the friendships and family ties that characterised a life. It was also interesting 
that a patient’s account and the accounts of others were often subtly different!  Sometimes 
there would be an attempt to change the story of the life at a late stage. Efforts at 
reconciliation after long term family feuds might come into this category.  Others would cling 
steadfastly to the story as given and refuse contact with certain people who wanted to be 
reconciled. Did the story narrate the life, or did the life narrate the story?  Do we become the 
story we narrate for ourselves?  
If we are ‘beings unto death’ and if every self has a story because reality is fundamentally 
narrative in character, then the instinctive desire to tell the story of one’s life as the end 
approaches may be understood as a capitulation to a basic sense of personhood, and it may 
also help to resolve the dualistic tensions of postmodernism for the dying or suffering person. 
 
4.3 Narrative and process thought: natural partners? 
How does it progress this project if we understand the narrative nature of reality? 
Philosophically, narrative offers an alternative to the dualism and separation of modern and 
some postmodern thought by offering unification without universalism. Theologically 
Christianity, which offers a religious account of reality, is narrative in form (as are Judaism and 
Islam). Socially, narrative is inclusive and offers a sense of telos to a fragmented world. 
Scientifically, Chapter 2 of this thesis considered the possibilities of using insights from process 
thought to argue for a single reality in which science and faith, the material and the 
transcendent, could coexist without demeaning any of them.  I have already argued that 
process and dialogical personhood have some natural correspondence, and that dialogical 
personhood is narrative-like. Can we now find some correspondences between process 
insights and narrative that might help us in finding a meaningful location for suffering and 




4.3.1 The sense of a journey or story that is also coherent 
Foundational to process thinking is, of course, the notion of development and change: the 
dynamic ‘becomingness’ of all reality. Transience with endurance is built into process thinking 
at every level. A key point in process thinking is that Whitehead understands God not as the 
external controller, or ultimate cause, but as the one who journeys intimately with us (and all 
things) in all life’s uncertainty.403 The journey is itself as important as any arriving, because we 
are constantly challenged in the vagaries of life to respond to the lure of God: ‘He is the lure 
for feeling, the eternal urge of desire’.404  God (in God’s ‘consequent’ nature according to 
Whitehead) holds all reality in Godself, so we cannot be ‘without God’ in any of life’s 
experiences, good or bad, and neither can there be a true epistemological separation between 
science and faith. Every experience we undergo has significance in being held eternally in God, 
adding to the great creative network of existence and affirming the contributive value of all 
things: ‘he is the beginning and the end. He is not the beginning in the sense of being in the 
past of all members. He is the presupposed actuality of conceptual operation, in unison of 
becoming with every other creative act’.405 
If we now return to our thinking on the character of narrative, then there are resonances with 
process thought in several places. First we might note the desire for forming a coherent whole 
out of our life experiences; to place the ‘beads’ of events onto the ‘string’ of story, and in so 
doing, to satisfy our desire for unity, meaning, and order. Process thinking accommodates the 
notion of a history very suitably, and some of its undergirding characteristics may be covertly 
traced in much later 20th century theology that is not labelled as process.406  For example, 
when Moltmann discusses the network of time,407 he observes that each present moment has 
a past and a future, which pasts and futures are themselves present moments in their turn. 
This sense of time resonates with a process model and demonstrates the connectedness of 
each instant and the relatedness of all things. 
Furthermore, narrative theorists attach special significance to anticipation and memory, which 
again closely correspond to the process categories of prehension and concrescence. Kermode 
speaks of the ‘tick’ and ‘tock’ model of a story plot, which describes the anticipation at every 
moment of the next (and different) instant of existence, and notes that we desire meaning in 
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the space between the tick and the tock, and especially when we are speaking of birth and 
death. When beginnings and ends are not fixed, there is an implication for the space between: 
the loss of certainty to which Heidegger refers in his discussion of Da-sein as being-toward-
death.408 The result is that we constantly anticipate the end (hence the enduring and 
ubiquitous fascination with the apocalyptic genre); and in postmodernism the absence of an 
interpretive metanarrative means that all our ends are individual ones: we do not share a 
vision for what might come.  In Chapter 1 I referred to Beverley McNamara’s comment that we 
no longer live in anticipation of the life to come; we just live for as long as possible.        
Others have commented upon the importance of memory for meaning in life. Stephen Crites 
says that memory allows us to escape the ignorance of the present moment by allowing us to 
build up knowledge of ourselves. Our very sense of self arises from memory and anticipation 
working in harmony: ‘It is the narrative from of consciousness which allows for the holding 
together of a determined past and an indeterminate future in the present moment’.409  
Loughlin notes that we can thus understand, say, the Eucharist, not just as a past 
remembrance but also as determinative of our present and our future; while the future 
determines our past as anticipation. Thus the present is narrativised from both the past and 
the future and we are indeed coherent.410   
The final correspondence between process and narrative in this section on journey and 
coherence is to do with finding that we are in touch with transcendent reality. It has already 
been observed that individual narratives (the ‘mundane’ stories of Crites411) which do not 
acknowledge their dependence upon a grand narrative (the ‘sacred’ stories) have a tendency 
towards nihilism. Not only is there no big story into which the individual story may fit, to lend 
an overall sense of telos, but self-determined and self-referenced narratives also destroy our 
dialogue, our relationality, and leave us asking only ‘what?’ and not ‘who?’. We are thus 
degraded as persons, just as we degrade other persons by this overly subjective way of 
thinking, since we truly discover ourselves through others.   
4.3.2 The implications of relationality   
Narrative material dominates the whole Bible: indeed, the primary metaphor of scripture is 
that God speaks a Word (Nicholas Lash412 emphasises that God only speaks one Word (ie Jesus 
Christ, and that this idea is the (hermeneutical) key to reading scripture).  Sallie McFague has 
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similarly observed that parable – a form of narrative – is the dominant genre of the NT and has 
discussed the parabolic and metaphorical nature of theology (and indeed of reality) itself: she 
identifies Jesus Christ as the parable of God. This narrative approach addresses the ontological 
issue of the person from another angle: if Christ and his life are expressed in parabolic form, 
and if the incarnation is the ideal of true humanity, then by logical extension, life must be 
parabolic or narrative in form for us all. It also has implications for the reading of scripture, 
since the inherent ‘is and is not’ of metaphor that enables the description of new things by 
language also precludes the notion of the fixed meaning of scripture.413  
There are two main consequences of this observation about the narrative person in imago dei 
that are particularly significant for this project and which relate to process thought.  
4.3.2(a) Contingency  
The incarnation shows us that God is fully exposed to and engaged with the world in the way 
that we are. Jesus of Nazareth was not a man who lived in special circumstances. He was (we 
think) a relatively uneducated member of the poorer classes of society and was not preserved 
in any way from the excesses of the political and religious establishment of his time. God in 
Christ was subject to the contingencies of life on earth, and this information has been given to 
us in the form of narrative.  Narrative does not explain; it illustrates and reveals. It is not 
reductive or forensic but suggestive and inclusive. Ricoeur says that it invents and discovers.414 
Narrative does not close off with boundaries, but opens up to a variety of interpretations: 
some of which will be inadequate because of the contingent nature of this world. If life is 
narrative in form, then life is also uncertain, lived between the tick and the tock; yet at the 
same time, life is patterned narratively for us in the incarnation and so we have the option of 
adopting that sacred story as a source of meaning for our mundane existences.  
Process thinking can happily accommodate all these suggestions. In process thought there is 
no attempt to explain evil, suffering or disaster away as something that ‘should not’ happen; 
rather, process thought absorbs such events within the knowledge that nothing is outside the 
experience of God. Whitehead discusses the way in which God allows Godself to be affected 
by the context of the world. He says: ‘What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in 
heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal 
relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the 
world. In this sense, God is the great companion – the fellow-sufferer who understands’.415  
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This vital insight for those who suffer is that God is also a sufferer, and so suffering is in some 
way normalised as part of life on earth. It can be given a meaning by relating it to the sacred 
story, but it cannot be explained causally. Though painful to admit, suffering is not a soluble 
problem, or an alien intrusion, but it just is. Narrative shares the pain and sorrow, and laments 
it in solidarity with the other sufferers of the world, without trying to link it to blame or fault. 
4.3.2 (b) Participation 
The other great insight of narrative is the necessity of participation. We heard from Cavarero 
and differently from McFadyen that we give our stories to one another; our selves are 
discovered through our interactions with other selves and are never solo projects. This is why a 
culture based upon categories of success, difference, dominance and separation in the classical 
manner can never be a just setting in which humans can live. Humans cannot be categorised in 
this way if our very being is narrative at its root.  
The clue seems to lie in recognising participation. Narratives cannot be held ‘outside’ ourselves 
as objective existents, because they are inherently relational: we are dependent upon one 
another to tell the stories of our own lives. Thus we must participate – although the nature of 
grace is such that we have a choice about the degree of our conscious participation.  
Process thought is participative: everything is held within the story that is God. Everything has 
meaning because it has significance in God’s eternal being. Everything exists in network and 
relationship.  It is the classical systems of hard monotheism that have established the invisible 
but institutional boundaries that slice through western culture and which encourage 
competitive and violent relations between persons to be the norm. 
It might be possible to develop a reading of the progressive revelation in scripture in terms of 
this suggestion. In such a reading, the Genesis 2 story of the tree of the knowledge of good and 
evil, from which the man and woman are forbidden to eat, represents the kind of destructive 
dualistic thinking that sets relative values on persons and makes a person into a ‘what’ rather 
than a ‘who’. The ‘founding act’ of violence (in Girardian terms416) of the slaughter of Abel by 
Cain (Genesis 4) is the result of this kind of divisive and anti-relational thinking. The Tower of 
Babel demonstrates the depth and extent of the problem: that we cannot tell and interpret 
one another’s ‘mundane’ stories because we are not thinking as participants in the ‘sacred’ 
story; and so on. Along the way there are examples of a different way of life: Abraham linked 
relationally with his people; Noah and the inclusive Ark community; kings (dominating types) 
versus prophets (relational types); and then ultimately the Word is spoken with irresistible 
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power in the coming of Christ and the kingdom of love, which is the way that has eternal value 
and cannot be suppressed by death.  Pentecost seals the healing of the divisions: the 
inaugurated restoration of the sacred narrative.    
The story of Jesus is therefore not just to be read; but to be entered into. If we participate in 
this story then it can transform us, just as our dialogues with other people can transform our 
lives. The ‘Jesus information’ that we are given in the gospels is narrative for that reason: it 
cannot simply be read objectively. Jesus tells his disciples that the person who is not for him is 
against him: rather than assuming that Jesus means simply that people will either follow or 
persecute him, we could view it as an invitation to be transformed, to undergo metanoia, to 
find meaning even in our pain – and this matter is surely the task of the Christian pastor today. 
With this object in view, the combination of narrative, dialogical personhood, and process 
thought discussed in the first four chapters of this thesis seems to offer a potential platform on 
which to develop the idea of ‘ontological impertinence’ as a response to the challenge of 














Chapter 5: Resituating suffering  
I had heard of you by the hearing of the ear, but now my eye sees you. (Job 42:5, NRSV) 
 
5.1 The matter of ‘meaningless’ suffering 
In Chapter 1, the issue of ‘meaningless’ suffering was raised in the context of terminal illness, 
and reference was made to Frankl’s exposition of his Holocaust experience. The idea of 
suffering having meaning417 requires careful handling since it is prone to misinterpretation, 
both theologically and phenomenologically.418   Invoking a meaning does not mean that we 
should deliberately seek or prize suffering for its own sake in a misguided search for 
redemption through the inappropriate imitation of Christ; neither is the inference intended 
that suffering is to be understood as intrinsically ‘good’, or as having any kind of moral 
pedagogical value.  Suffering may resist rationalisation, but it is not the uninterpretable act of 
an uninterpretable deity in terms of Christian theological narrative.  It is important to 
emphasise that to interpret does not necessarily mean to analyse causally or mechanistically. 
In previous chapters I have examined three main thought streams behind the resistance of 
liberal postmodern culture to understand suffering as a meaningful experience of life, as 
follows. 
(1) Models of God within traditional theism. The argument outlined in Chapter 2 unpacks the 
way in which western culture has been influenced by Greek philosophical categories, and how 
this, in partnership with philosophical materialism, has impacted modern Christian theology. 
The result is an often unanalysed foundational belief in a remote and impassible deity, and an 
implicit working dualism about the nature of reality.  
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In response I have suggested that the use of process insights as a type of narrative tool (rather 
than insisting on a comprehensive process theology, which raises other problems for Christians 
about the ultimate nature of God419) may relieve some of the tension surrounding the matter 
of a God who may or may not ‘intervene’ in human affairs. Whitehead comments that God is ‘a 
being at once actual, eternal, immanent, and transcendent. The transcendence of God is not 
peculiar to him. Every actual entity, in virtue of its novelty, transcends its universe, God 
included’.420 Ricoeur’s philosophical approach seems to me to be a natural partner in this 
enterprise because it anticipates a single reality that can be accessed through narrative, and 
whose metaphorical nature is in itself transcendent in terms of meaning. Other useful links (for 
this thesis) between the thinking of the two philosophers include:                                                                                                                  
(i) the importance of experience – in Whitehead’s scheme, all experience is eternally held in 
God, while Ricoeur’s method is deliberately phenomenological (see $5.2);                                                                         
(ii) the fundamental nature of creativity - Whitehead views creativity as a basic category, while 
Ricoeur analyses both metaphor and narrative as innovative of new meaning; and                               
(iii) the unidirectional flow of time – Whitehead notes that ‘all things flow;421 while Ricoeur 
regards the direction of time as an irreducible dimension of reality.422  
(2) The enormously successful enterprise of western science, interpreted as reductionist 
materialism and rational thought.423 While this approach yields excellent empirical results in 
many areas of life, it cannot logically accommodate transcendent experience, and struggles 
with the unavoidably metaphorical nature of some explanation.  Reductionism as a philosophy 
has an enormous contemporary appeal and is difficult to expose and challenge because of its 
indigenous status in western culture.  
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In response I argue with others that suffering cannot be ‘reduced’ to its component parts: 
indeed, I think this is what Frankl means when he insists that suffering need not be 
‘meaningless’. Suffering is not meaningful when it can be causally attributed and meaningless 
when it cannot. Furthermore, suffering is not a generic experience, to be attributed in this 
manner: it is messy and lacks clear boundaries, and is highly personalised and 
contextualised.424 Thus we are taken into the realms of what it is to be a person, and a 
suffering person at that; and then we find that the paradigmatic story of Christ has suffering at 
its heart that is neither meaningless nor avoidable, but is foundational both for God and for 
humans in imago dei.  Together these ideas provide an intellectual basis for thinking about 
suffering that is neither reductionist nor rigidly causal, but accepts the experience as a 
legitimate starting point rather than as a problem that needs to be unclothed. The legitimacy 
of experience is appreciated by both Whitehead and Ricoeur.  Whitehead says ‘The best 
rendering of integral experience...is often to be found in the utterances of religious aspiration. 
One of the reasons for the thinness of so much modern metaphysics is its neglect of this 
wealth of expression of ultimate feeling’.425 Ricoeur’s method is explicitly phenomenological 
(see $5.2). 
(3) The human person described as an autonomous rational subject. The individualism fostered 
by the liberal Enlightenment model of the person fits neatly into the dualistic and rational 
worldviews consequent on (1) and (2) above, but is a poor representation of real or ideal 
human being (see Chapters 3 and 4). Nonetheless this model of the person underpins our 
economic, legal, and social structures and, combined with the prevailing ‘cult of normalcy’,426 
makes the person who is undergoing suffering into a social curiosity.427    
In response, and as indicated in (2) above, a more helpful model is to understand a person less 
as a ‘billiard ball’ and more as a dynamic, interactive event.428 I have drawn upon relational 
models of the person and in particular have found McFadyen’s dialogical personhood to be 
helpful: it can accommodate holistic approaches to suffering; I believe it to be consonant with 
some useful process insights; and, furthermore, it is a natural partner to a narrative philosophy 
of reality, since a dialogue is a particular form of narrative.   
In this chapter I will explore further some of the aspects of narrative (based upon the work of 
Paul Ricoeur) that make it such a useful category for a discussion of suffering, and ultimately 
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for the profound reassessment of suffering within human experience, which I have termed 
‘ontological impertinence’.  Ricoeur’s view429 of the Cartesian subject is one of mistrust: he 
understands ‘self’ to be a gift from others, which implies that a self cannot be the foundation 
of its own meaning. The properties of language, with its natural ambiguities and creativity, 
bring into question the validity of the Cartesian model.430 Ricoeur’s approach is 
phenomenological, which implies a dimension that is not easily captured by rational 
objectivity.  He believes that reality is essentially narrative in form, and if he is right, then it is 
not surprising that narrative therapy is so effective at times of crisis, when people ask 
questions about the foundation of life itself, which stray into the transcendent.  The temporal 
and metaphorical characteristics of narrative will be of special interest. 
   
5.2 A narrative possibility 
Ricoeur’s method is sometimes called phenomenological hermeneutics – in other words, he 
brings together actual human experience with the interpretation of that experience.  In so 
doing, he is responding to the nihilism and fragmentation of some earlier 20th century 
structural philosophies,431 and indeed commentators often remark on Ricoeur’s sense of hope, 
expressed in terms of an ultimate philosophical unity, in his analyses of the human condition.  I 
would like to note again the significance of this approach for interpretations of suffering that 
start from experience – like those of Frankl in the Nazi camps, and the patients in the hospice. 
Frankl’s logotherapeutic method432 takes the experience of the sufferer seriously: he does not 
try to rationalise the suffering but instead he relocates it – at least during the therapeutic 
period − as the central experience of the person’s life, which is then used to redefine the rest.  
This pathway can be seen in the book of Job and there are many useful correspondences with 
Ricoeur to be explored (see $5.4.3).      
In particular Ricoeur wants to affirm that what we express through language does bear a 
relationship to what actually is433 – that there is a genuine relationship between ‘sign’ and 
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‘referent’, and that we are not committed to a limitless relativism. However, this relationship is 
not a causal or reductive one.434  I would like to focus here on a number of relevant aspects of 
narrative: its metaphorical nature, its temporality, holistic nature and ‘truthfulness’, and the 
way in which narrative constitutes the self in a reflexive manner. 
5.2.1 The metaphorical nature of narrative 
Metaphor is an aspect of language that, while well recognised, has proved exceptionally 
difficult to define.  Janet Soskice offers the following: ‘metaphor is that figure of speech 
whereby we speak about one thing in terms which are seen to be suggestive of another’.435 
She makes this definition deliberately broad and simple, adding that ‘speaking’ does not 
necessarily imply an oral transmission, and ‘thing’ does not have to be a material entity. The 
feminist theologian Sallie McFague (also known as Teselle) developed a whole ‘metaphorical 
theology’ that celebrates and deepens the ‘is and is not’ of metaphor (based on Ricoeur’s 
analysis of metaphor) as a way of representing the mystery of the divine.436   
Ricoeur’s classic exploration, The rule of metaphor, was written in the 1970s. In it he 
establishes that words have an inner characteristic from which they and we cannot escape: it is 
known as polysemy, or the possession by a word of multiple possible referents.437  In everyday 
life we know this to be an accurate description of words, evidenced in the ambiguities and 
misunderstandings of everyday conversations, as well as in the interesting possibilities arising 
from translation from one language or dialect to another. There is no simple one to one 
correspondence between a word and its referent:438 any word is always interpreted 
contextually and used grammatically.  On the other hand, there are boundaries to possible 
meanings: a word does not mean ONE thing forever, but neither does it mean ANYthing.  This 
appreciation of parameters of meaning is one aspect of our shared culture. As social beings, 
we need to find descriptions of our world that are collectively understood. This line of 
argument leads Ricoeur to warn of the potential ‘tyranny of the word’439 in theories of 
meaning; he urges us to see that in practice, words function in sentences, which are context-
dependent.  
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Ricoeur argues that from this attribute of polysemy arises the creative and dynamic potential 
of metaphor to expand language and understanding. Metaphor establishes similarities, but is 
never a matter of simply substituting one word for another: a true metaphor will always 
expand understanding and bring new things to light. A metaphor has ‘is and is not’ properties 
that take us into new territory. A metaphor has the ability to shock: ‘For this is the function of 
metaphor, to instruct by suddenly combining elements that have not been put together 
before...It is from  metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh’, because it depicts 
the abstract in concrete terms.440  A metaphor is a metaphor for as long as it continues to 
surprise and instruct us; once we no longer feel that surprise (which Ricoeur describes as its 
‘impertinent attribution’),  it is ‘dead’; its creative dynamic is exhausted, and it can be put into 
a dictionary. Thus the ‘leg’ of a table was metaphorical once, but no longer startles us when it 
is used, and so we classify it as dead; but from this example we can begin to see how 
dependent all language is upon this ability to extend communally held meaning.441 
Because the metaphor introduces this semantic impertinence, the original reference of the 
word becomes less obvious and new meaning breaks in.442 The suggested metaphor is either 
understood and becomes a successful innovation, or it is perceived as nonsense and is 
discarded. For example, if I were to say: ‘the sunrise jumped froglike onto the world’, then the 
reader has to consider what a sunrise and a frog have in common and decide whether our 
understanding of the event is expanded or not. In this case it is a nonsensical connection 
(sunrises do not arrive suddenly in a bouncy manner) and it does not help us. If, instead, I said: 
‘the sunrise flooded the world’, we might be much happier; yet both statements are 
metaphorical, since sunrises neither jump like frogs, nor flood like rivers. 
Ricoeur’s analysis of the character of metaphor led him naturally to a consideration of 
narrative, culminating in the 1980s in his three-volume opus, Time and narrative. He identifies 
a function of narrative that is similar to metaphor – ie its ability to innovate semantically – 
which, in the case of narrative, is achieved by coming up with a ‘plot’: ‘By means of the plot, 
goals, causes and chance are brought together within the temporal unity of a whole and 
complete action. It is this synthesis of the heterogeneous that brings narrative close to 
metaphor.  In both cases, the new thing – the as yet unsaid, the unwritten – springs up in 
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language’.443  Narrative emplotment issues in a new understanding (we might say ‘meaning’ in 
everyday speech) of life events by providing them with a coherence that is derived from the 
larger whole (the worldview, context, or metanarrative).444  However, as with metaphor, 
meaning is never closed off: the narrative has fluid boundaries that depend upon the narrator, 
the reader or spectator, and the context itself, and which can always be reinterpreted.   
Ricoeur says that understanding has two parts: first, grasping the new semantic impertinence 
and second, grasping a sense of the operation that moulds the bits into a whole.445  To clarify 
the significance of this insight for my own argument about suffering: we understand 
something new when we see both its differences from and its similarities to things that we 
already know, and when we can then fit it into our picture of life.  
I will now suggest some key features of the experience of suffering. First, suffering is 
frequently perceived as an alien experience, and our desire and instinct intellectually is to 
reject it. Thus we log the discontinuity, the difference from, our ‘normal’ and expected 
experience.  However, we may not be able to reject the suffering in a phenomenological sense: 
it is an actual experience, part of our new experienced reality, whether or not it is wanted.  
The result of this rejection will unavoidably be spiritual pain (‘Why me?’, coupled with an 
associated helplessness). If the suffering cannot be resolved phenomenologically (and it may 
sometimes be possible to deal with it at this level446), then we have to take the step of looking 
for points of identity with the suffering, which in effect is a reassessment of our own selfhood: 
‘I am now a person who suffers’. This step is the one that sufferers find so hard, and especially 
when there is a poor grasp of any framework of ultimate meaning.  It is very important to note 
here that we can never adequately occupy the suffering space of another, because the 
narrator and the interpreter both contribute to the possible meanings of a narrative. To say 
that someone’s suffering has no meaning (for example, inherited disease) is already to try to 
isolate a single narrative interpretation, which may be philosophically impossible if Ricoeur has 
correctly painted the nature of language.447 It is certainly pastorally insensitive, because it 
dismisses the felt experience of the sufferer, who may already have started to identify 
him/herself as a suffering person. Thus such dismissal of the experience can come close to 
dismissing and objectifying that person through our analysis of the problem, and thus intensify 
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the pain.  Once again, it is important to note that to say suffering has meaning does not mean 
that it is good, or that it does not hurt. 
Furthermore, I note that Whitehead’s process view of the prehension, concrescence and decay 
of all actual entities also has parallels with metaphorical process: a word is built from a 
previous existent, with which it has a creative relationship. New understanding occurs in this 
creative process; we grasp new territory; then we make it ours and the creativity eventually 
dies as the event perishes and the metaphor becomes concretised. Later I am going to locate 
the experience of suffering in this liminal place of creative transition.  
 5.2.2 The temporality of narrative 
Ricoeur hypothesises that reality is narrative in form, and the hinge of his argument is the 
temporality that acts as a common denominator for all human experience and understanding. 
‘My basic hypothesis... is the following: the common feature of human experience, that which 
is marked, organized and clarified by the fact of storytelling in all its forms, is its temporal 
character. Everything that is recounted occurs in time, takes time, unfolds temporally; and 
what unfolds in time can be recounted. Perhaps, indeed, every temporal process is recognized 
as such only to the extent that it can, in one way or another, be recounted’.448  He identifies 
cosmic time (the time of the universe), and human time (time as we experience it), and notes 
that the deep anxiety of human existence arises because we are consciously aware of these 
two kinds of time.449 Furthermore, Ricoeur argues that the existence of succession is an 
irreducible phenomenon.450 Once again this is arguably consonant with a Whiteheadian 
process system.451 
In other words, we recognise that our human lives take place within a context of cosmic time 
that both precedes and outlasts us; and this knowledge makes us aware of our limitations, our 
mortality (and, if we allow it, it is also the source of our longing for God). The great human 
desire is for one’s time to be significant within that bigger picture of time – ie for one’s life to 
make a ‘permanent’ mark on the cosmos, to achieve a lasting dimension (in $3.1.3 and $3.1.4 
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the universal concrete extension of this longing in the form of mementi mori was discussed).  If 
we had no concept of this temporal limit, we might live more contentedly: but we would not 
be human. This paradox is basic to human existence.452       
The link between the two kinds of time (cosmic and human) is described by Ricoeur as 
narrative: ‘time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, 
and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence’.453  
Narrative emplotment identifies a beginning and an end (although beginnings and endings are 
always chosen by the narrator and have a relative character).454  A narrative supplies a sense of 
coherence to the events of someone’s life: these events may be chance events or causal 
events, but the imposition of a temporal sequence gives a sense of order rather than chaos, 
and fundamentally, links human time to cosmic time.  This process takes place whenever a 
person reflects on a specific life event and begins to see it as part of his/her life story, and 
indeed part of the wider cultural and historical story. ‘A life is no more than a biological 
phenomenon as long as it is not interpreted,’ comments Ricoeur.455  
I would therefore argue that the very fact that a life can be recounted and interpreted releases 
it from the grip of the reductionism that presents such difficulties in the search for meaning. 
When someone suffers or dies, this tragic and chaotic event needs to be interpreted by being 
placed in a coherent plot.  The crisis facing modern culture could be articulated as its 
impoverished ability to make the connections between the human and cosmic dimensions of 
suffering and death − we have managed to apply consumerism, an aspect of material thinking, 
to life itself such that we want more and more, and better quality, life always.456  Death brings 
an abrupt halt to economic, biological, or intellectual achievement and personal fulfilment. 
While death has perhaps always been the ‘enemy’, in modernism it has powerful new 
weapons. In terms of hospice pastoral practice, the difficulty is thus one of finding an 
emplotment strategy that makes sense within this consumerist worldview. We often say that 
in a non-religious culture there is no language to discuss the transcendent (the language of 
scripture and church is poorly understood in wider society, having been replaced by an 
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unsympathetic reductive rationalism) and Ricoeur’s narrative philosophy offers us a reason for 
why this is so catastrophic in terms of our ‘hold’ on reality itself.  
5.2.3 The holistic nature of narrative meaning 
One of Ricoeur’s discoveries about metaphor is that it does not operate at the level of the 
single word, but in a sentence. The same dynamics apply to narrative: the whole story is ‘more 
than’ the sum of the events that are strung together by narrative ordering. Ricoeur says: 
‘Emplotment is never the simple triumph of “order”...The plots themselves coordinate 
distention and intention’.457  The various setbacks and joys of life are indeed ‘just chance’ 
unless we narrate them. Once we do begin to narrate, a superabundance of meaning becomes 
available to us: meaning that is greater than the sum of the parts. The generation of a 
narrative allows us to begin to interpret the events – and then meaning follows; although we 
note that the interpretation cannot be pinned down in a forensic manner, since it depends to 
some extent upon the reader. The intelligibility offered by Ricoeur is not simply logical or 
causal (though it may include these elements), but is connected with the frame of 
interpretation: but the work of interpretation is precisely where modern culture founders, 
because of its scientific concept of truth.  
We could summarise by saying that narrative meaning is holistic and interpretive, while 
scientific meaning is causal and often reductionist. Ricoeur says: ‘The essential difference 
distinguishing the narrative model from every other model of connectedness resides in the 
status of events, which we have repeatedly made the touchstone of the analysis of the self. 
Whereas in a causal-type model, event and occurrence are indiscernible, the narrative event is 
defined by its relation to the very operation of configuration; it participates in the unstable 
structure of discordant concordance characteristic of the plot itself’.458   
If we really grasp the significance of this task of narrative then we are set free from the 
apparent cruelty of contingent existence, which leaves us saying that there is no purpose in 
life. Ricoeur suggests that the retrospective ordering of narrative can replace what we first 
perceived as contingency (at the time of the experience) with what we now, after 
interpretation, perceive as necessity. He says: ‘The paradox of emplotment is that it inverts the 
effect of contingency, in the sense of that which could have happened differently or which 
might not have happened at all, by incorporating it in some way into the effect of necessity or 
probability  exerted by the configuring act. The inversion of the effect of contingency into an 
effect of necessity is produced at the very core of the event: as a mere occurrence, the latter is 
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confined to thwarting the expectations created by the prior course of events; it is quite simply 
the unexpected, the surprising. It only becomes an integral part of the story when understood 
after the fact, once it is transfigured by the so-to-speak retrograde necessity which proceeds 
from the temporal totality carried to its term. This necessity is a narrative necessity whose 
meaning effect comes from the configuring act as such; this narrative necessity transforms 
physical contingency, the other side of physical necessity, into narrative contingency, implied 
in narrative necessity’.459  
In principle I think this idea of the inversion of contingency and necessity sheds light upon the 
dark fatalism of the questions: ‘What did I do to deserve this?’; ‘Why did God allow me to get 
cancer?’ – since it opens up the individualism of the sequence of events by setting them within 
a broader worldview within which we can respond to (I do not say understand) the existence of 
evil and pain. I think it allows us to move away from the view that suffering must be caused by 
something, possibly God if we cannot think of another explanation, towards understanding 
that causality is a function of the hermeneutical process.  This more nuanced response to life’s 
desperate questions is not deductive, but unashamedly interpretative: but it is borne of the 
ability to reflect on one’s life story, which can be seriously compromised in modernity. 
Jonathan Rée comments that ‘Modernity...can be seen as a flight from temporality and 
personality – in short, from narrative’.460 
5.2.4 Narrative truth or narrative fiction?   
Such processes of course raise the issue of the nature of truth, and Ricoeur spends some time 
examining the similarities and differences between fictive and historical narratives, particularly 
the focus of Part IV of Time and narrative.461 Since the reader completes the emplotment 
process in narrative, both fiction and history can generate a response within the reader that 
can alter his/her own life story. It is possible, however strange it might seem to a scientific 
culture, to be changed by a story of fiction. This ability to generate change is the power behind 
parabolic storytelling. If the reader/hearer appropriates that change, then there is a sense in 
which it is ‘true’. The reader/hearer has realised the sense of that narrative; has made it into 
reality.462 Ricoeur also notes that the material we regard as factual history is clearly subject to 
interpretation just as much as fiction, and the past can be reinterpreted and ‘changed’.   Truth 
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cannot be easily defined as ‘what happened’ or ‘what is’, since these categories are always 
subject to interpretation.   
For the purposes of the suffering person we may note the following:              
(i) that we may be unable to discern a direct or clear ‘cause’ for the person’s suffering in the 
way that we might say that a flat tyre developed from a puncture caused by a nail;                                                
(ii) that the extent of another person’s suffering may seem to us (as observers) to be 
disproportionate or even unrelated to their ‘causal’ pain, but this supposed disproportion does 
not invalidate the suffering in any way; and                                                                                                         
(iii) a measure of healing may be found in terms of contextualising the suffering even if this 
context appears to us (the observers) to be ‘untrue’.  Thus a person in the hospice would often 
find his/her physical pain moderated by apparently unrelated interventions such as social or 
spiritual ‘therapies’.  Staff also found that narratives that were not strictly ‘true’ could still 
become part of the patient’s life story.  An example might be the common collusion by families 
with the idea that the terminally ill person would get home again: ‘When you get home, we 
will...’.  All parties would know that going home was extremely unlikely, yet it became a 
therapeutic intervention, giving the patient apparent ‘options’ about his/her future (ie that 
s/he would die, but might ‘get home’ first). Sometimes the patient did get home; often s/he 
did not, but still incorporated that story into the family narrative. Other ‘untrue’ narratives 
might relate to unconventional treatments, which everyone must have known were unlikely to 
help, but which became a huge part of a patient’s routine and even shaped that patient’s 
expectations of the future. Another manifestation of fictional narrative being incorporated into 
the family narrative may occur after death, and especially at the funeral, when a selective and 
nuanced biography of the person who has died is frequently adopted.    
Later I will be suggesting that this time of suffering or terminal illness can be described as 
‘liminal’ (see $5.3). It is a time on the threshold, a time of impermanence, when normal social 
function is suspended while a person re-evaluates him/herself.  I would like to argue that in 
such liminal periods a person is more inclined to appropriate new mini-narratives into a 
personal narrative, whether or not they would previously have been perceived as ‘true’. In the 
liminal phase, everything is reassessed and so the familiar landmarks of culture and society are 
less clear, opening up the person to new possibilities. In the context of this argument I want to 
suggest that when a person suffers, s/he is more likely to question the pervasive materialism 
of normal culture and to be open to transcendent dimensions of existence, which s/he may 
previously have dismissed as fictitious.             
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5.2.5 The reflexive narrative self 
The same kinds of criteria apply to the understanding of the self in Ricoeur’s narrative 
philosophy. The self is not an object but is accessed indirectly through the interpretation of 
stories. These stories are told by others as well as by ourselves, and it is in hearing and then 
reflecting on these stories that we come to know ourselves over time. McFadyen’s dialogical 
self, ‘sedimented’ and cyclically reinforced in community, is a less philosophically abstract but 
otherwise very similar model of what it is to be a person.  
The identity of a person is the answer to the question, ‘who?’463 Our first  instinct is to name 
the person, but Ricoeur is interested in what lies behind the name – though it is wise to keep 
in mind Cavarero’s warning464 that we often end up describing ‘what’ a person is rather than 
‘who’. In the end this takes us back to the fundamental nature of metaphor in that a word (or a 
name) has an innate plurality of meaning and this nascent creativity expands the boundaries of 
intelligibility. In the biblical record of creation, in the beginning, God speaks. God later 
encourages humanity to name the creation. In so doing, we do not ‘fix’ objects, as we like to 
think we do, but rather we push at the limits of our understanding. If we can allow that God’s 
word of creation might have analogies with the human use of language, then we could infer 
that neither does God ‘fix’ us as we are called into being: the metaphorical character of 
creation allows for the inclusion of ‘risk’ or ‘openness’. This thought suggests that God does 
not have an itemised ‘plan’ for each life, but rather a dream of relational creativity that is 
process-like in its character. The superabundance of metaphorical meaning can, I think, be 
compared with the desire for ever greater beauty or creativity in process thought.  
For the circumstances of the suffering and dying person, I offer the following points.  
5.2.5 (a)The suffering person understood as a creator of meaning.  
In the light of this discussion we can justifiably understand any person, but here specifically a 
suffering person, to be a creator of meaning (literally a poet, in Aristotelian terms). This 
creative function operates both dynamically, in relationship with others, and contextually, 
within an historical space. The meaning of an experience is not fixed (either by the sufferer or 
by the interpreters), but may have to be adapted and altered as the context or relationships 
change, and thus meaning is inherently metaphorical in character. Any proposed meaning will 
either be verified by its use within the context; or eliminated if that use is perceived to be 
invalid within the community.  Thus a person who suffers has a choice: s/he can create a new 
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meaning for that suffering, or s/he can accept the verdict of the community on what is 
happening to him/her (as did Job initially). If the sufferer chooses to narrate his/her suffering, 
then s/he becomes extremely vulnerable because that narrative may or may not be validated 
by the community, just as a new metaphor is or is not comprehended. The result of this 
dynamic and reflexive process of offering a narrative will either confirm the suffering person in 
his/her suffering personhood or reject that suffering person in his/her experience. 
I now suggest the following. 
(i) If we accept the insights of René Girard, then the suffering person is in a dangerous position, 
unless the whole community shares the suffering.465 The ‘unusual’ person is the one who is 
likely to be scapegoated – noting that scapegoating is not necessarily physically violent and 
may be quite subtle. In the biblical record, once Job became ill, he was patronised by his still 
healthy and wealthy peers; in our society this patronising attitude can be meted out to the 
terminally ill, the disabled, the elderly and so on – and can be done so in a manner that seems 
to be compassionate.466 In reality it may degrade the personhood of the sufferer by failing to 
hear the alternative narrative offered and by imposing its own, socially acceptable, narrative, 
which Reynolds has called the ‘cult of normalcy’.467 The corporate collusion of the community 
over its criteria of normality is institutional and thus very difficult to expose and to challenge.  
(ii) Developing idea (i) further, I suggest that the narratives of the community, developed 
corporately and historically, can be oppressive and can silence the sufferer so that his/her 
narrative is not normally heard – maybe cannot be heard, because it does not ‘make sense’ 
within the culture.  Thus the dominant reductionism sanctioned corporately in our culture 
prevents us from hearing or being able to articulate fully the experience of suffering, which 
eludes rational or causal description.  McFague notes with respect to the use of parables 
(extended metaphors) that these story forms generate uneasiness and disorientation: ‘...not 
“liking” the parables is the appropriate initial reaction to them’.468  
(iii) The element of choice for the suffering person is extremely important: s/he can choose to 
narrate, or not to narrate; to attempt to create meaning for the experience, or not. This latter 
choice - ie not to attempt to find meaning - can cause extreme psychological pain, as Frankl 
noted; by using ideas from Sölle and McFadyen we can attribute this pain to isolation, or 
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silenced dialogue, which intrinsically degrades human personhood. An environment that 
facilitates the choice is a liberating environment, while one that suppresses the choice is an 
oppressive one (this facilitating of choice is not to be confused with the ‘free’ choice of the 
consumer economy). The church is undoubtedly commissioned to be a community of 
liberation (for example, Luke 4:14-21): a place where the stories of outsiders are appreciated.  
This tradition of hospitality extends throughout scripture, sometimes explicitly (as in the 
Torah’s provision for aliens and widows etc); and sometimes through a more subtle exposition 
of God’s free and willing embrace of unlikely candidates (an obvious example would be 
Ruth469).          
5.2.5 (b) The suffering person understood as signification.  
I suggest that not only is the person (including the suffering person) a creator of new meaning; 
but s/he also acts as a sign (one who points ‘beyond’). Christians understand from scripture 
that persons image God in some way, although we also acknowledge that this image can be 
easily distorted. In McFadyen’s model, one such distortion is the way in which we participate 
in our various dialogues. We can actively effect, and passively receive, distortion through 
dialogue: either way our personhood is diminished from the imago dei.   
In Kazoh Kitamori’s theology of suffering, in which he grounds the love of God in the 
ontologically more fundamental pain of God, his astonishing conclusion is that we will never 
understand our pain unless we see that it functions as a witness to Christ.470 In Chapter 2 of 
this thesis I explored other arguments that the suffering of Christ has this critical ultimate 
dimension (ie that suffering is part of the trinitarian God’s eternal experience), which 
profoundly affects the view we take of the suffering we experience in our lives here and now; 
and then considered the difficulties of reconciling this view with a hard classical theism. 
The combined result of these considerations is that the suffering person could be uniquely 
significant, in that s/he points to the eternal and unavoidable pain of God that arises from 
God’s being in relationship with this creation. In other words, when a person is suffering, s/he 
points uniquely to the God revealed in Jesus Christ, in a way that s/he does not when life is 
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‘easy’. Suffering has this signification because it triggers the narrative re-articulation of life that 
explodes beyond the causal, rational and material. In other words, it has the potential to 
initiate metanoia.471 The corollary of this assertion is that suffering may facilitate the work of 
the Spirit, whose prerogative is the process of metanoia (if this sounds implausible then we 
can be reminded that it was the Spirit who led Jesus into the wilderness to be tempted). 
Suffering is not thereby directly attributable to the Spirit, which would render the trinitarian 
God susceptible to the accusation that God is capricious. Rather, this model avoids the 
good/evil dualism described in the early chapters of this thesis, with the associated issues 
about God’s intervention.  Instead, this view is compatible with a single metaphysical reality in 
which God allows creation to unfold. God is our companion, host, and fellow-traveller, rather 
than the director of operations.  Whitehead’s discomfort with traditional hard theistic models 
led him to comment that ‘God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical 
principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification;’ and follows this by 
noting that God’s nature is that of ‘tender care that nothing be lost’.  God, for Whitehead, is no 
less than the ‘fellow-sufferer who understands’.472             
Ricoeur and Soskice each credit Aristotle with the earliest recorded discussions on metaphor 
and use his work as a logical starting point.473 Briefly, Aristotle distinguishes between the 
language forms of poetics (as mimetic of human action) and of rhetoric (as persuasive 
argument), but argues that metaphor belongs to both forms. Aristotle’s discussion of mythos, 
or emplotment, in the context of tragic plays leads him to attribute primacy to tragedy over 
comedy, because he believes that tragedy more closely imitates human actions (or reality, we 
might say). It is tragedy with which fundamentally we struggle: the essential question of 
human life.  We narrate tragedy in order to find meaning and significance for it. 
Ricoeur, along with others such as Kermode and Heidegger, locates our human existential 
discomfort in the intersection of human and cosmic time. Bringing together this sense of 
discomfort with the importance of tragedy, we find that the pain of suffering originates both 
from its temporality and its apparent incoherence. Human time is interrupted painfully by 
suffering, which projects us temporarily into the cosmic, where we do not normally dwell. If 
we cannot find a narrative for this ‘interruption’ of human time, which we might term ‘liminal’ 
(see $5.3 below), then we cannot accept it. This narrative occupies the space of Ricoeur’s 
historical time, which mediates between human and cosmic time, and I would argue that 
therefore narrative is the language of liminal space, the space of transition and of 
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transformation, the space where the material and the transcendent can make meaningful 
contact.   
 
5.3 Suffering understood as liminal temporality  
In her study of the spirituality of dying persons, Rachel Stanworth finds it helpful to describe 
the person who is terminally ill and approaching death as occupying a liminal state – liminal 
meaning ‘border’ or ‘threshold’ territory – rather than as being at a terminus.474  This 
identification of liminal experience in dying is helpful in the context of palliative care. Cicely 
Saunders, for example, produced groundbreaking work on the perceived marginal status of the 
terminally ill (see $1.1); while Autton’s discussion of pain475 invokes transcendence as a coping 
mechanism (ie a person bridges the physical and the spiritual);  Kearney uses imagination and 
myth therapeutically to facilitate the transition between the deep and the surface self;476 while 
Ainsworth-Smith and Speck observe ‘cones of awareness’ in the dying patient (see $3.1.4), in 
which the life perspective of the dying person narrows and focuses and becomes a very 
different space from the multiple dimensions of everyday life − a phenomenon sometimes 
labelled ‘decathexis’ in the medical palliative literature.477 
5.3.1 Liminal experience  
What is liminality? The concept became a useful category for anthropologists studying 
traditional cultures in the early 20th century, and is also used by psychologists and 
psychiatrists for describing altered mental states; however, relatively few theologians appear 
to have engaged with the idea explicitly.478  The anthropologist Arnold van Gennep479 
classically identified the need of cultures to respond to change and decay by transforming and 
renewing themselves through ritual.  For van Gennep, the task of ritual is to foster transitions 
between life states (eg puberty, childbirth, marriage, death, religious initiation), or between 
the strata of society. Ritual achieves this by putting boundaries around the transitional phase 
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and protecting the structures of the host society from the stresses of change.480 Van Gennep 
describes three phases of transition: the preliminal (separation from the old social status); the 
liminal or transitional period (in which I am particularly interested here); and the postliminal 
(reincorporation into society in a new status). The liminal phase is often perceived as being 
dangerous or ‘unclean’; van Gennep speaks of the boundaries between sacred and profane 
being relative,481 and observes that a person entering transition becomes ‘sacred’ with respect 
to the rest of the group.  Those who are concurrently ‘liminal’ often experience a remarkable 
existential solidarity, as normal social distinctions are set aside.482 Van Gennep notes that this 
transitional unity is often marked by acts of exchange or sharing, such as a common meal or 
the exchange of gifts, because these acts indicate a ‘mutual transference of personality’.483 
(There is an implicit link here with process philosophy, in which reality has a transient 
developing character. Liminality provides us with an ‘extended transience’ that is accessible to 
the conscious mind and which provides a mental no-man’s land in which we can reflect.) 
Victor Turner has explored further this phenomenon of entering the liminal state in traditional 
societies, and develops some interesting conclusions. He notes, with regard to the ‘at-one-
ness’ of the liminal or transitional group, that it often functions as a period of role reversal: 
‘the liminality of the strong is weakness – of the weak, strength. Or again, the liminality of 
wealth and nobility is poverty and pauperism...’.484 He questions why this should be so and 
concludes that under the controlled circumstances of ritual process this reversal allows a 
release from stress by removing the person from the arena of normal social expectation.485 
This insight connects fundamentally with (chronologically much later) Girardian thought on 
violence and the sacred, in which a group releases its inner suppressed disharmony by 
scapegoating or lynching a representative victim, usually someone who is perceived to be 
different. The model could apply also to the process of dying, when the living find it hard to 
know how to speak to, or be with, the dying person unless suitable standardised behaviours 
are suggested.486    
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Turner also notes that rituals involving such role reversals (or indeed, any rituals) reinforce 
structure in a society or community: liminal experience takes place in the ‘gaps’ in the 
structure, so ‘structure’ must facilitate spaces for ‘no structure’. He concludes that ‘society 
(societas) seems to be a process rather than a thing – a dialectical process with successive 
phases of structure and communitas’.487 (McFadyen’s dialogical personhood, with its 
movement of sedimentation and dialectic, is a complementary way of thinking about the 
persons who make up such societies.)  Moltmann uses Mircea Eliade’s work on the revelatory 
nature of sacred space to note that primitive humanity did not understand time as linear 
history, as we do today, but rather lived both in the normal, transient, chaotic (and cyclical) 
time of everyday life, and also in ritual time, which rooted the community in meaning and 
linked it to the divine.488  Moltmann concludes that the contingency of history is always 
transformed into repeatable ritual. Something extraordinary happens and then it is 
commemorated (eg a birthday, anniversary, etc), so that we are not overwhelmed by the 
experience of chaos, but find stability in ritual – one way of coping with the existential anxiety 
observed by Ricoeur of humans caught in the intersection of cosmic and human time. 
People starved of structure and communitas seek it in ritual liminality, comments Turner, 
which is the phenomenon that Richard Rohr has explored more recently in his experiments 
with male Christian initiation rites in the US.489 Turner, and later Rohr, have noted that where 
truly liminal experience has been lost (as in western European culture), there is a tendency to 
invent the ‘liminoid’ in its place: the liminoid experience might be found in such activities as 
holidays, film, art, music, accessing virtual space, or other ‘leisure pursuits’ (or even 
counselling or psychotherapy!), but although such experiences remove us from our normal 
social roles and allow a degree of escapism, they lack the characteristic irreversible 
transformation of a truly liminal process. When the liminoid experience is over, life is 
essentially the same as before.  Any glimpsed existential dissatisfaction with the status quo 
remains (in other words, there is still the sense of searching, of lost meaning, of exhaustion 
with the demands of life. I wonder whether the denial that is common in the early stages of 
the contemplation of mortality is a manifestation of this limnoid activity: it is liminoid because 
there is no real transformation of the person, simply a desire to avoid the liminal territory.  
This denial is not the same as the appropriation by the suffering person of new (and possibly 
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‘untrue’) stories (these could include religious metanarratives) to which I referred  as 
characteristic of the liminal phase in $5.2.2.    
Robert Moore490 identifies the key difference between liminal and liminoid as the absence in 
the latter of a ritual leader who guards the boundaries of the transitional space. He discusses 
the possible identification of the psychotherapist with a modern day ritual leader or guide 
through liminal and transformative space. Ann Hallstein has written about the work of the 
hospital chaplain as a ritual leader in liminal space, and draws parallels with the hospital as a 
possible setting for transformation (towards healing, in her study, since that is the ‘aim’ of 
hospitals).491 This task could be even more appropriate for hospice professionals working with 
the dying, whose entry into liminal space is inevitable.      
5.3.2 Liminality and transcendence 
The comments of the previous section indicate the existence of a spiritual492 dimension to 
liminal experience. By nature, the liminal cannot be articulated well within the material world: 
it is betwixt and between; it escapes precise definition and thus renders itself apparently 
unsatisfactory as a category of empirical explanation. However, religious faith is (or should be) 
comfortable with the liminal as the place of contact with the transcendent (whatever that may 
mean in each religious context). That frequently it is not (in the West) provides evidence of the 
remaining powerful hold of reductionist thought – and this human tendency appears to be 
deeply rooted, since Jesus continually warned his followers against various types of legalism in 
a culture unaffected by the technological revolution that has shaped ours.  Recent 
neuropsychological research suggests that the human inclination for categorisation is 
hardwired into the human brain as a survival strategy.493 It is this kind of ‘self’-ishness that we 
are called to overcome in community (and initiation seeks to tackle this trait), and in becoming 
disciples of Christ.     
If the concept of liminality is to help people at the time of death, which itself is uncertain and 
may be sudden or slow, then, ideally, it should not be new and unexplored territory at that 
time. This conviction indicates precisely why members of traditional cultures, less protected 
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than Westerners against the ravages of death in their midst, understand the liminal ritual 
experience as one that presages death in some ways and certainly as one that offers a 
heightened level of contact with the transcendent.  
Our culture has invested extensively in the liminoid activity that fits conveniently into a 
materialist, consumerist and individualist worldview; but is far less comfortable with the 
liminal, which involves a struggle at the thresholds of experience; a commitment to 
community; and the existence of structure and ritual. Michael Meade writes at the turn of the 
21st century that we inhabit an extended cultural funeral – huge shifts in expectation and 
procedure affect daily life, but ‘without spiritual vision and ritual structure we lose the capacity 
to handle death and embrace life fully. Instead, we build walls of denial to hold off terror and 
confusion and try to cover our helplessness with displays of force and greed...And the 
momentum of loss increases because a death unmourned becomes a lingering ghost that 
haunts the living...’.494  
Eliade argues that we need a means of renewal after a life ‘loss’: that the rituals of passage 
allow us to deal meaningfully with the joys and sorrows of life and give death a meaning. In 
ritual language, death is the opposite of birth (not life, as westerners commonly polarise it) 
and life includes both birth and death. This perspective is essential for meaningful existence, 
and it is what religious faith instinctively recognises and celebrates. Only in initiation is death 
given a positive meaning; as a transitional boundary rather than a terminus.495 Eliade draws 
our attention496 to the niche survival of ritual in our non-religious society within 
apprenticeships, Freemasonry, yoga, art, and film; and the enduring interest in stories of 
clichéd successes – fairy tales, heroes and so on. These examples represent the subconscious 
playing out of initiatory rites about the deaths and resurrections of normal life; no longer 
framed necessarily in the context of religion but operating nevertheless at a deep 
psychological level. He notes the imperative of a means of ‘renewal’ in the midst of life (which 
Christians would understand in terms of metanoia and salvation). Michael Meade adds that if 
rites of passage are not culturally available then they resurface in other ways – possibly as 
gang culture, addictive behaviour, crime and neurosis.497   
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5.3.3 Liminality and suffering: the place of pilgrimage 
It is impossible to develop a generic category for suffering (see the discussion of total pain in 
$1.1) because of its highly contextual nature. However, suffering persons usually find 
themselves disabled with respect to wider society: there will be some way in which they 
cannot be full members of the group, occupying a strange territory that has a liminal identity. 
Sölle believes this isolation to be a key characteristic of suffering (see $5.4.1).  
Turner was interested in identifying ‘what was to Christian salvific belief and practice the 
homologue of the liminality of major initiations in tribal religions’.498 He decided that the 
sacramental Christian rites did not function in this way in a complex society like ours, but that 
the concept of pilgrimage did. He noted the following key differences between pilgrimage and 
initiation: pilgrimage is voluntary, reversible, individual, and dangerous. Initiation is essential, 
irreversible, social, and − although the rites may involve danger − the initiation group is 
‘protected’ in terms of where it takes place, how long it lasts, and in having mature oversight. 
Thus Turner is inclined to describe pilgrimage as liminoid.  
I want to differ from Turner, and to construct an argument that when suffering is able to be 
perceived as pilgrimage, as a place of transition, learning, or even growth, and as part of a 
‘bigger’ journey rather than as an event in itself, then its features are more liminal than 
liminoid. Suffering can then be understood as a place of separation, where one is 
(involuntarily) set aside and can take stock of normal life. Suffering thus functions as an 
initiation (although not necessarily a socially recognised one) into a different paradigm of 
being. Taking such a view of suffering does NOT thereby logically imply that God – or ‘fate’ – is 
responsible for the suffering as a pedagogical experience: a common default assumption 
within religious faith of all kinds: rather, it is to value the journey and, with Frankl, to perceive 
one’s suffering as the unique task of one’s life, through which one discovers meaning and 
purpose.  It is much harder to perceive these aspects of suffering if the experience is evaluated 
only in terms of a ‘medical’ or material model, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis.  
Suffering is frequently described as a part of the variable journey of life. The metaphor is so 
common that we do not question it, and indeed we can readily see that the story of the 
journey of life is the narrative of life.  So, to what extent is it pilgrimage, and is it liminal or 
liminoid? This distinction is important for developing models of pastoral care for those who 
suffer.  I want to argue that suffering is in fact a true liminal experience, or at least, has the 
potential to be so.  Here I will critique the characteristics that Turner has identified. 
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(a) Voluntary or essential?  Suffering is probably never a voluntary exercise,499 although we do 
have choices about our response to it. Several theologians argue that suffering has the sense of 
imposition about it.500 When we suffer, we are involuntarily placed in a class of ‘outsider’:501 a 
liminal characteristic.  Within a consumer worldview we assume we are entitled to a choice 
about our experiences, and so the imposition of suffering is psychologically rejected as ‘unfair’ 
or ‘meaningless’, lacking causal or consequential rationality. 
(b) Reversible?  Initiation is irreversible – either one has, or has not, been through the rite, and 
this is socially recognised to be the case. One’s status is either changed or not. Pilgrimage is 
perceived by Turner to have a voluntariness about it that means one can choose to go or not, 
or to stop part way through. However, in this case he is viewing pilgrimage as an elected 
journey, for example, to a shrine, as in the traditional Catholic understanding: ‘The plain truth 
is that pilgrimage does not ensure a major change in religious state – and seldom in secular 
status – though it may make one a better person, fortified by the graces merited by the 
hardships and self-sacrifice of the journey’.502 However, if we take a more global view of 
pilgrimage as the journey of life, then suffering is one of the hazards that we encounter upon 
it. To experience the suffering is an irreversible experience. We cannot refuse to go through it; 
and almost certainly are changed profoundly by it.     
I am arguing that if the focus of the journey becomes arrival rather than travelling, then it is 
possible that the suffering may leave us fundamentally unchanged.  It may be that the 
atrophied transcendent dimension of modern life robs us of a sense of purpose unless we 
arrive (this is the materialist’s worldview), contributing to the painful conclusion that suffering 
is indeed ‘meaningless’ – because suffering prevents us from ‘arriving’ quickly and efficiently. 
Suffering distorts our perception of the life narrative’s ending: it may be different from the 
ending for which we had hoped, or the end may not be perceptible at all. The virtue of a 
worldview that affirms transcendence is that the ending does not have to be apparent to us as 
an immediate material consequence of the journey. In Christian terms, the project of 
personhood, or becoming more and more aware of ourselves as beings in the image of God, is 
one that is completed in death, which state is unavailable for empirical evaluation. 
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Nonetheless, we are aware of the goals and signposts of the personal journey and have a 
model for it in the form of the gospels.  
(c) Individual or social?  Suffering has an inescapable corporate dimension. Suffering can be 
imposed by others (see the discussion in $5.4), either deliberately (by inflicting pain), or 
involuntarily (by colluding with the exclusion of the sufferer in some way, and this collusion 
can be quite complex). Suffering is also, as we have seen, an inescapable part of being a 
person, and persons are relational and social.  
(d) Exposed or enclosed?  At first sight we might assume that suffering is ‘dangerous’ and 
exposes us; however, I believe it makes more sense to understand suffering as taking place in 
the ‘sacred’ space, separated from normal social life. Sufferers are isolated and refused. Dame 
Cicely Saunders, in an interview not long before her death, commented: ‘I remember one 
patient, years ago, saying to me: “It’s very strange; nobody seems to want to look at me.” 
People do “cross the road” to avoid the bereaved and dying. In a way, they feel they’re a 
failure because they’ve tried treatments that haven’t worked, so, by the time they come to us, 
they’ve been quite battered, almost like social outcasts. They need to feel self-worth again. 
After being in the hospice, patients will sometimes say to us: “Now I feel I’m a person 
again”‘.503  
Non-sufferers do not fully understand how to approach or help those who suffer (for example, 
Job’s friends in the OT story), and may not even be interested in doing so. The removal from 
sight (the ‘sequestration’) of sufferers is characteristic of a liminal process. If the sufferers 
emerge from the isolation, they are permanently transformed. Certain figures – doctors, 
priests, psychologists, gaolers − are delegated by society to be liminal guides to these suffering 
people, but most people do not associate with the sufferers.     
Perhaps in summary we could say that suffering that is perceived as meaningful is truly liminal, 
since the person undergoes a transformation or a metanoia.504 Suffering that is perceived as 
meaningless is liminoid: its deep significance can be evaded, and the opportunity for metanoia 
is lost.  
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5.3.4 Liminality and temporality  
Turner draws our attention to the way in which traditional pilgrims will conduct rituals on 
arrival at their destination, but on the way are subject to ‘hazards’.  ‘Pilgrimages, although 
rooted in atemporal paradigms, experience temporality in ways rather foreign to the protected 
milieus of initiation rituals’, he says, adding that ‘the former *pilgrimage] liminalizes time, the 
latter *initiation+ space...’.505  The question is how these hazards on the way to the end are 
subsequently interpreted when the journey is recounted as narrative: are they just 
purposeless obstacles or do they in fact enhance the meaning of the journey? Ricoeur argues 
that narrative emplotment, which imposes coherence onto a selection of events, can 
effectively invert perceived necessity and contingency.506 He also argues that the re-telling of 
narratives allows us to take a different view of initial conditions and consequences, such that 
we can ‘see’ the beginning in the end and vice versa.  
Narrative, the story of the pilgrimage, is thus the ‘vessel’ in which the fundamental conflict of 
human and cosmic time can be held, and is itself neither one nor the other. Narrative has the 
potential for effecting a change in the reader/interpreter (see the discussion in $5.2.4), which 
is also the property and function of liminal space.  So we could suggest that narrative has 
characteristics of temporal liminality, and is therefore a natural location in which to name and 
undergo the experience of suffering – and we might call this particular form of narrative 
‘lament’ (discussed further in $5.4).507  Conversely we could argue that suffering triggers the 
conceptual move into narrative space. From a pastoral point of view this means that being 
able to narrate the pilgrimage will be profoundly helpful in terms of locating meaning in the 
experience of suffering. Furthermore, if the person experiencing suffering is familiar with the 
concept and practice of pilgrimage, then the narration of his/her pain will be easier and more 
effective, because that person will be more comfortable with the occupation of liminal space.  
The significance of this line of argument is that it offers an accessible alternative to the 
description of the world in material and reductionist ways. In practice the effectiveness of life 
story therapy in the management of terminal patients is evident; but there is also the 
possibility here that the introduction of the practice of pilgrimage – whether physical or 
narrative - in some way at an earlier stage of life might be extremely helpful to all persons. 
Pilgrimage has passed out of practice in most Protestant churches, but perhaps those in 
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pastorate need to explore new ways of introducing this aspect of spirituality because of its 
natural alliance to the transcendent.     
 
5.4 Suffering: the central human experience? 
Ricoeur suggests that ‘*w+e tell stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit 
being narrated. This remark takes on its full force when we refer to the necessity to save the 
history of the defeated and the lost. The whole history of suffering cries out for vengeance and 
calls for narrative’.508  
Speaking on Radio 4 in early 2010, Rabbi Jonathan Sacks described how the Jews trapped in 
the Warsaw Ghetto during the Nazi occupation decided to gather collections of stories and 
photographs of what was happening to them, and to hide them in the ghetto as a record of the 
Holocaust. 509  After the war, the survivors of the ghetto were able to search for these firsthand 
documents, hidden in tin cans and milk churns and buried beneath the wreckage of the 
houses. This desperate act of concealment of documents was considered by Sacks to be one of 
hope, because the imprisoned Jewish victims held onto the beliefs that (a) the war would end 
and that there would be survivors of the ghetto, and (b) that the world would be willing to 
hear the stories of injustice, which would validate the suffering of the Jewish community. 
This short account demonstrates the fragility of undistorted (in McFadyen’s sense of 
undistorted) human narrative possibility. The development and offering of a narrative is not in 
itself enough. It has to be heard and evaluated, which has implications for the relationships 
between narrator and hearer. In particular, we would want to ask where the balance of power 
may lie – for example, does the narrative conform to cultural norms? If not, can it be truly 
heard? The suppression of narrative can occur in various ways – the narrator can be silenced 
by removal or disempowerment (this was the Nazi strategy); the narrative can be ridiculed or 
made to seem irrational (the Holocaust deniers); the surrounding cultural narratives may be so 
loud that they drown out the small voice (cultural apathy: it doesn’t affect me). 
When the dying or suffering person wants to articulate her/his narrative, s/he meets several 
obstacles. First, there appears to be a consensual silence in western culture about death and 
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bodily impairment, both of which are perceived as failures in success. Second, there is a 
powerful metanarrative that suppresses serious engagement with the transcendent or non-
rational aspects of human being. Third, there is a distancing of persons from sacrificial 
relationship because of the cultural focus on the autonomous self.  
Sölle dialogues powerfully with these criteria in her liberation-focused theology of suffering.510  
Her critique discloses a western church that is deeply flawed in compassion (she uses the term 
apatheia), since it prefers cultural ‘success’ to a Christ-like identification with the victim, and 
she illuminates the irony of a ‘Christianity *that+ has become a stranger to pain’.511  
She identifies three movements in the process of suffering that are consonant both with our 
own personal experiences and with the observation of the experience of others: first, a stage 
of mute shock; second, the articulation of the suffering (often as lament); and third, the 
transformation – or perhaps we might say, the enculturation – of suffering and sufferer. I 
would like to engage with these movements with reference to the ideas of Ricoeur, McFadyen 
and Whitehead. 
5.4.1 Mute shock stage  
Profound suffering initially robs us of words. We are forced inside ourselves and cannot 
communicate our pain. This is a deeply dehumanising part of suffering because we are isolated 
within ourselves – either because we are not allowed to ‘speak’ or because we cannot.512  
If we transfer this experience to McFadyen’s personhood model, dialogue becomes impossible 
and we are reduced to a monological existence. We have no way of cyclically reinforcing 
through social dialogue the ‘self’ that we have been using and projecting to this point, and our 
personhood is felt to be compromised. A person is still, in this model, addressed lovingly by 
God, or s/he would cease to exist. However, if that person never works with a metanarrative of 
the transcendent, how can s/he hear or recognise this address? Even if the person does have a 
religious belief, s/he may still struggle to hear the address of the divine if the working image of 
God is devoid of vulnerability or pain.        
The archetypal story of inexplicable suffering is given in Job, and Job notably sits initially for 
seven days in silence with his friends (Job 2:13), since no-one can believe that such an upright 
person has been stricken.  In the biblical story, Job does then begin to speak, but speaking may 
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not always be an option, depending on the context. We considered earlier the involuntary 
silencing of the Warsaw Jews by violent suppression. Another kind of silencing can take place 
by the passive withholding of compassion, which Sölle names as ‘apathy’,513 ie the inability to 
empathise with another’s suffering and a lack of understanding of one’s own.  Jean Vanier 
offers this disturbing anecdote: ‘I once visited a psychiatric hospital that was a kind of 
warehouse of human misery. Hundreds of children with severe disabilities were lying, 
neglected, on their cots. There was deadly silence. Not one of them was crying. When they 
realize that nobody cares, that nobody will answer them, children no longer cry. It takes too 
much energy. We cry out only when there is hope that someone may hear us’.514  
So far the silence of suffering has been construed rather negatively, but I would like to analyse 
it a little more. Let us think of the ‘shock’ that occurs when a metaphor comes into play in 
language. The metaphor has the ‘is and is not’ quality that has the ‘impertinence’ to suggest 
likeness where there is none.  The power of metaphor to extend language arises from this 
shock ‘out of’ familiar territory. In other words, metaphor makes us pause and see the world 
afresh; and in so doing, we may learn a new thing, and expand our comprehension (although 
there is also the serious possibility, especially in our scientific culture, that the metaphor will 
not enlighten us at all).  
I think it is credible to argue four things: 
a) that Sölle’s mute shock phase of suffering can be styled as a ‘metaphorical experience’ − 
suffering does come to us as something alien and new that causes us to re-evaluate the world; 
b) that suffering has the quality of ‘metaphorical experience’ in that it is and is not as we 
expect life to be; 
c) that suffering is metaphorical experience in that it brings together the human and divine: 
God is ‘like us’ in the suffering Christ, but unlike us in his transcendence and perfect love; 
d) that we are free to accept or reject the new insight into life that suffering as a metaphorical 
experience brings: just as we may either accept or reject a metaphorical association in 
language. This feature also images the work of God in its non-coercive persuasion, 
characteristic of process thinkers.       
 
 
                                                          
513
 Sölle, Suffering, p 36. 
514
 Vanier, Becoming human, p 9. 
151 
 
5.4.2 Articulation (lament) stage 
Sölle’s second phase of suffering is that of being able to articulate the experience. The 
articulation may be very basic:  a raw cry of pain is at least a start, because it breaks out of the 
solitary inner place of monologue by assuming that someone – maybe God? − will hear.  In Job 
the phase of articulation, or lament, takes up a great deal of the book.  Job expresses his pain 
to various listeners and receives advice from them. The advice from the three friends 
(comforters of Job) actually demonstrates their poor listening skills, since they are at pains to 
analyse Job’s suffering and find a cause for it, which is usually expressed in terms of Job’s sin or 
fault in some way.  When Job is unable to identify such sin or fault in his life, this advice simply 
compounds his suffering and further isolates him from his community.  
In this process we can see a typical Girardian dynamic: the suffering one is identified and 
targeted as the community’s secret sinner, making the friends feel righteous and safe. They 
have not been afflicted, so they must be righteous. The effect is to push Job back into the 
isolation of suffering even further: he cannot articulate the sin that he has not committed and 
his pain is increased. This destructive cycle is repeated until something very interesting 
happens: the young man Elihu waits while his elders reason with Job. Only when they have 
finished does the young outsider suggest an alternative interpretation to Job for his experience 
– interestingly, the transforming discourse comes from another ‘marginal’ person rather than 
from the establishment elders.515     
In the hospice, being able to articulate – ie to talk freely about death to staff – was often very 
liberating for patients. Often the patient’s articulation of pain was hampered by a concern for 
her/his loved ones, not wanting to hurt them. Families may collude with this evasion of reality 
because of the cultural taboo around death. For example, patients and families would often 
talk of ‘when we go home’, when there was actually no prospect of such a thing; or seek 
further and often unorthodox treatment when it was clearly unsuitable, in an attempt to 
evade the inevitable outcome, as noted in $5.2.4. Such evasions make it difficult for the 
patient to articulate – in McFadyen’s terms, they are distorted dialogues, albeit for the best of 
reasons. Families could further impede the articulation of pain by analysing the disease 
causally: once biological and environmental factors were exhausted (genetics, smoking, 
occupational hazards), the analysis could become metaphysical: ‘s/he did not deserve this’, 
implying that a transcendent justice and causality might be at work, since they had failed to 
make sense of the experience in any other manner.       
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How might we analyse the phase of lament for this study? McFadyen speaks of the dialogue 
that leads out of personal isolation – of course, dialogue need not be understood to be vocal, 
but can be any relational experience – and by which we establish our humanity. If we are 
condemned to a self-referential existence then we do not live, at least, not as humans. 
McFadyen would argue that technically such an existence is impossible because of the call of 
God to each person; heard or unheard, but we know that in practice we can live as if there is 
no such address of God. 
Furthermore, there is a significant narrative implication. If one can narrate one’s suffering, 
which occurs in human experience but also draws its meaning from the cosmic dimension, is 
this to place it in Ricoeur’s historical time – the time that links human and cosmic time? And if 
this is correct, could we even say that historical time has liminal as well as narrative 
characteristics? If so, then narrated suffering can be understood as a place of transformation 
on the pilgrimage of life, and this might provide helpful pastoral insights into spiritual pain, 
making use of the telling of stories.   
5.4.3 Transformation stage 
Sölle’s third phase is transformation, or moving out of isolation into a new form of relationship 
with others. This transformation is about being able to articulate the experience of suffering 
and then to reincorporate it into life, so that it does not simply oppress and silence the 
sufferer.516 In McFadyen’s terms, dialogue is re-established between the suffering person and 
the community, although all parties will be changed by the experience: the new relationship 
will not be the same as the one that was disrupted by the impact of suffering on its ‘victim’, 
and some communities and some suffering individuals may of course be more receptive to re-
establishing dialogue than others.  
Sölle uses Job as a paradigm for this process. When Job moves out of silence into articulation 
and lament, initially his friends struggle to receive him back as a full dialogue partner. Their 
driving purpose is to attribute Job’s suffering, and when they cannot, they give up. So, Eliphaz 
says to Job: ‘Consider now: Who, being innocent, has ever perished? Where were the upright 
ever destroyed? As I have observed, those who plough evil and those who sow trouble reap 
it...hear it and apply it to yourself’ (Job 4:7-8 and 5: 27b). Bildad and Zophar follow with similar 
advice: that Job must in some way be culpable before God.  This dialogue is very painful to Job, 
because he does not believe that he has sinned such that he ‘deserves’ the suffering that 
befalls him. It does not make rational sense.     
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If we apply McFadyen’s model to these exchanges then we might label them as distorted 
dialogues, primarily because Job’s access to the dialogue is limited. He is oppressed by the 
assumptions of his community about the nature of his presumed sin. As readers and 
interpreters, we have privileged access to the introductory material in Job 1 which tells us that 
Job has not in fact sinned: but the participants in the story do not know this.  We know in 
advance, therefore, that the story is not about a causal or punitive relationship between sin 
and suffering; but Job and his friends have to work out their own interpretation, and capitulate 
to the assumption that Job has failed and needs to atone for his failure. This canalised517  
response to suffering seems to be fundamental to human social existence, no less so today in 
terms of illness and disability.  
The story is no less an illustration of power dynamics in operation. The inexplicable suffering of 
Job undermines at a stroke his position as a blameless elder of the community and destroys 
the basis of his veneration by the people.  The powerful one becomes powerless. His health, 
wealth and family are stricken.  His friends are now the ones in power and the very tenor of 
the debates is one of ‘polite’ oppression of the now-vulnerable Job. They cannot hear Job’s 
lament without judgement; and so he is not truly heard at all. The dialogue is distorted. Then 
in Job 32, Elihu, the young man who does not hold the social position of the three friends of 
Job, begins to speak. He offers a ‘view from the margins’ that is different. He describes the 
inability of humanity to understand God’s ways: yet not in a fatalistic manner, for he also 
affirms the loving nature of God, hearing and caring for all people without oppression (Job 
37:23b).  He reveals a different possibility of relationship with God in his passionate defence of 
the Almighty.  
Job’s transformation occurs when he realises that suffering and joy in life are not about 
punishment and reward but different aspects of a faithful relationship with God. He begins to 
see God as a life partner rather than as a cosmic judge and dispenser of services: ‘My ears had 
heard of you but now my eyes have seen you’ (Job 42:5). The restoration of Job is not a reward 
for his presumed sinlessness, but an aspect of his restoration to the community and to true 
dialogue.  The new Job, the post-suffering Job, can witness more truthfully to the nature of a 
God of loving relationship than the righteous Job we meet at the beginning of the story. 
However, the community’s worldview is profoundly challenged by this experience: if Job is 
restored, then what does that mean for the experience of suffering and the way in which God 
is perceived?      
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We might want to use the term metanoia for this process – the individual undergoes a 
metanoia when s/he is ‘saved’ from  desolation; but the community can also undergo 
metanoia when it actually hears the story of suffering and is able to include that person and 
her/his story within the community, thus expanding the limits of that community’s 
understanding. Metaphorically speaking, the experience of suffering shocks the community 
into stretching its cognitive boundaries; in Job’s case, about the nature of God and his 
relationship to people, a profound challenge to the prevailing worldview and arguably the task 
of the whole story of scripture.  
 
5.5 Blame and lament: the ontological impertinence of suffering and the story of Jesus 
In the final section of this chapter I would like to apply and adapt Ricoeur’s discussion of the 
difference between ‘blame’ and ‘lament’, which I believe illuminates the heart of the pastoral 
questions around suffering.  Ricoeur says, ‘The whole enigma of evil may be said to lie in the 
fact that, at least in the traditions of the West, we put under the same terms such different 
phenomena as sin, suffering, and death. However, evil as wrongdoing and evil as suffering 
belong to two heterogeneous categories, that of blame and that of lament’.518 In his discussion 
Ricoeur remarks that when humans violate cultural codes (ie when they sin), then guilt and 
blame are invoked; but lament occurs when suffering is undergone (as for Sölle).519  
Here I would like to make an overt connection with the critique of reductionism in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis, and say that I would broadly identify the work of blame as forensic in character, 
while the work of lament is both integrative and interpretive.520  
Ricoeur finds three stages in lament which correspond fairly closely with the stages of suffering 
identified by Sölle, although neither theologian references the other. Ricoeur speaks of a first 
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‘inadequate’ to an ‘adequate’ form of lament (ie from one that complains against God to one that 
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stage of incomprehension; a second of complaint against God; and a third that occurs when 
we discover that the reasons for believing in God have nothing to do with the need to explain 
the origin of suffering. ‘Suffering is only a scandal for the person who understands God to be 
the source of everything that is good in creation, including our indignation against evil, our 
courage to bear it, and our feeling of sympathy toward victims. In other words, we believe in 
God in spite of evil’.521  
The pastoral pathway encountered in the care of terminal patients often follows this kind of 
process. There is a search for culpability: was the cause of my sickness environmental? was it 
dietary? is it genetic? otherwise, is it the fault of God – or fate? This search for an empirical 
cause is common to those with or without religious faith in a modern liberal culture; however, 
the resolution of the search may be (though is not always) a very different process for those 
with Christian belief, for whom lament is part of the tradition – if they can hear it.   
The paradigmatic life of Jesus Christ is one that embraces and reveals the true nature of 
suffering as the experience of the victim.  Jesus as victim is truly and undeniably innocent: and 
if his incarnation is to show us anything then he has to be thus, to illuminate the profound 
reality that suffering is not necessarily ‘because of’ anything we have done, or anything we 
might be. There is no divine transaction that administers punishment in proportion to sin, or 
retribution in proportion to pain. Unmitigated suffering is visited upon the blameless second 
person of the Trinity: yet it is not for no reason; it is not meaningless. It is revelatory of the 
character of God in a broken universe, and it shows both God’s complete empathy with those 
who suffer and the nature of the perfect response to the experience of suffering, which is to 
break the cycle of blame.  
At this point I want to develop the idea that the characteristic of suffering can be described as 
ontological impertinence. This characteristic has the potential to change us fundamentally 
from blamers (causal mentality) into lamenters (interpretive mentality). The intractable 
experiences of profound suffering that we find so difficult pastorally are in fact the gates to 
new meaning. Whenever the question ‘Why me?’ arises it is in fact a unique opportunity to 
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cause for suffering – ‘We humans have purpose on the brain. We find it hard to look at anything without 
wondering what it is “for,” what the motive for it is, or the purpose behind it’. He then uses this 
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look at all the presumptions of life that hitherto led us to say that there is no meaning in what 
has happened.522   
By using the analogy with metaphor, we might say that the original referent of our suffering 
(the presumed ‘responsible’ agent or event) founders, and allows the new meaning to emerge. 
Suffering offers access to the transcendent dimension of existence by confounding the 
‘human’ referential experience: life no longer makes sense, and one is open to new 
possibilities in a manner that was not possible before.  We seek for something that is similar 
and yet dissimilar to our own experience: and this is the ‘unique opportunity’523 to refer our 
experience of suffering to that of the crucified God in our search for new meaning. Does our 
suffering make sense? Yes, now it does, for we have a new referent in the experience of Christ.  
Only by the paradoxical combinations of power and weakness, life and death, divine and 
human in Christ is this successful referential activity possible.  We are dependent not just upon 
Christ’s work and person but upon the dynamic and imprecise nature, the sheer messiness, of 
the God-story given to us in Christ. If it were tidy then we would too readily make it our own 
and it would cease to be a useful referent – it would ‘die’, like the metaphorical table leg. On 
the other hand, if the God-story were less like ours then we would not make the connection at 
all: the comparison would be wide of the mark, like the froglike sunrise, and Jesus’ life would 
cease to deliver the new meaning we desire and need for the resolution of our spiritual pain.    
5.5.1 The ontological impertinence of the passion 
Kitamori argues that we will never make sense of our suffering unless it testifies to the 
suffering of Christ.  In the terms of the argument in this section, this means that we need to 
understand his paradigmatic life and the ‘impertinence’ of his passion as the referent for our 
own ‘impertinent’ pain. I would like to explore this argument within my suggested scheme by 
looking at the biblical account in Luke, as follows.  
The cross is indeed the ultimate referent for our pain: but the cross is not a logical outcome in 
that it is not a right judgement, and there is no ‘because’ that is adequate to explain it. The 
cross was undeserved, and is quite clearly demonstrated to be so by the gospel accounts, 
which describe collusion and plotting against Jesus to achieve his death (James Alison speaks 
helpfully, after Girard,  of exposing the ‘intelligence of the victim’). The sentence of the cross is 
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thus logically unrelated to the quality of the life (of Jesus), with which it is eternally associated. 
Our essential spiritual task in life is to appropriate this discontinuity, to become participants in 
this story rather than observers,524 and I will discuss this further in the concluding chapter 
(Chapter 6).  The cross is the ultimate location for metaphorical meaning: it is the place where 
‘God died… and yet did not die’.525 
In the crucifixion the human need to blame was made manifest: but it was not rational, 
because the victim was not guilty.526 Jesus was not responsible for the existential pain of the 
Jews but instead offered possibilities for healing it, both paradigmatically, through his personal 
ministry of compassionate signs (the miracles and healings of the gospels) and pragmatically, 
by establishing a way of life for all people that embraces healing and relational existence, the 
interpersonal dealings of which life do not focus on any kind of retributive justice, but on 
unconditional love.  Thus in Jesus himself, in his life and in his death (and we shall come to the 
resurrection presently), the causal link between suffering and sin is demonstrated to be 
unsound when applied as a universal.527    
On the cross Jesus did not become a ‘blamer’, but did the work of lament, which integrates 
and interprets the relationship of grace between God and humanity. He refused to dispense or 
to perpetuate violence in his response to the people’s violent blaming of himself. In fact, he 
was largely silent during the period of accusation, responding only to certain specific questions 
about his identity and ministry, and these responses were careful ones. For example, in Luke 
22:66-23:4, there are three interactions between Jesus and his accusers, as follows (text 
quoted from NIV). 
[First] 
(v 67) ‘If you are the Christ’, they said, ‘tell us’. 
Jesus answered, ‘If I tell you, you will not believe me, (v 68) and if I asked you, you would not 
answer. (v 69) But from now on, the Son of Man will be seated at the right hand of the mighty 
God’. 
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(v 70) They all asked, ‘Are you then the Son of God?’ 
He replied, ‘You are right in saying I am’. 
 [Thirdly] 
(v 3) So Pilate asked Jesus, ‘Are you the king of the Jews?’ 
‘Yes, it is as you say,’ Jesus replied. 
The content of these confessions about Jesus’s identity all originate from the accusers: Jesus 
does not put any words into their mouths at all. He does not inflame the debate by offering 
unpalatable assertions, although he does not deny what is true. The accusers have come to 
their opinion about his (presumed) divinity by seeing the works of Jesus and his popularity, 
both of which challenge their security, yet Jesus constantly warns his followers NOT to jump to 
conclusions based upon his healings and miracles. Mark’s gospel is especially clear about the 
‘Messianic secret’ but all the gospels are peppered with remarks that deflect attention away 
from the signs and miracles, and  towards the (far more costly) lifestyle of compassion and 
service. The economy of Jesus is not a market economy, nor one that can be described by 
cause and effect, retributive justice, or any other reductive mechanism.  It is about a process of 
self-giving love.     
Outside the interviews quoted above, Jesus’s words during his passion were largely words that 
broke into the blaming cycle and turned it to lament: 
‘...do not weep for me; weep for yourselves and for your children’ (Luke 23:28); 
and, later,  
‘Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing’ (Luke 23:34).  
Critically, these words do not say that suffering does not hurt or does not matter, but they use 
the suffering to suggest a new way of life, which laments without blaming. In today’s world 
this is roughly the equivalent of adopting a non-causal dimension to our explanation: taking 
seriously the evidence of experience as an indicator of the nature of reality. Importantly for my 
argument, it is the ontological impertinence of suffering, its ‘metaphorical shock’ quality, 




5.5.2 The ontological impertinence of the resurrection 
Thinking about the resurrection is the next step in my argument.  The risen Jesus is initially 
unrecognised in the various gospel encounters, yet in each recorded case he is eventually 
affirmed in his identity. Resurrected, he is both like and unlike the Jesus of Nazareth known to 
his followers prior to Good Friday.528 He is different enough for the impertinence to be felt; but 
similar enough for the likeness to the executed Jesus to become evident. The same process of 
impertinent attribution allows us to think about life and death, humanity and divinity, in a new 
way. The shock of seeing the dead Jesus raised to life triggers the cosmic re-evaluation of the 
world and of the nature of God that characterises the New Testament witness.529  The 
experience of death is retained within the experience of the resurrected Christ (he is and is not 
dead).530 The re-evaluation leading to metanoia causes the original referents to founder:  so 
the apparent impossibility of emerging from death in some way is now challenged, although 
the changed nature of the risen Christ indicates that death is neither forgotten nor erased 
from his new existence. 
Once again, the dialogues and events of the gospels after the resurrection are not 
characterised by blame: although neither is lament now the dominant genre. Instead, there is 
a movement towards transformation or metanoia: the adoption and incorporation of the 
shocking reality (the whole life, death and resurrection of Jesus understood as the Son of God) 
that opens up a new and creative way of understanding reality – and most particularly, 
provides a new way of interpreting the experience of suffering and of death that starts from 
the radically discontinuous experience of resurrection and completely passes under the radar 
of rational causality.531 We cannot attribute a cause or reason for resurrection other than the 
unconditional grace and love of God: that he did not blame humanity for the death of Jesus, 
but rather gave further evidence of his desire to heal. In a rational scheme, if Jesus is the 
innocent victim and also God’s Son, then his death at the hands of human beings should invite 
revenge, destruction, punishment. It does not: this shocking reality means that we cannot 
apportion blame.  God is not against us, whatever we might do.  
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5.5.3 The ontological impertinence of personhood 
The shock to our human conceptions of personhood and community from the referential life 
of Christ is no less profound. In Chapter 3 I explored the dialogical conception of personhood 
developed by McFadyen, in which persons are understood as formed through a process of 
communal dialogue.  Experiences of call and response take place throughout life and become 
sedimented into a whole dynamic personal existence. A person cannot exist in isolation.  This 
view of personhood challenges the autonomous subject so beloved of liberal western societies 
and also sits happily with the process insights that challenge the reductionism and remoteness 
of traditional hard theism. How then is Christian personhood to be viewed as ontologically 
impertinent?  
I have argued ($5.4) that suffering is the central human experience, because the impertinence 
of suffering triggers the creative re-evaluation and transformation of the human being, leading 
to new meaning in the light of the matters that challenge us. In particular, suffering opens the 
gateway to the transcendent and expands our capacity for life beyond the material and causal. 
This type of personhood is offered to us paradigmatically and perfectly in Christ.  
Sölle notes that Jesus does not overcome death simply in his resurrection.532 Her concept of 
death is what she terms ‘death by bread alone’ – or an obsession with the material realm such 
that we give ourselves to social alienation. We are already dead if we cannot value others 
except as points of competition and comparison by which to judge our own achievements. 
Thus Jesus does not just overcome natural death in the resurrection: he also battles with and 
overcomes death wherever he meets it during his public ministry – by reconciling the outsiders 
with their communities, and by challenging those who exclude and alienate through social or 
religious convention.  It is the suffering of the outsider that triggers this transformational 
activity, challenging people to re-evaluate reality.     
In none of this does Jesus apportion blame, in the sense that he seeks judgement on, and 
punishment for, the excluders. His strategy is overwhelmingly to lament the hardness of heart 
of the people, and to teach a compassionate (compassion meaning literally ‘to suffer with’) 
alternative to those who will follow him.  Thus we are called to become a transformational 
society of those who do not cut others down by blaming, but who express genuine lament for 
suffering and seek the transformation of the community. Such an approach would profoundly 
alter our society’s attitude to incidents both of moral and of natural evil, seeing in them 
possibilities rather than problems. It would be a society characterised by healing and inclusion 
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rather than by competition and difference.533 It would be a model consonant with a process 
paradigm, in which all experience is held in God and has ‘value’ (although it is not necessarily 
‘good’). 
My conclusion is that it is precisely in these ontological impertinences that we may learn to 
lament instead of to blame. The possibility of new meaning and of metanoia is always open to 
us, both as individuals and as communities, and is in fact the only way to live in the dynamic 
tension of relationship. If we cease to respond creatively to suffering, then we are already 
dead: we live in a closed cycle of regret and bitterness that will close us off from new and 
healthy relationships with others. 
5.5.4 The impertinence of temporality 
In The unheard cry for meaning, Viktor Frankl develops the interesting process-like thought 
that everything is both transitory (it passes away) and eternal (once something exists, its 
existence is irreversible and has consequences: this is effectively a statement of objective 
immortality).534 We have no control, says Frankl, over the transitory or eternal nature of reality 
– but we do have control over the decisions we make in life and thus about what we commit 
to the eternal record, which record can be neither corrected nor lost. The present moment is 
the border between the future and the past and is also the borderline at which we decide 
what to commit to eternity. Frankl notes that we ‘rescue’ things from their transitory status 
and make them permanent by means of these decisions.   
Frankl’s reasoning feels to me a little fatalistic, in spite of his protestations that by accepting 
our responsibilities for our decisions we can effectively ‘write’ our own eternity. Men and 
women often make decisions that they subsequently regret: this is life. It is a tall pastoral 
challenge to expect people to shoulder full responsibility for their (perhaps unwittingly) 
disastrous decisions and then to live content with the anticipation of eternal consequences, 
simply because the decisions, once made, are immutable. Such fatalism has no place in the 
story of the resurrection, which does not suggest a static timeless repository of events after 
death, but rather a pattern of transformative being that offers tremendous hope for healing 
and change (Christ is both dead and undead,535 see discussion in $5.5.2). Some thinkers 
suggest that judgement can be included as a hopeful and healing process within such a 
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 Clearly this form of society would suggest political and civil applications, for example, in terms of 
legal process. A concrete example might be the Truth and Reconciliation process in post-apartheid 
South Africa. 
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 This argument will be found in the chapter entitled Temporality and mortality: an ontological essay, 
pp 102-113 of Frankl’s The unheard cry for meaning. 
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 See Alison, Knowing Jesus, p  20; Moltmann, Crucified, p 253. 
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dynamic eternity, and Paul Fiddes offers a discussion of this point in The promised end.536  A 
recent debate in process thought between David Griffin and Marjorie Suchocki concerns the 
nature of immortality.537 The idea of Whitehead’s objective immortality (that every experience 
is held in God eternally and thus is significant) is sometimes thought to be unsatisfactory, 
because for those whose lives are characterised by failure or unhappiness these negative 
experiences are the total and miserable content of eternity, which offers little in the way of 
hope. Suchocki suggests a notion of subjective immortality instead, in which the redemptive 
transformation in God of every experience of every person takes place. One of the most 
obvious problems with this view538 is that there would be multiple versions of each person in 
eternity – many already ‘there’ (and increasing all the time) while the human person is still 
‘here’ – which raises a question about how these multiple persons relate to one another.  
Another problem is that Whitehead’s actual occasions are meant to be complete in themselves 
and so technically cannot take part in ‘the future’ (though see the first adaptation immediately 
below).     
If we were to keep to Whitehead’s basic model of objective immortality as a kind of narrative 
model of the life to come, I wonder whether two adaptations might help to address this 
problem of what we might call ‘eternal regret’.  
First, could we ask about the nature of an actual occasion’s process of decay (or satisfaction).  
If we assume that the reality we experience is a good guide to the nature of reality (and 
Whitehead suggests that it is), then what is our experience of suffering like? I think we can say 
that initially, after the ‘trauma’, it is intense and acute; then the pain begins to be moderated 
(by articulation or lament, in Sölle’s scheme); and finally we become able to live with the 
suffering or pain and it may become effectively unnoticeable unless specifically triggered (like 
the longer term stages of bereavement loss). The suffering or pain does not, however, 
disappear as if it had never been.  It leaves a trace in our lives and in eternity. We are different 
because of it (Christ keeps his scars), and all our subsequent experiences are altered by it. The 
model is more like one of exponential decay of the experience, with an asymptotic final stage. 
This model seems to fit life experiences and also McFadyen’s sedimentation model of 
personhood (fluvial rather than static). I think it might be possible to reflect helpfully on 
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 Fiddes, The promised end, pp 192-212.  
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 Griffin, review of Suchocki’s The end of evil, in Process Studies, 1989, 18(1), 57-69. 
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 Several other problems are discussed between Griffin and Suchocki in this interesting article. 
Suchocki mentions the constraints of needing to develop a strict metaphysical argument without mixing 
it with ‘intuitive imagination’ (p 68). But perhaps by understanding process thought as a narrative tool, a 
metaphor or model of reality, rather than a logical straitjacket, we can deal theologically with this 
problem.    
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metanoia in these terms, and might form the material for some further thinking and 
research.539  
The second possible adaptation to a Whiteheadian model of objective immortality is to 
redefine our ‘failure’ or ‘unhappiness’ as ontological impertinence, such that the retention of 
these experiences is not perceived as purely negative and meaningless; yet also I would like to 
hope for their transformative redemption in God. How might this redemption happen?  
Perhaps we cannot find an adequate philosophical answer unless we invoke a narrative 
understanding alongside the process thought.  If we think of the transformation in God in 
eternity in the same way as we think of the signs and miracles of Jesus of Nazareth, then 
perhaps  we can start to see a way forward.  The signs and miracles redirect us: away from a 
tidy causal/retributive system and towards a total metanoia of what it is to be human in imago 
dei  – a messy place defined by the weak power, the living death, the human divinity of Christ: 
the dynamic and imprecise God-story that we have been given and which we find so very 
difficult to appropriate for ourselves.   
Once again, I would like to suggest that we are treading the ground between blame and 
lament. The accretion of events in the eternal record of a human person is unlikely to 
represent a perfect execution of life on earth! We often say, when referring to something that 
has not gone well, ‘I’ll have to live with it’, but in practice either the memory or the 
consequences will result in damaging blame and negative judgement. In contrast, the gospel 
offers us a pattern of lament that recognises sin and suffering for what they are without 
diminishing their immediate destructive powers, yet through grace continues and transforms 
the story.  Perhaps in eternity our redemption occurs through our ability to lament, to tell our 
stories justly, and to be heard by a community of others who know themselves to be 
redeemed.    
There is a sense in which the story of Jesus suggests an imposition of temporality upon 
eternity; at least in the sense of a progression of events. Fiddes notes that we cannot imagine 
a God who understands suffering if God is not also somehow limited by time. Suffering that is 
known to be finite is not the same as suffering that seems to have no end.  As humans we do 
not have that vantage point on suffering: in the very worst circumstances we hope only to 
have an end in death. Kermode remarks that ‘If time cannot be felt as successive, this end 
ceases to have effect; without the sense of passing time one is virtually ceasing to live, one 
loses ‘contact with reality’. So the prisoner invents a clock...’.540 If God does not share this pain 
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 See also fn 555 of this thesis. 
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 Kermode, Sense of an ending, p 160. 
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of the passing of time, then God is indeed remote from our suffering.  Neither can we evade 
the problem by identifying suffering too particularly with the incarnation, because that would 
drive a division between the persons of the Trinity.   
It is important to note that once again, it is the experience of suffering that triggers this re-
evaluation.  If our eternal records are blameless then perhaps we are indeed finished at death: 
otherwise, our stories will rumble on in the lives of those who labour under or transform our 
mistakes. 
Ricoeur’s discussion of human and cosmic time seems to be relevant here. He describes the 
relationship between human and cosmic time as being a temporal one: both can be narrated, 
and the limitations of human time are evident because of our awareness of the cosmic 
dimension (something like Frankl’s eternal record).  Not only is suffering the key impertinent 
event that triggers the consideration of the cosmic and makes us aware that there is a 
transcendent dimension to life over which we have no control; I would also like to suggest that 
we think in terms of our human narrative being able to impact the cosmic narrative – that the 
relationship is a dynamic and responsive one and firmly grounded in temporality. In this 
manner the unique incarnation of Christ shapes both the human and cosmic dimensions with 



















Chapter 6. Conclusion: meaningful suffering as ‘ontological 
impertinence’ 
 
He delivers the afflicted by their affliction, and opens their ears by adversity. (Job 36:15, NRSV) 
 
In this conclusion I want to offer an overview of the way in which the preceding chapters 
identify and critique the modern western view of suffering as an ‘insult to normality’.  I will do 
this by examining and critiquing culturally embedded views of the nature of reality and the 
nature of the person. Then I will consider the rehabilitation of suffering (from the discussion of 
Chapter 5) as a key experience in the formation of a person – effectively the deliverance of the 
‘afflicted by their affliction’, to quote from Job. I will reflect on the experience of suffering in 
(post)modernity541 in the light of Ricoeur’s hypothesis that reality is narrative in form, and 
develop my thesis that we can work with the idea that suffering is understood as an 
‘ontological impertinence’, because suffering functions in life in a manner analogous to the 
way in which metaphor functions in language. Finally I will suggest some practical applications 
and indicate possible further research.  
 
6.1 Job’s suffering: the ancient story illuminates the modern problem   
I will begin with some remarks about how the book of Job might be used or misused, 
interpreted or misinterpreted, in the modern era, because I think that this exercise may 
helpfully highlight some of the difficulties experienced with the very concept of suffering in 
modern settings.  I think this is an appropriate process because Job is recognised as the 
archetypal biblical story of suffering, and many of its insights are transferable to, and (more 
importantly) revelatory of, experiences of suffering today − Job is not a story of antiquity, but a 
parable for life. Most significantly for my argument, however, Job’s story in scripture has a 
happy ending, which neatly concludes his experiences and leave us with a sense of satisfaction 
that justice has been done. In spite of this feeling of appropriate closure and the universal 
appeal of this personal justice for Job, I argue that the ending functions as a red herring for 
modern westerners, because we interpret it rather doggedly from a post-Enlightenment 
perspective.  
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 With respect to my own reflections on suffering based upon working with hospice patients and the 
disability sector, postmodernity seems to be superimposed upon embedded modern assumptions about 
the nature of reality. The result is a new dualism of practical postmodern living (individualistic, anti-
authoritarian) with an underlying view of reality that is still quite modernistic (God is other, omnipotent, 
impassible etc, combined with commitment to a functional matter/spirit dualism). See $6.3. 
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I would like to suggest, for the purposes of this argument, that the happy ending (Job 42: 10-
17) be viewed less as ‘information-giving’ (although admittedly it does give summary facts and 
figures about Job’s family situation after his restoration) than as a rhetorical device along the 
lines of our more familiar ‘they all lived happily ever after’− which tells us nothing factually, 
since no-one really lives forever; still less in eternal happiness.  Rather, such epilogues indicate 
the functional end of the story (ie the narrator’s point has been made and the rest is irrelevant 
for him/her), but we are aware of a caveat about how we interpret the rest of the story drawn 
from the following insights of Ricoeur and Kermode.  Ricoeur542 observes that the reader’s 
desire is always to configure the events of a story and to make a consonant whole – so as we 
read, we interpret and catalogue and order the bits of the story into something that it might 
not have been; while Kermode543 draws our attention to the ontological difference between 
the ‘tick’ and the ‘tock’ of the plot (the kairos or significant points, the beginning and ending) 
by referring to the nature of the temporal space between them (the tick anticipates, the tock 
closes), which means that our expectations change as the plot develops.  In short, the caveat is 
that we have to be aware of what we do, if we interpret the whole story from its ending. We 
interpret the story, and obtain the meaning we want to find – yet we cannot release ourselves 
from  this privileged view of the past. The best we can do is to recognise that our personal 
contextualisation exists, even if we are not aware of our own interpretive criteria.  
As Ricoeur notes, the beginning and ending of any narrative is a decision made by the narrator: 
it is relative.544 Ricoeur identifies the existence of a generic cosmic time545 in which the 
particular human narrative is set, and even if we do not know any details of that cosmic time 
(if we did, they might add to our interpretive possibilities with that narrative), we will 
recognise that the story is placed within a broader context and purpose.   
So, if we return to Job, we do not know the details of any further conversations with God or his 
friends after the (supposedly final) resolution of his suffering in Job 42; yet such conversations 
comprise the majority of the narrative in the episode in which the storyteller is interested.  As 
far as the narrator is concerned, Job’s story is finished once this extended experience of 
suffering is dealt with. In fact we know that Job’s life story carries on, since he did not die until 
later – but his continuing story does not explicate the matter of this suffering any further in the 
view of the storyteller.    
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 Ricoeur, Time and narrative, vol 2, pp 20-25. 
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 Kermode, The sense of an ending, pp 45-47. 
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 See Ricoeur, Time and narrative, vol 2, p 20.  
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 Discussed by Ricoeur in Time and narrative, vol 3, see for example pp180ff. 
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Already some potential contemporary problems with the interpretation of Job are emerging 
which illuminate the material identified in the earlier chapters of this thesis: the issues of a 
modern dualism that struggles with transcendent reality; of forensic and reductionist thinking 
that damages human personhood and relationship; the desire for a causal explanation for 
suffering, and the consequent modern impulse to theodicy. Let me look at these problems in a 
little more detail.       
(i) The recognition that the beginning and ending of Job direct our attention to the basic 
existence of cosmic time may be overlooked in a reductionist modern reading that more 
naturally focuses on the ‘data’ within the story. A modern reader may underestimate the 
significance of the explicit links to the cosmic dimension in the opening paragraphs (expressed 
as the discussion between God and Satan, which we are not obliged to take to imply a real 
conversation, but perhaps as indicative of the existence of good and evil in the universe); and 
may simply skim over the happy ending, which more implicitly alludes to the same thing: that 
this story has a whole worldview behind it that makes sense of what happens in the story 
itself. Another way of expressing this is to say that the transcendent dimension of the story 
may be compromised in modern understanding; but without the transcendent dimension the 
story can never make sense – and this is one reason why moderns struggle with suffering.   
(ii) We like the implied (retributive type) justice of the happy ending because it feels right 
within our modern causal and forensic approach to morality and polity. Unfortunately the 
ending may completely mislead us with respect to the true message of Job. Reading Job in the 
manner of Gutierrez546 and Sölle547 places the focus not on the material resolution of his 
suffering (the pain and sickness is healed and the lost property is returned), but on (a) the 
relational dynamics between the various participants in the story; and on (b) the unconditional 
love of God, which is not bestowed according to any system of human ‘deserving’.   The 
purpose of Job’s story in this kind of reading is to show that God does not simply mete out 
punishment to the guilty and blessing to the innocent. Job confounds this logic because he 
appears to be the punished innocent, which is internally inconsistent in an archetypal story 
read in a forensic manner. In this he prefigures Christ: the illogicality of the crucifixion, which 
renders it revelatory of our human imprisonment in retributive and categorical thinking,548 is 
discussed in Chapter 5.               
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 Gutierrez, On Job. 
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 Sölle, Suffering. 
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 Arguably one way of interpreting the original sin of Genesis, in which the humans seek the forbidden 
knowledge of good and evil. After eating from the tree, the ensuing ability to categorise brings us only 
pain, bitterness and resentment of others: hell on earth, which separates us from one another in violent 
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(iii) The third issue, which may be more of a problem for the modern reader than it was for the 
original hearers, is that God is presented as the source of good and evil, both in the opening 
narrative section, in which God agrees to Job’s testing by Satan, and in the epilogue (42:11, 
which speaks of ‘all the evil that the Lord had brought upon him’). There is no real attempt at 
theodicy by the storyteller, for presumably it is not the major issue in the worldview of his 
hearers.  God (the radical monotheistic God) was for them almighty and unfathomable, but 
could be trusted to be righteous. This view is not the modern approach, which seeks 
satisfaction in a rational causal association.549     
All these points are fundamental for understanding the nature of our anxious struggles with 
the perceived meaninglessness of suffering today.  I will now review the earlier chapters’ 
analysis of the modern context in order to establish the grounds for the key argument of this 
thesis: that there is no ‘meaningless’ suffering,550 but rather, suffering has the character of 
‘ontological impertinence’ and is (a) the primary vehicle for metanoia or personal 
transformation; and (b) the intrinsic mark of personhood in the image of Christ.  Indeed, God 
delivers the afflicted by their affliction and opens their ears by adversity. 
 
6.2 The modern pastoral question: ‘Why me?’ 
In Chapter 1 I discussed the contemporary pastoral experience of caring for dying people, and 
noted the psychospiritual anguish frequently associated with the perceived failure of death, 
particularly when that death was felt to be ‘untimely’.  The hospice philosophy of care both 
names and addresses the phenomenon of ‘total pain’, first defined by Cicely Saunders, with its 
complexity of physical, social, and spiritual components. I argue that total pain is a useful 
working explanation of the more evasive and theological concept of suffering, which latter is 
understood to be contextual, subjective, and dynamic in nature – and notoriously difficult to 
describe generically, since what is a mere irritation to one person may be torture to another. 
We do not occupy another’s shoes.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
competition. Girard identifies the murder of Cain by Abel as the foundational story of violence, but the 
taking of fruit from the tree is the act that introduces the possibility of violent mimetic desire.  
549
 Ricoeur comments briefly on the desire for theodicy in his paper, Evil, a challenge to philosophy and 
theology, in Figuring the sacred (ed Wallace), p 249.   
550
 I am aware that the assertion that all suffering has meaning would not be acceptable to everyone. 
Fiddes, for example, speaks of a residual brokenness of the world, of something ‘strange’, outside God’s 
creative intention (The promised end, p 248). I would argue that if Frankl can find meaning in Auschwitz 
then we can conceive at least of the possibility that all suffering is meaningful in some way, although I 
would always acknowledge that it can be extremely difficult to find that meaning. Perhaps if we can 
accept that suffering always changes us, then we can also accept that it is never meaningless, which is 
not the same as saying that suffering is intrinsically good.    
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In hospice care, the physical and social components of total pain can often be resolved by 
practical intervention: but the psychospiritual elements can be elusive. Both patients and 
carers may struggle either to identify or to address the problem, or both, and frequently (and 
quite understandably) resort to variations of the essence of Job’s complaint: ‘Why me?’ This 
tortured cry implies felt meaninglessness and a lack of rational comprehension about the 
experience. Behind the cry lies a commonly held damaged worldview, often suppressed and 
unacknowledged, but powerful nonetheless to cause existential pain related to vague concepts 
of judgement, guilt, and transcendent power.551  It is the pastor’s task to be aware of, and 
unafraid of, this complex dynamic as s/he accompanies the suffering person.552   
The question of meaning, then, expressed as ‘Why me?’, is suggestive of a sense of personal 
betrayal. Implicitly or explicitly the questioner is comparing him- or herself to others and 
looking for a rational explanation for the suffering experience; implicitly also there is an appeal 
to cosmic justice, whether perceived as the act of a good God, or as some other rational and 
benign ultimate principle. If only the person can understand why s/he is afflicted, the suffering 
will become more bearable, as Frankl observed in the Nazi death camps. Those undertaking 
the pastoral care of suffering persons may find they are expected to address this request for 
meaning, or may even be implicated in the ‘judgement’ because they are the perceived 
representatives of God (or alternative ultimate other). They are the liminal guides of 
modernity, as discussed in Chapter 5. This place can be an uncomfortable, and indeed a 
powerless, one to occupy as a pastor, and without some ability to reflect theologically it will be 
unsustainable because suffering is offensive to our modern minds. 
 
6.3 The underlying worldviews 
In this thesis I have effectively broken down the question, ‘Why me?’, into two parts: 
(i) ‘why’ is a question about how reality is understood, and then how suffering is understood 
within that reality; 
(ii) ‘me’ is a matter of personhood – ie what does it mean to be human, to be this person in 
this situation? 
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In Chapter 2, I addressed the question of the nature of reality, offering a critique of traditional 
‘hard’ theism and agreeing with those who suggest that western society, although presenting 
itself as post-Christian, is still deeply influenced by an embedded Platonism that is still 
culturally associated with the Christian God.  I drew on the work of Fiddes, Kitamori, Sölle and 
others to argue that this image of God – remote, powerful, perfect, impassible, interventionist 
− is not truly compatible with Christian scripture or religious experience, and is unhelpful when 
dealing with suffering, and that a more helpful model of reality could be developed by using 
Whitehead’s process thought as a basis. 
In Chapter 3, I examined the issue of personhood, which pertains to the second part of the key 
question, why me?  The subject of personhood is massive and of enduring interest, with many 
possible approaches from many different disciplines. I chose to focus on Alastair McFadyen’s 
‘dialogical’ personhood,553 in which a person is understood as a dynamic product of interactive 
relationships (the primary one being the dialogue with God).  This model addresses a number 
of key issues of interest to my thesis. Primarily it does away with the influential western view 
of the person as an autonomous subject and instead focuses on our mutual formation of one 
another in context and in relationship. This shift away from autonomy seems to me to be 
essential in any attempt to engage properly with the suffering of persons, because the 
immediate temptation of the individualistic mindset is to see that suffering person as ‘other’, 
which then compromises our ability to empathise and accompany; it also distances the 
suffering person from our own experience such that we do not humbly learn that we, too, are 
vulnerable.554    
McFadyen’s model does much more than to deal with our individualism. It portrays the person 
as an ‘open’ project. The person is formed and developed by his or her dialogues (or 
interactions) with others, each new exchange or encounter modifying what is already there. 
Far from being a descent into total relativity, the person begins to recognise him/herself, and 
to be recognised corporately by others, through his/her preferred and expected responses; 
and a personal character emerges in this interactive tension between individual and society 
which is reinforced cyclically over time. McFadyen describes this process of the formation of a 
person as ‘sedimentation’, as the ‘layers’ are laid down (although the layers are not immune to 
subsequent disturbance).  It is important to note that a person is not ‘fixed’, although s/he 
might be ‘predictable’: there is always the possibility of change and development. The model is 
a very hopeful one, and also one that fits comfortably with the central Christian narrative of 
resurrection and of its devolved narrative of metanoia. In terms of incorporating suffering as a 
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171 
 
meaningful experience within a life, this feature of transformation is a useful one that I link 
both to metaphor and to process.555  
McFadyen talks further in terms of call and response between persons in dialogue, and shows 
that dialogues may not be positive. If our dialogues are healthy, they will feed and build both 
ourselves and others; if they are distorted they will damage the persons engaged in them. It is 
possible to interpret aspects of suffering in this way, since suffering has a recognisable 
dimension of (i) being inflicted on the sufferer, and (ii) being inflated by other people – 
suffering is not just an internal experience.556  I have discussed Job’s interactions with his 
friends, and how their dialogues shape his experience of suffering, in Chapter 5.557 
McFadyen also identifies the constitutive dialogue for any human person as the one s/he holds 
with God, who calls us into being but allows us the freedom to respond (or not). This address 
of God to persons embraces the important transcendent dimension of life to which I 
frequently refer as a potential stumbling block in the modern search for meaning in suffering.  
God’s address to us is whole and undistorted, and the Trinity offers us a picture of true 
dialogical relationship, in which none of the Persons is diminished or exalted above the others.  
Being made in God’s image thus sets criteria for the way in which we dialogue with others.   
Although McFadyen is cautious about the use of natural theologies in The call to 
personhood,558 there are potentially many identifiable points of correspondence with process 
thought.  For example, McFadyen says ‘Personal identity is therefore only a temporary 
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 I wonder whether a dialogical notion of transformation of the person might be a helpful dimension 
within the process debate about the nature of immortality. Whiteheadian objective immortality suffers 
from the problem that bad as well as good experiences are preserved in God and, depending upon the 
particular person’s circumstances, might offer little hope in an eternal life which consists of 
immortalised bad experiences. Subjective immortality may respond to this difficulty but in its turn 
implies the existence of multiple contemporary identities of the same person within God (see the 
discussion between Griffin and Suchocki in Process Studies, 1989, 18 (1), 57ff). The McFadyen model 
(see Call, pp 73-74 and p 115) proposes that all experiences contribute to full personhood yet only 
proposes one evolving identity. Can these insights be linked? As in $5.5.4, I wonder whether it is the 
notion of an experience being ‘finished’ that is the issue with the original Whiteheadian notion of 
objective immortality (see Process p 45, in which Whitehead says that the final satisfaction of an entity 
is intolerant of any addition – although it contains potential for a new ‘becoming’). If experiences 
develop and decay (by prehension, concrescence and perishing) in an exponential fashion in the process 
model, then the influence of the experience after the point of satisfaction may approach zero and 
become infinitesimally small, but it never completely disappears. Thus the actual event tails into the 
future (and the past) and continues minutely to affect subsequent experiences/actual occasions. If one 
reflects on one’s own personal (traumatic) experiences (assuming that experience is valid!), these 
experiences do not seem to have a linear resolution. Rather there is a time of intense pain, followed by 
a period of decreasing pain, and finally a plateau of residual pain with which one lives, but one never 
completely forgets the pain or returns to the pre-traumatic state.        
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‘synthesis’ of the past which is open for future formation (information) through that history’s 
subsequent development or transformation.This may lead to a reinterpretation of the past as 
it is present in a sedimented identity and therefore, whether consciously or otherwise, in 
communication and relation too’.559 He goes on to talk about the importance of the future for 
redemption, ‘In addition to the more mundane sedimentation processes through which past 
relations push persons into an evolutionary future, God’s Word pulls persons into the divine 
future which so radically differs from the present that it seriously challenges our present 
identities, relations and social structures in the process’.560 Whitehead’s dynamic model of 
networked actual entities, which come into being and then die away after a transient 
existence, to be replaced by others, bears some resemblance to McFadyen’s view of the 
developing person with its transient stages as s/he is shaped dynamically by others. The divine 
lure of Whitehead is similar to the redemptive tug of McFadyen. The networked nature of 
reality is another common feature.  The inherent creativity of both models and the possibilities 
for change or metanoia are both exciting and reassuring. The value of dialogue for McFadyen, 
such that every encounter either builds up or erodes the personhood of the other, is paralleled 
by Whitehead’s desire that nothing be lost, but everything be held eternally within God. 
But perhaps the most fruitful correspondence for the purposes of this thesis is that both 
McFadyen’s personhood model and Whitehead’s process thought are natural allies for 
Ricoeur’s narrative philosophy.  This alliance is enhanced by the pastoral observation that 
dying people in the hospice (as a specific subset of suffering people) benefited from the use of 
narrative therapy – telling the stories of their lives in some manner (Chapter 4), and setting 
these stories within a broader framework of meaning.  
The hope is that to establish credible alternative models of reality and personhood, which 
share some important characteristics, can help us to think differently about suffering, but it is 
very important that in trying to address this existential pain we do not make sufferers feel that 
their experiences are dismissed or lessened, or that we suggest that suffering be ignored or 
denied.  Discomfort, disorientation, isolation, and dysfunction will all still be present. Finding 
meaning does not do away with any of these very real dimensions of suffering, or with the 
pastoral demands they generate.     
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 6.4 Contemporary responses to suffering 
By using the combined insights of process thinking, dialogical personhood, and narrative, I 
have tried to illuminate the conceptual problems that make it so difficult to discover meaning 
in our experiences of suffering in contemporary western society. In the UK since WWII, 
responses to suffering broadly fall into one of the following categories: 
(i) to develop a theodicy – I believe this approach (which is probably a minority position in view 
of the lack of formal religious observance in the total population) may be flawed if it is 
predicated upon a limited causal view of reality in which an impassible God is the ultimate 
source of good and evil;561 
(ii) to assert that God does not exist – this approach denies both the extensive world traditions 
of religious belief and the experiential foundation of belief in the transcendent: it fails to take 
spiritual  experience seriously; 
(iii) to assent to a formal belief in God but actually to behave as if God does not exist – this is 
probably a majority position and in practical effect differs little from (ii);  
(iv) to privatise and hide the suffering and to carry on as if it has not happened − this is a form 
of what Sölle calls apatheia, the inability to engage compassionately with the suffering of 
others or, indeed, oneself.  
None of these responses works creatively with the experience of suffering: each rejects it as an 
alien intrusion into normal life. The prevailing view562 is that suffering simply should not be and 
that we do not deserve it.  It seems to me vital that pastorally we attempt to break this 
impasse around suffering. The paradox is that suffering happens to everyone in the course of a 
life, but our culture is unwilling to accept that and to develop or use strategies or 
metanarratives in which suffering can be held and contained, and be allowed to evidence 
meaning.  Corporately we have colluded in the advance decision that suffering is a meaningless 
feature of the landscape of life, and therefore when it happens, we only experience it as 
meaningless, because it falls outside our parameters of meaning in a reductive and rationalistic 
liberal modernism.  
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 But it is possible to develop theodicies along (say) process lines and Fiddes does so in Creative 
suffering. The fact remains that theodicies can be blunt pastoral instruments (Hauerwas even describes 
theodicies as ‘parasitic’ strategies, see Hauerwas, God, suffering and medicine, pp 39-59), and should be 
used with great care lest they be seen to diminish the importance of the experience for the suffering 
person. Swinton (Raging with compassion) is also critical of theodicy, see especially chap 4. 
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 I can vouch for this anecdotally from working in the hospice. 
174 
 
It is my belief that not only is suffering a vehicle for the discovery of profound meaning, but 
that it presents a unique opportunity for the fulfilment of the project of personhood.563  
Counterculturally, this means that without suffering we cannot fully appropriate our humanity. 
Because this suggestion challenges our normal expectations, it is essential to illuminate and 
interrogate the worldview that underlies those expectations in order to support this claim 
about suffering. By using process insights (not hard theism) and relational personhood (not 
subjective autonomy) together with narrative thought, it is possible to suggest another basis 
for human being within which suffering is no longer an insult to our dreams and self-
actualisation, but (counterintuitively) the primary mechanism by which they are achieved. In 
other words, we are speaking of delivering the afflicted by their affliction (cf Job 36:15). 
 
6.5 Key features of a framework for thinking about suffering as meaningful 
From the analysis and discussion in Chapters 1−5, some key features can be identified for 
forming a framework in which suffering could be described as meaningful, as follows. 
6.5.1 Transcendent experience as a challenge to materialism 
In Chapters 1 and 2 I discussed the underlying dualism that characterises much popular 
thinking about the nature of religious belief.  In a reductionist and materialist culture it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to find ways to authenticate religious experience.  Because all 
experience is considered to be highly subjective it becomes impossible to quantify or prove. It 
is inaccessible to empirical scientific study, which is the cultural touchstone of authenticity. I 
noted ($1.1) that in the hospice, dying patients are confronted with the dilemma of straddling 
these two cultures: they are embracing a transcendent experience but have been equipped for 
life largely by the material world, which is suspicious of the transcendent and views death as 
the end of a person.  These patients occupy a liminal space, in which modern westerners feel 
estranged and for which they are poorly prepared (see $5.3). The same criteria apply to all 
people who are suffering in any way: although an explanation in causal or material terms may 
be available, there are many occasions when it is not. The lack of access to the transcendent 
dimensions of life leaves sufferers feeling that their experience has no meaning, no point: it 
cannot be explained. Even religious people have to exercise their faith in an unsympathetic 
culture and may struggle fully to incarnate their beliefs.    
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 I do not mean this in the weak sense of ‘character building’ but in a strong ontological sense. 
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In contrast, Whitehead considers experience to be a fundamental source of information about 
the nature of reality. Every experience is valuable and is given eternal significance in the form 
of objective immortality.564 In his final discussion of objective immortality in Process and 
reality, Whitehead portrays a reciprocal movement between the world and heaven: ‘the 
kingdom of heaven is with us today...What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in 
heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world...Throughout the perishing 
occasions in the life of each temporal Creature...is the transformation of Itself, everlasting in 
the Being of God. In this way, the insistent craving is justified...that zest for existence be 
refreshed by the ever-present, unfading importance of our immediate actions, which perish 
and yet live for evermore’.565 If we shift to Ricoeur, then his method is often described as 
‘phenomenological hermeneutics’: it is the interpretation of human experience.  Both 
philosophers – Whitehead and Ricoeur − seek a unity of all reality that can escape the 
restraints of dualistic western thinking.  Such a single reality allows us to address the 
difficulties which lead to the development of theodicies, particularly over the question of 
intervention by God: how can a spiritual being intervene in a material world?; how can God’s 
power be ‘manipulated’ by prayer?; how can God be the source both of good and of evil?            
6.5.2  Creativity and change as a challenge to unchanging perfection 
A second stumbling block for moderns is the innate dynamism of life. Although at one level we 
appear to embrace change, transience, and all that is new, at another we are deeply fearful, 
and this fear is reflected in our corporate avoidance of the liminal, the uncertain, the marginal. 
Our embedded Platonic worldview encourages us to think in terms of static eternal categories 
that are reflected in the world we see, and this influence affects us profoundly.  Newtonian 
science also operates on such static categories and has been highly successful at describing the 
world in which we live.566 Suffering (including the specific experience of dying) acts as a 
profound discontinuity and disturbs our ‘normality’, pushing us into the liminal space between 
our pre-suffering and post-suffering states. 
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 Objective immortality, as mentioned in fn 555, is the subject of debate. Some find the idea of 
objective immortality too static and fossilised to bear comparison to the Christian hope of resurrection 
and transformation through Christ. Although Whitehead insists on harmony – future occasions must be 
consonant with past and present occasions, which are themselves determinant of the future – perhaps 
it helps also to recall Ricoeur’s observation that the past is interpreted from the present, and that as 
interpreters we can impose coherence on events that might otherwise appear to be random and 
unconnected.  
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 Whitehead, Process, p 351. 
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 Whitehead says that this empirical stability and temporal-spatial order is characteristic of the current 
epoch, but might not be characteristic of every episode of existence. See Process and reality, pp 90ff. He 
believes that western philosophy has over-emphasised certain kinds of perception, giving priority to 
visual over visceral feelings (ibid, p 121ff).  
176 
 
Any explanation in which suffering is held to be meaningful will need to address this question 
of change.  The traditional view of God as impassible and unchanging almost certainly 
translates logically into a God who cannot share our suffering.  Fiddes567 argues that a God 
who does share our suffering must in some way also fully share the human inability to know 
the outcome of his/her suffering, which is partly what makes human suffering so serious, 
because we are very aware of our limitations. This problem leads Fiddes (after Hartshorne) to 
distinguish helpfully between the notions of God’s perfection and God’s completion, which 
latter allows for a dynamic relationship between God and the creature that can develop into 
the future.  If we do not address this dilemma, then God’s experience is that of an observer of 
suffering rather than as one who suffers with us – for part of the pain of suffering is the 
powerlessness of having it imposed upon us, being out of control. This insight is vitally 
important because it shows us why a worldview that upholds an interventionist model of God 
(a God who is ‘complete’ outside time and space but who can pop in and out of it as God 
wishes) subtly undermines the unity of the Trinity in the incarnation.568 We need a framework 
that is not constrained by a hidden notion of static perfection, if we are to regard suffering as 
anything other than an aberrant occurrence and to give it dignity and meaning. The three 
philosophers (Whitehead, Ricoeur and McFadyen) with whom I have engaged all offer some 
help here. 
The process thinking of Whitehead is based upon the proposed transience of all actual entities: 
‘things’ only appear to be solid and permanent because the process of change and renewal 
does not introduce any macroscopic variation that we can see.  For Whitehead, creativity is a 
fundamental category, and the increase of variety in the world is the mark of God. This variety 
has to include the potentialities (the ‘not yet’ elements) of life, which contribute to the whole 
and facilitate change. Furthermore, Whitehead’s insistence that God is always the ‘chief 
exemplification’ of all actual occasions (or entities) means that God participates fully in all 
experiences, good and bad. There is no division of spiritual and material in the stuff of reality.  
Ricoeur argues that reality is narrative in form: narrative is dynamic, relational, contextual, and 
temporal by nature.  Narrative is creative: new fields of meaning and understanding are 
introduced through the very nature of language itself, because hermeneutics is an open and 
contingent process.  
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 See The creative suffering of God, p 91, for a clear explanation. 
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 As typically (and not always helpfully) understood in the Philippian hymn, in which Christ ‘emptied 
himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human form...’ 
(Philippians 2:7).  
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McFadyen’s dialogical personhood allows for a narrative understanding of humanity, in which 
people are formed and shaped by their dialogues – dialogues being a subset of their narrative 
interactions with one another.  Once again, a person’s nature is not fixed but dynamic, and is 
always open to the possibility of development, renewal, and change.   
Suffering can thus be robustly validated as a dynamic and meaningful experience within these 
three frameworks. Such an understanding does not mean that it is necessarily a good or 
pleasant experience in and of itself, but that its interpretation must be handled with care. It is 
not interpretable within a ‘cause and consequence’ worldview (we are reminded that Ricoeur 
speaks of narrative as revelatory rather than explanatory).  
 
6.6 Metaphor, metanoia and ontological impertinence 
How can we address these necessary challenges of transcendence and change in a culture that 
is uncomfortable with these concepts?  It is here that I want to make use of Ricoeur’s 
suggestion that that reality is narrative in form. If he is right, then language may possess 
‘ultimate’ properties. I want to put forward the suggestion that metaphor, which has the key 
property of generating creative meaning in language, can offer us a possible basis for finding 
meaning in suffering. What metaphor does in a sentence may mirror what suffering does in a 
person’s life experience.  I have used the term ‘ontological impertinence’ to describe this 
aspect of suffering, adapting Ricoeur’s description of metaphor as ‘semantic impertinence’.     
Metaphor is an exciting aspect of language that offers us considerable possibilities as a vehicle 
for understanding suffering.  As discussed in $5.2.1, metaphor is able to contain great tension. 
It is both like and not like that to which it refers.  It is thus creative of new meaning, because it 
shocks us into re-assessing what we have previously assumed and then expanding our 
understanding beyond its earlier limits.  
These properties of metaphor are potentially very useful in dealing with suffering. A person 
who suffers can be thought of as occupying a liminal space – one that is transitional between 
two recognised states.  This liminality has many of the characters of metaphor. The person 
who suffers: 
(i) is both part of and not part of normal society − Cicely Saunders has written of the way in 
which the terminally ill are ostracised by those who are well, and how this compounds their 
pain (and there are similar observations for those experiencing bereavement);  
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(ii) struggles to exist in the material/spiritual dualism of modernism – the suffering experience 
cannot necessarily be named and described in a causal or material fashion, in which case it 
cannot be found meaningful without recourse to the transcendent or spiritual dimension of 
being – and the sufferer is caught between the two aspects of the duality; 
(iii) most importantly, both is and is not him/herself – s/he has to deal with an all-consuming 
experience of pain that disrupts his/her whole life, yet s/he is still the same person in the same 
social networks.569 
It is these tensions that lead me to suggest that metaphor could be a helpful analogy for 
suffering. Not only does it hold the tension of the sufferer’s liminal state, it also offers a way 
forward that is consonant with developing personhood.  
A liminal state is a transient and separated condition; after passing through it a person re-
enters society but with an altered status. For a suffering person this new status might be the 
satisfactory resolution of the suffering; it might be accepting and living with the suffering; it 
might be death. Any of these will resolve the psychospiritual pain that is so destructive; in all of 
them the suffering person is reabsorbed into pre-existing networks (if the person dies, s/he is 
still a social presence even if biologically dead, see $3.1.3).   
Vital for the argument is the fact that the person is not unchanged by the liminal experience 
(here, the suffering).  The liminal separation engendered by suffering gives the person space, 
just as in a rite of passage, to examine him/herself and reassess life in general as a result of the 
trials s/he has undergone.  There is a discontinuity, a shock, a profound ontological 
impertinence, attached to the experience.  This discontinuity allows something creative to 
occur and a new person, who is and is not the old person, can emerge.    
Theologically, we cannot separate this analysis from a consideration of metanoia in the NT 
sense. The Johannine expression is rebirth (John 3 and 1 John 5); while Paul refers to the 
‘renewal of the mind’ (Romans 12:2); the changing of clothes representing the new self 
(Ephesians 4:24); the old and new self (Colossians 3:9-10); and uses many other metaphors to 
describe the complete re-evaluation of reality that takes place in the light of the teaching 
ministry, crucifixion, and resurrection of Christ. This story of the incarnate God is 
comprehensively revelatory of human being and society: the fragmented and violent 
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 Further research might consider Ricoeur’s ipse and idem identities here. The idem identity is an 
abstract sameness and refers to how a person appears to others; the ipse identity (narrative identity) is 
about self-sameness (or self-constancy) and can accommodate change and development over a lifetime. 
It would be interesting to think further about the ipse and idem identities as the locations of ontological 
impertinence, and to link it with a consideration of Liebert’s (Jungian) stages of spiritual development 
and possibilities for the pastoral use of Ignatian spirituality. Liebert, Changing life patterns.   
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tendencies of human nature are exposed through the terrible consequences of the betrayal, 
trial and execution of Jesus the innocent victim. In the light of this shocking discontinuity we 
have to re-evaluate who we are, what is important, and how we should live with this new 
experience behind us. Sallie McFague describes Jesus as the parable of God par excellence, and 
indeed he is.  
The NT witnesses were forced into a re-evaluation of the being of Jesus in the light of the 
crucifixion and resurrection, and came to a new understanding of who he was, and of the 
nature of God.  On the cross Jesus’s cry of desolation (‘My God, why have you forsaken me?’) 
indicates a desperate questioning of his relationship with the Father as their mutual life-giving 
dialogue is terminated. This is the most extreme and shocking suffering: isolation, silence, 
physical pain, and most certainly not what we would expect in God’s experience based upon 
the categories of hard radical monotheism. The crucifixion is indeed total pain, and penetrates 
to the heart of the Trinity. In the incarnation Jesus ‘had to become like his brothers and sisters 
in every respect...Because he himself was tested by what he suffered, he is able to help those 
who are being tested’ (Hebrews 2: 17-18). In the life of Jesus, suffering is revelatory of the 
nature of reality but it is also ontologically impertinent: it is not as we think it should be. 
Holding that human beings are made in the image of God means that this kind of shocking 
suffering experience can also precipitate a re-evaluation within us, which has the potential for 
metanoia (noting always that we are never forced into belief, and that we are free to resist the 
creative possibilities of ontological impertinence).  Indeed, if a person is constituted by 
dynamic processes of change, as McFadyen argues (and which also satisfies a process analysis), 
then perhaps metanoia is the very essence of life itself? If we stop changing and growing and 
responding, then do we also stop living? In small (or big) ways, do we continually need the 
shock of the new encounter to develop, change and grow into fuller personhood?570 From this 
basis we can see the truth of the wisdom that every small loss in life prepares us for the bigger 
losses of bereavement and death.  
In 1 Corinthians 1: 27-28 we read that ‘God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the 
wise; God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong; God chose what is low and 
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 An interesting associated question for further research might be to use these arguments to consider 
the possible nature of the life to come: Sheldrake (Befriending our desires, pp 107-110) suggests that we 
will still experience change and growth after death, because we are created with an inner desire for 
God; and we can never exhaust the possibilities of God. Sheldrake suggests that ‘God has no shoreline’. 
Once again, the potentialities of Whitehead are present, and the hymn to love from I Corinthians 13 
springs to mind: ‘when perfection comes, the imperfect disappears...Now we see but a poor reflection; 
then we shall see face to face. Now I know in part; then shall I know fully, even as I am fully known’. 
Once again, the way in which we define ‘perfect’ is of course important: we do not need to understand 
it as complete or finished, but rather as totally self-consistent in love.  
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despised in the world, things that are not, to reduce to nothing things that are’. These kingdom 
values are contrary to the values of the consumer society and are the things that we might in 
the West categorise as suffering (or at least, deprivation). Yet these very things are biblically, 
and in the teaching of Jesus, the marks of metanoia. Our minds are changed; we have re-
evaluated life, and emerged as the same persons, but having appropriated the shock and 
tension in a creative development of the human being that could have taken place in no other 
way. The reference to the ‘things that are not’ resonates with the potentialities of Whitehead; 
the ‘not-yet-ness’ of reality which drives change and creativity. 
Even if metanoia occurs, the meaning of the suffering may still not be obvious to the sufferer 
in the manner of an explanation. However, the process of liminal transformation removes a 
person temporarily from the purely material and rational milieu of ‘normal’ modern life and 
puts that person in touch with another dimension of existence: the transcendent. In this way 
the experience triggers awareness in the person of a context (the transcendent) within which 
their immediate life story is situated. The hope of meaning is thus ignited, even though the 
precise nature of that meaning may still be elusive. Knowing about the existence of the bigger 
picture is enough to begin an interpretation at some level, and then meaning is guaranteed to 
follow, although it may take time to absorb it.571  Anxieties may be raised here about 
encouraging a fatalistic attitude in religious believers, but such fatalism is not characteristic of 
healthy developing personhood (fatalism is static rather than dynamic, monologically receptive 
rather than dialogically active in the creation of meaning), and is quite different from faith, 
which is ‘the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen’ (Hebrews 11: 1).   
We are returned to reflecting on the search for the meaning of suffering in a culture that prizes 
reductionist explanation.  In Job we see that God is clearly identified as the source of the 
suffering of Job and also its cessation. God is the cause and effect as far as the OT writer is 
concerned: but within the ancient worldview of radical monotheism this did not detract from 
the ‘God-ness’ of God. It was neither a trigger for unbelief nor for an ‘heretical’ questioning of 
God’s abilities as a deity. In the NT the major discontinuity is that the suffering happens to 
God, rather than to others at God’s behest.  The God concept itself is subjected to ontological 
impertinence between the OT and the NT, a shocking challenge that causes believers to re-
evaluate their beliefs about God.  Thus if we believe that we are made in God’s image, we 
come to the unavoidable conclusion that a human person is actually defined by suffering after 
the NT revelation of God in Christ. Our modern society has instead made a causal scientific 
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worldview into an idolatrous ultimate,572 but it is an ultimate that cannot address the question: 
‘Why me?’.    
 
6.7  Pastoral practice 
My initial interest in this whole area came from working in a hospice with patients who 
constantly asked ‘Why me?’, and who alongside that distress found life narrative a helpful 
therapeutic tool.  I would like briefly to indicate some pastoral dimensions to the work I have 
done in this thesis. 
6.7.1 Practical application 
I have already expressed dissatisfaction with the too-ready use of theodicies. To someone who 
is suffering, theodicies seem like arguments for the sake of it; one’s distress is not relieved by 
the bare academic justification of God (as Job realised).  Furthermore, I have suggested (and 
found it confirmed in experience!) that a theodicy is often an inappropriate response to 
suffering. Suffering is complex, contextual, and frequently resists rationalisation. A theodicy 
can seem like a dry and insensitive distillation of events that bypasses the sufferer’s human 
pain and dignity. Furthermore, a theodicy cements the underlying sense of suffering as an 
alien attack on human life, an experience that really should not be. I hope that I have shown 
that suffering is an essential part of growing in our personhood. Thus, as pastors, we need to 
accept the experience of suffering as the starting point for reflection, rather than seeking an 
explanation to ‘get rid’ of it. 
The use of life storytelling as a therapeutic method was discussed in Chapter 4, and 
undergirded by discussion of narrative theory in Chapters 4 and 5. It is clear that this method 
works as an end of life strategy in helping patients to come to terms with dying (if there is 
time), by placing the story in a bigger context and by lending it coherence and order.  
The narrative therapeutic methods employed by art and music therapists, or in simpler 
approaches such as making a memory box or life book, or even in writing letters to loved ones 
before dying, are effective if they can be used when someone is terminally ill. Yet modern 
westerners are uncomfortable with the liminal state, with the ‘failure’ of dying (especially 
when thought to be too young), and even with the practice of reflecting on one’s own story 
                                                          
572
 This remark is not intended to be critical of science per se, but of the tendency of society to idolise 
the scientific process. See Maxwell, Cutting God in half, passim.   
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because of the dearth of active religious observance.573   What can pastors do to help people 
to deal with the crisis experiences that may drive metanoia?   
Here I would like to return briefly to the idea of pilgrimage, addressed in $5.3.3. I discussed 
Turner’s view of pilgrimage as liminoid and my own view that it can be truly liminal if taken 
contextually as a picture of the journey of life. I think that Turner may be discussing a limited 
view of pilgrimage understood as a finite physical journey (say, going to Walsingham), which 
would be completely appropriate to his discussion of rites of passage. However, there is also a 
different way of thinking of pilgrimage, in which it is understood as a microcosm of the journey 
of life itself.  A (physical) pilgrimage offers a significant opportunity to reflect on one’s life 
pilgrimage, and particularly gives a separate space (liminal) in which to absorb the effects of 
ontological impertinence.  There is no better argument for encouraging experiences of retreat 
and of developing prayer as people meet challenges in life.574  
I would like to mention the particular experience of using a labyrinth in the hospice setting. I 
have mentioned the phenomenon of decathesis in the terminally ill, in which the cone of 
awareness of the patient (the sphere of active engagement) shrinks and focuses down as the 
person’s ability to deal with others is reduced and finally becomes the task of dying, which has 
to be done alone but hopefully in the company of a liminal guide − a particular type of 
pilgrimage, into the transcendent space of death.  
Labyrinths give an opportunity to make a pilgrimage without leaving home. They are set out on 
the floors on churches or in the open air and allow people to walk and think.  Lizzie Hopthrow, 
chaplain at The Pilgrims Hospice in Canterbury, became interested in the labyrinth and made a 
temporary one at her hospice, which was so effective with dying and bereaved persons that 
the hospice now has a permanent labyrinth.575 The labyrinth encourages one to set one’s 
particular journey of life within a transcendent context. This kind of spiritual tool is not difficult 
to use and often appeals to people who find mental prayer difficult. 
All these therapeutic practices accept the human experience as a valid starting point and then 
encourage its absorption into the story of the person’s life, rather than attempting primarily to 
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 Arguably the observed effect that religious people live ‘happier’ lives could be the result of the 
practice of reflection on one’s life, common to most religions.  
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 Noting the insights of Liebert and Jung, that stages of life need to be passed though on the way to 
maturity; yet suffering can speed this journey along. One can be mature at 15 or childish at 50.  
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 See the article published in the FT on 8 May 2010 at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/094bdd9a-571e-
11df-aaff-00144feab49a.html, last accessed 1526h on 15 July 2010. 
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explain why God has allowed this suffering to occur. There are serious implications, of course, 
for the healing ministry as traditionally understood.576  
6.7.2. A warning: meaning or signification? 
Many people are deeply offended by the suggestion that all suffering can have meaning, 
especially when that suffering is intractable and cannot be ascribed to any source. Clearly a 
strategy that is pastorally insensitive, even if it is theoretically correct, is not much use. In The 
rule of metaphor, Ricoeur argues that meaning as what we understand, think and feel ; while 
signification is that to which the sentence points. Are we really talking only about signification, 
and is that concept so intangible that it is no use? What might it mean here?  
I am happy to apply Ricoeur’s suggestions to my discussion as follows. The meaning of 
suffering is not, as I have discussed, explanatory or causal.  Suffering is also highly contextual 
with respect to the personality of the one who suffers. Something that is painful for me may 
not be a problem to you. Suffering very much takes place within a life story, a narrative; it is 
not an abstract experience.  How then can we think of what it means?  
Sölle suggests not a definition but some characteristics of suffering. These included a sense of 
isolation, a sense of oppression (it is often imposed upon us rather than chosen), and a sense 
of loss of control. All these characteristics have (for us) to be interpreted within late 
modernism, in which the individual is conceived as the rational autonomous subject.  In the 
hospice, the worst experience for many people was perceived as their loss of dignity, which 
registered much more highly as an anxiety than pain or even death.  I argue that this 
perception is culturally conditioned and contextual. In asserting such I do not mean that the 
indignity (or whatever other phenomenon we focus on) is not really suffering. Rather, it means 
that it is a source of (total) pain in this time and place and culture.  There are almost certainly 
aspects of the experience that will be painful in any setting, but we cannot easily separate 
these from one another. It is a complex phenomenon.577  
This analysis tells us not that meaning is absent, but rather that the meaning of the suffering 
challenges the things in which we normally find purpose and value.  What we understand, 
think and feel as a result of the suffering (analogously to Ricoeur’s metaphor) is that the 
‘normal’ parameters of life have been stretched for us. In particular, our sense of personhood 
is extended by suffering, because we are ‘normally’ conditioned to work with an operative 
view of the person that is culturally conceived as static and as perfect as possible. However, 
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 Some of which are explored in S. Nelson, A thousand crucifixions, with respect to long-term disability. 
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 See the discussion of total pain in Chapter 1. 
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our ‘normal’ assumptions are not an absolute measure of anything. Our challenge is to see 
things differently – and here the suggestion of suffering as ontologically impertinent comes 
into its own.  Our view of life is drastically interrupted and we have to refocus, re-evaluate.   
What about signification? To what does the suffering point? I gave some space in Chapter 5 to 
exploring the transcendent dimension of suffering: how being in a liminal place (which has the 
metaphorical characteristics of ‘is and is not’) puts us into more intimate conscious contact 
with the transcendent dimension of life – acting as a bridge between human and cosmic time. 
The conceptual dualism and categorisation of modern life is unpicked by the experience of 
suffering. If we have access to the story of the crucifixion then we can begin to appropriate the 
reality of that for ourselves: the divine/human nature of Jesus points to a liminal (or threshold) 
reality that is obscure to us much of the time, yet if made in his image this is the reality for 
which we hope for ourselves. Furthermore, there is more than a suggestion in the story of 
Jesus that in suffering a human person truly discovers his/her personhood, because of the 
revelatory nature of the ontological impertinence.   I believe this to be the sense of Kitamori’s 
assertion that we can only find meaning in our pain if it testifies to the pain of God (revealed 
perfectly in Christ).  We can find this revelatory process of impertinence elsewhere. In our 
prayer experience we might speak of the ‘dark night’ in which we ‘lose’ God.  John of the 
Cross, in his classical analysis of prayer, does not present this dark experience as a negative 
one, but as a necessary stage for those who are serious in their search for God.  In the ‘losing’ 
we are committed to the abandonment of our previous expectations and images, and a re-
evaluation must take place, such that God is and is not as we previously thought God to be.  
This darkness constitutes the only way in which our prayer relationship can grow: otherwise it 
becomes static and ultimately useless to us.     
Thus I do not think that we can divide meaning from signification in this discussion of suffering, 
because that capitulates to the unhelpful dualism that I have been trying to address through 
questions about the nature of reality. We cannot have the transcendent dimension without 
the material, or vice versa. Both are necessary to realise our full personhood; but without the 
ontologically impertinent experience we might never be able to undergo the process of 
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